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The Impact of Elections on Democratization in Libya

DEMOCRATIC ARAB CENTER GERMANY: BERLIN



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The Impact of Elections on Democratization in Libya
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Abstract

This book aims to answer some crucial questions: How and why is democratization in Libya deteriorating despite the accountable and transparent elections in 2012 and 2014? What are the essential environmental factors affecting democratization in Libya post-Kaddafi? How to measure the impact of elections, the functioning of government, political culture and participation, and civil liberties on democratization in Libya since 2010?

Although Libya was a constitutional monarch (1952-1969), it also witnessed a dictatorship regime for over forty years (1969-2011). However, the Interim Constitutional Declaration announced a democratic road map for Libya since the early years of the February Revolution of 2011. Thus, the 2012 parliamentary election was successful, and the country recorded medium scores according to Democracy Index Reports in 2012-2015. Since 2015, Libya has witnessed a democratic setback due to delayed elections, elite fraction, and external intervention. Due to the available data, this book examines the impact of five independent variables on democratization and finds out that the functioning of government, delayed elections, and civil liberties are the most correlated to the deteriorating democracy in Libya since 2015.

Furthermore, examining the effect of political culture and participation on democracy showed less influence; thus, the correlation coefficients with democratization were less than (0.50). Many democratic countries have low turnout and disappointment towards politics; the Libyan case is no exception. This study does not claim its results are conclusive, but it is a primary attempt to conduct an empirical, quantitative-qualitative study for an urgent Libyan dilemma since 2014. Thus, further scientific researchers are required in this regard regardless of the theoretical framework of writers. Accordingly, this book is divided into an introduction and a conclusion, three chapters on democratization, elections, and other explanatory variables, and their impact on democracy in Libya since 2010.

الملخص

إن هذا الكتاب يهدف إلى الإجابة عن بعض الأسئلة الملحة لاسيما الاسئلة التالية: كيف ولماذا تتدهور الديمقراطية في ليبيا على الرغم من إجراء انتخابات مسؤولة وشفافة في عامي 2012 و 2014؟ ما هي العوامل البيئية الأساسية التي تؤثر في عملية التحول الديمقراطي في ليبيا ما بعد القذافي؟ وكيف يتم قياس تأثير الانتخابات، وأداء الحكومة (حكومتي الانقاذ الوطني والوحدة الوطنية)، والثقافة السياسية، والمشاركة السياسية، والحريات المدنية على التحول الديمقراطي في ليبيا منذ عام 2010؟

وعلى الرغم من أن ليبيا كانت ملكية دستورية خلال الفترة (1952-1969)، إلا أنها قد شهدت أيضًا نظامًا ديكتاتوريًا لأكثر من أربعين عامًا (1969-2011). ومع ذلك فإن الإعلان الدستوري المؤقت حدد خارطة طريق للديمقراطية في ليبيا ما بعد القذافي منذ السنوات الأولى لثورة فبراير 2011. وهكذا، كانت الانتخابات البرلمانية لعام 2012 ناجحة بكل المقاييس، وسجلت البلاد درجات متوسطة وفقًا لتقارير مؤشر الديمقراطية في 2012-2015. لكن منذ عام 2015، شهدت ليبيا انتكاسة ديمقراطية بسبب الانتخابات المتأخرة، وانقسام النخب السياسية، والتدخل الخارجي. وتمشيا مع البيانات المتاحة، يبحث هذا الكتاب في تأثير خمسة متغيرات مستقلة على التحول الديمقراطي ويتوصل الي نتائج مفادها أن أداء الحكومة، والانتخابات المتأخرة، وانتهاك الحريات المدنية هي الأكثر ارتباطاً بتدهور الديمقراطية في ليبيا منذ عام 2015.

وعلاوة على ذلك، أظهر التحليل الاحصائي للبيانات عدم تأثير متغيري الثقافة السياسية والمشاركة السياسية على الديمقراطية بنفس كيفية المتغيرات الثلاثة الاولى؛ وبالتالي فلقد كانت معاملات الارتباط بالديمقراطية أقل من (0.50). إن العديد من الدول الديمقراطية لديها نسبة مشاركة منخفضة وإحباط تجاه الانتخابات والسياسة ومع هذا تصنف بأنها ديمقراطية وفقا لبيانات تقرير دليل الديمقراطية، وبالتالي فإن الحالة الليبية ليست استثناء لذلك.

ولا ندعي في هذا الكتاب بأي حال من الأحوال أن نتائجه نهائية وقاطعة، ولكنها تعتبر محاولة أولية لإجراء دراسة امبيريقية وكمية وكيفية لمعضلة ليبية ملحة منذ عام 2014. عليه، فإن الحاجة قد تذبذ ملحّة إلى مزيد من البحث العلمي في هذا الصدد بغض النظر عن الإطار النظري للمنخرطين في العملية البحثية. وينقسم هذا الكتاب عموماً إلى مقدمة، وفصل عن التحول الديمقراطي، وفصل ثاني عن الانتخابات وبقية المتغيرات التفسيرية الأخرى، وفصل ثالث عن تأثير هذه المتغيرات المستقلة الخمسة على الديمقراطية في ليبيا منذ عام 2010، وخاتمة تتضمن نتائج الكتاب.

Preface

This book examines the impact of elections and other independent variables on democratization in Libya post-Kaddafi era. It argues that elections have had a mixed impact on the country's democratic transition. On the one hand, they have helped to legitimize the new government and provide a platform for political participation. On the other hand, they have also been divisive, leading to political instability.

The book is divided into three chapters. The first one provides an overview of the political history of democracy in Libya since its independence in December 1951. The second part examines the role of elections and other independent variables in the post-Kaddafi period. The third part discusses the impact of elections and other explanatory variables on Libya's democratic transition. This book is based on extensive research, including interviews with Libyan politicians, activists, and journalists. It is essential to understand Libya's complex and challenging democratization process.

We are grateful to everyone who helped in any way while writing and collecting the data for this book. We are incredibly grateful to *the Democratic Arab Center* in Berlin for publishing this book in a PDF format. We are also indebted to *Bard google.com* for their help drafting the book manuscript. Bard's feedback helped us to improve the clarity, organization, and persuasiveness of our writing. Moreover, we are writing to express our sincere gratitude to *the Grammarly website* for help editing our book, identifying and correcting grammatical errors, and suggesting more concise and compelling writing.

Special thanks also go to the teams who collected the data from the *Democracy and Fragile States Indexes Reports*, which are the primary data sources of this book. We would also like to thank the many Libyan colleagues, politicians, activists, and journalists who shared their insights and experiences with us. Without their help, this book would not have been possible.

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Introduction:

Libya has held three primaries general and several sub-national elections since the overthrow of Kaddafi in 2011. Firstly, there was the first Libyan general election, which was held on July 24, 2012. The General National Congress “GNC” was elected in this election. Secondly, the second Libyan general election was held on June 25, 2014. The House of Representatives “HoRs” of Libya was elected in this election. The Interim Constitutional Committee, “ICC” in Libya, was also elected by popular vote in 2014. The committee comprised 60 members, with each of the three known regions of Libya (Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan) electing 20 members. The elections were held in 2014, but voter turnout could have been much higher. The ICC was chaired by Ali Tarhouni, a former Finance minister of Libya, in 2011-2012.

The committee submitted its draft constitution to the GNC in 2015. The GNC did not approve the draft constitution, and the country remained without one for several years. The Interim Constitutional Committee was controversial, and its work was often criticized. Some critics argued that the committee did not represent the Libyan people and that its draft constitution was not in the country's best interests. Others argued that the committee needed more time to complete its work.

The election of the ICC was a significant step forward in Libya's transition to democracy. The diverse committee represents Libya's different regions and political factions. The committee's work is essential to creating a new constitution for Libya to unite the country and provide a foundation for peace and stability. The following general elections in Libya will be held in late 2023-2024. However, it is still being determined if these elections will be held, as there is still a great deal of political instability in Libya.

In addition to these three central general elections, Libya has also held several sub-national elections, including the 2013 Libyan municipal elections, which were held on May 19, 2013, and the 2014 Libyan local council elections, which were held on October 31, 2014. Other sub-national elections were held in Libya post-Kaddafi. The elections of 2019 were held in most of Libya's districts. However, they were boycotted by many political factions, especially in the Eastern region of Libya ruled by Hafter; thus, they were marred by some violence and irregularities. These sub-national elections were a step towards national reconciliation and stability



in Libya. However, the political situation in the country remains volatile, and it is still being determined when or if further sub-national elections will be held.

The most recent sub-national election in Libya was the 2021 Libyan municipal elections. These elections were held on December 10, 2021, and were Libya's latest municipal elections. The elections of 2021 also were marred by violence and technical problems, but they were nonetheless seen as a step forward in Libya's democratic transition. The elections were held for the 274 municipalities in Libya. The turnout was estimated to be around 50%. The results of the elections were subject to controversy. The Libyan National Movement (LNM) and the Justice and Construction Party (JCP) accused the National Unity Government NUG of rigging the elections. The National Unity Government (NUG) denied these accusations, but the controversy postponed the parliamentary elections, initially scheduled for January 2022. The 2021 Libyan municipal elections were a significant step forward in Libya's democratic transition. However, they also highlighted the country's challenges in its quest for stability and peace.

Thus, Libya faces some challenges in holding sub-national elections: Political instability, insecurity, and lack of trust among the political elites. Despite these obstacles, the United Nations and other international organizations continue working with the Libyan authorities to hold sub-national elections in the future. These elections are essential for building a more stable and democratic Libya.

Literature review

The literature review indicates that there is some interest in the topics of democracy and its relation to elections. For example, Samuel Huntington (1991) and Larry Diamond (1992) are among the leading scholars on democracy and elections in a transitional society, and their writing has been published in various scholarly journals and books. While Huntington mentioned the beginning of the democratic third wave on the one hand, Diamond reconsidered it on the other. However, both scholars did not focus on democratization in the Arab countries.¹

¹ - As developed by Huntington, the democratic third wave is the historic democratic transitions in Latin America in the 1980s, Asia-Pacific countries, Eastern Europe in the late 1990s, and sub-Saharan Africa, beginning in the late 1980s. In this regard, one might ask: Is democratization in Libya and other Arab countries a fourth wave of democracy in the new millennium?



Other scholars wrote on democracy and elections in general and Western societies in particular. Arend Lijphart's (2008) contributions to electoral systems and democratic stability are considered to be seminal. Adam Przeworski (2001) is known for his work on democratic institutions and economic development. John Zaller is also an American political scientist known for his work on public opinion and political communication. His book "The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion" is considered to be a classic in the field of political science. (See Zaller, 2016)

These are just a few examples of scholars contributing to the election literature. Elections studies are vast and complex, with many perspectives on the issues involved. The scholars mentioned above are just a few who have made significant contributions to this field. The literature on democracy can be related to Libya's democratization in many ways. (See Randall, 2015; and Anderson, 2013)

1. One of the critical elements of democracy is the frequency of holding free and accountable elections. In Libya, the first democratic elections were held in 2012. However, these elections occasionally were marred by violence and irregularities. In the years since there have been further elections, they have yet to be universally accepted as free and fair. The lack of free and fair elections has significantly hindered Libya's democratization.
2. Another critical element of democracy is the existence of strong institutions. These institutions must be able to uphold the rule of law and protect human rights. In Libya, the state institutions need to be stronger and more cohesive. They have made it difficult to govern the country and contributed to Libya's instability since the 2011 revolution.
3. Civil society is a vital part of any democracy. It is made up of organizations and groups that are independent of the state and that work to promote the interests of citizens. In Libya, civil society is still in its early stages of development. Thus, civil society has made it difficult to hold the government accountable and promote democratic values.
4. Libya's transition to democracy is a complex and challenging process. The international community can be essential in supporting Libya's efforts to build a democratic state. This support can take some forms,

including providing financial aid, training for government officials, and promoting human rights.

5. Identify the key factors necessary for successful democratization. These factors include free and independent media, a robust civil society, and a commitment to the rule of law.
6. The literature can also help to identify the challenges that Libya faces in its transition to democracy. These challenges include the legacy of the Kaddafi regime, the lack of trust in government institutions, and the threat of armed groups.
7. The literature can guide how to address these challenges. For example, the literature suggests that it is crucial to build strong democratic institutions, promote human rights, and support civil society organizations.

In short, a literature review reveals that democracy requires a compatible set of values systems, particularly economic development, and political legitimacy, to endure. (See Lipset, 1959; Almond and Verba, 1963 and 1980) As far as democracy is concerned, it may be emphasized that Islam does not contradict democracy. Thus, rather than Islam, traditions and customs have hindered Islamic countries from transferring to democracy. In a distinctive study, Tessler (2002) has concluded, "Islam and democracy are incompatible."

The lack of empirical studies regarding democratic processes in the Arab world is mainly due to the dominance of dictatorship regimes and the spread of political development crises (See Huntington, 1971). In a unique study, Moreno (2002) found out that the prevailing political culture in Mexico reflected low levels of support for democracy, interpersonal trust, and intolerance versus high levels of support for the non-democratic government and strongly stressed deference. (Moreno 2002)

As far as Libya is concerned, a history review reveals that Libya was a constitutional monarchy from 1951-1969 and a dictatorship regime from 1969-2011. Therefore, many Libyans have known both types of governance in the last six decades. The interactive dynamic of religion, tribalism, oil, and ideology shaped and affected the past political processes, and they expect to do so in the future. (See in this regard, Sawani, 2012, pp. 1-26) The democratic transition that Libya is enjoying in the post-Kaddafi era is generally the first step in a long journey towards democracy; thus, government and people alike will face tremendous problems. Nevertheless,

a review of democratic transition processes in Libya is a prerequisite; therefore, we will follow up on the steps adopted by the Libyan roadmap toward democracy emphasized by the Interim Constitutional Declaration 2011.

Thus, Libya has a long history of political instability, and democracy has been elusive. The country has experienced periods of democracy, but these have been short-lived. As we noticed earlier, the first time Libya had a democratic government was in the Kingdom era, which lasted from 1951 to 1969. During this time, Libya was a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral legislature. The king, Idris al-Sanusi, was the head of state but shared power with the prime minister and the legislature. The Kingdom era was a time of relative peace and stability for Libya. However, the government was not always democratic. The king had the power to dissolve the legislature and appoint the prime minister. He also had the power to veto laws passed by the legislature.

In 1969, Kaddafi's military coup overthrew the monarchy and established a new government. Kaddafi called his new government the Libyan Arab Republic. The Libyan Arab Republic was a totalitarian state. Kaddafi was the country's supreme leader, and he had absolute power. He ruled through a system of secret police and military courts. There was no freedom of speech or assembly, and political dissent was not tolerated. (See Sawani, 2020) Kaddafi's government was responsible for human rights abuses, including torture, arbitrary detention, and extrajudicial killings. The country was also involved in some international conflicts, including the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988.

Libya, along with other Arab Spring countries, e.g., Tunisia, has experienced a tumultuous transition to democracy in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings. While there have been some advances in terms of democratic reforms, Libya remains a fragile state facing many challenges. One of the critical differences between Libya and other Arab Spring countries is the level of political instability. Libya has been plagued by violence and political infighting since the fall of Kaddafi. It has made it difficult to establish a stable government and implement democratic reforms. Another difference is the role of armed groups. Armed groups have played a significant role in the political process in Libya. These groups have been responsible for violence and human rights abuses, hindering the transition to democracy.

In contrast, other Arab Spring countries, such as Tunisia, have been able to make more progress in terms of democratic reforms. These countries have held relatively peaceful elections and have established functioning governments. However, they still face challenges like economic hardship and social unrest. Some other studies discuss the challenges and opportunities that elections present for the country's democratic transition. They also offer some recommendations for improving the electoral process in Libya. (See Masoud, 2021; Lacher, 2018; Grigoriadis & Kassem, 2021; and International Crisis Group, 2020)

Data and Methodology:

Thus, several methods can be used to study the impact of elections and other explanatory variables on democracy in Libya. Some of the most common methods include:

- There are qualitative methods that involve collecting and analyzing data in a non-numerical way. It can be done through interviews, focus groups, and participant observation. Qualitative methods may be used to explore the lived experiences of people in Libya and to understand how they perceive the impact of elections on democracy.
- There are also quantitative methods, which involve collecting and analyzing data numerically. They can be done through surveys, polls, collective data, and statistical analysis. Quantitative methods may be used to measure the impact of elections on democracy in Libya, such as by tracking changes in public opinion or by measuring the impact of external intervention on democratization.
- Various methods involve combining qualitative and quantitative methods. They can be a helpful way to get a more complete picture of the impact of elections on democracy in Libya. For example, a mixed methods study might involve interviewing people in Libya and then using the data from the interviews to develop a survey.

The best method to study the impact of elections on democracy in Libya will depend on the specific research questions being asked. (e.g., how and why are Libya's elections and other environmental factors delayed democratization?) However, all the methods listed above can be used to provide valuable insights into this topic. In addition to the methods listed, many other factors should be considered when studying the impact of elections on democracy in Libya. These factors include: (See Winer, 2019)

1. The political context in Libya is constantly changing, which can significantly affect elections and democracy simultaneously. For example, suppose the country is experiencing a period of political instability. In that case, the impact of elections may be different than if the country is experiencing a period of relative stability, e.g., Tunisia.
2. The economic sector in Libya is also essential to consider. If the economy is in a state of decline, this can make it more difficult for democracy to take root. For example, suppose people face economic crises, such as liquidity and food and gas shortages. In that case, they may be less likely to be interested in participating in the political process.
3. The social milieu in Libya is also another important to consider. If there is a lot of social division and conflict, this can make it more difficult for democracy to take root. For example, if there is much sectarian violence, it can be difficult for people from different groups to trust each other and work together to build a democratic society.
4. A stable and secure environment is essential for the development of democracy. If the country is experiencing high levels of violence or instability, it will be challenging to establish a functioning democratic system.
5. A strong economy can provide a foundation for democracy by giving people the resources to participate in politics. If the economy is weak or in decline, it can be more difficult for people to afford to participate in politics or to hold their leaders accountable.
6. A society divided along religious, ethnic, regional, or tribal lines will be more difficult to govern democratically. People need to trust each other and, if they have different priorities, build consensus and make decisions that are in the best interests of the country as a whole.
7. The role of external powers, such as regional and global states or international organizations, can play a significant role in supporting or undermining democracy in Libya. If external actors are willing to provide support for democratic institutions and processes, it can help to strengthen democracy in the country. However, if external actors try to promote their interests or destabilize the country, it can make it more challenging to build a functioning democracy.

These are just some of the most important factors that could affect democracy in Libya. The relative signify of these factors will vary

depending on the country's specific circumstances. However, by understanding these factors, it is possible to identify some of the challenges that Libya faces in its democratic transition and to develop strategies for addressing these obstacles. In short, this book aims to answer some crucial questions: How and why is democratization in Libya deteriorating despite the accountable and transparent elections in 2012 and 2014? What are the essential environmental factors affecting democratization in Libya post-Kaddafi? How to measure the impact of elections, the functioning of government, political culture and participation, and civil liberties on democratization in Libya since 2010?

Nevertheless, the importance of this study is to examine the impact of many independent variables on democratization. The data of this book examines the impact of delayed elections, political participation, political culture, the functioning of government, and civil liberties on democratization in Libya since 2011. The published data by the Democracy Index Reports is one primary source to focus on such independent variables. Thus, we can examine such impact empirically and quantitatively due to the following reasons:

1. Delayed elections: Libya still has to hold a national election since 2014. The delayed elections have made it difficult for the Libyan people to express their will and choose their leaders. It has also created a power vacuum filled by armed militias and non-state actors.
2. Political participation: Political participation in Libya has been hindered by several factors, including the ongoing conflict, the lack of trust in political institutions, and the moderate illiteracy rate. In addition, the political landscape is fragmented, with many political parties and groups vying for power. Libyan political participation has made it difficult to build consensus and move forward with the democratic process.
3. Political culture: Libya has a long history of authoritarian rule, leaving a legacy of mistrust and suspicion of the government. Political culture has made building a culture of tolerance and respect for the rule of law difficult. In addition, the rise of armed militias has further undermined the rule of law and made it difficult for the government to function effectively.
4. The functioning of government: The Libyan government has been weak and ineffective since 2011. The poor functioning of government is partly due to the country's political divisions, the lack of resources, and the interference of foreign powers. The government has been

unable to provide essential services to the people and has struggled to maintain law and order.

5. Civil liberties: Civil liberties have been under attack in Libya since 2011. Rights to assembly and freedoms are also restricted in Libya post-Kaddafi. In addition, there have been reports of arbitrary detentions, torture, and other human rights abuses.

Figure 1 assumes that five independent variables affect democratization, and Libya is no exception. However, this study's methodological limitation is examining the impact of delayed elections and other four explanatory variables on democratization in Libya since 2010. Several traditional and behavioral methods can be used to study the impact of elections and other independent variables on democracy in Libya. The best method to study the impact of elections on democracy in Libya will depend on the specific research questions being asked. However, different methods can be used to provide valuable insights into this topic.

As far as the data of this book is concerned, one should mention the following sources of data collection. Different research institutions publish annual reports on democratization on the international level, including Libya:

- Freedom House is an international non-governmental organization that monitors human rights and civil liberties in countries worldwide. In its 2022 Freedom in the World Report, Libya was rated as "not free," scoring 31 out of 100. It is a decline from 2019, when Libya was rated as "partly free," with a score of 43 out of 100.
- The Economist Intelligence Unit, or the "EIU," is a research and analysis firm that publishes the Democracy Index, which ranks countries on their level of democracy. In its 2021 Democracy Index, Libya was ranked 156 out of 167 countries, scoring 3.48 out of 10. It is a decline from 2011, when Libya was ranked 103 out of 167 countries, with a score of 5.28 out of 10.
- V-Dem Institute: The V-Dem Institute is a research institute that collects data on democracy worldwide. In its 2021 V-Dem Democracy Report, Libya was ranked as a "hybrid regime," with a score of 0.65 out of 1 on the V-Dem Index. It is a decline from 2011, when Libya was ranked as a "full democracy," with a score of 0.96 out of 1.

These data suggest that democratization in Libya has stalled in recent years. The country has experienced many challenges, including political instability, security problems, and economic hardship. These challenges have made it difficult to consolidate democracy in Libya. There are several methodological limitations to studying the impact of elections on democratization in Libya post-Kaddafi. These methodological limitations include:

1. The difficulty of defining democracy. There is no single, universally agreed-upon definition of democracy. It can make it difficult to measure and compare the level of democratization across countries.
2. There is difficulty in isolating the effects of elections. Elections are often not the only factor that contributes to democratization. Other factors, such as economic development, social change, and the strength of civil society, can also play a role. Civil society may make it difficult to isolate the impact of elections on democratization.
3. Measuring the quality of elections is challenging. Elections can be free and fair in terms of the legal framework and the procedures used. However, they may still not be democratic if they do not allow for meaningful participation by citizens or if they do not result in a government that is responsive to the needs of the people. It can make it difficult to measure the quality of elections and assess their impact on democratization.
4. There is the difficulty of conducting research in conflict-ridden countries. Many countries that are in the process of democratization are also experiencing conflict. It can make it challenging to study elections and democratization, as it can be dangerous to collect data, and people may be reluctant to speak openly about their political views.

Despite these limitations, a growing body of research on elections and democratization exists. This type of study is helping us to understand the factors that contribute to democratization and the challenges that countries face in their transition to democracy. In addition to the limitations mentioned earlier, several other methodological challenges can arise when studying elections and democratization in Libya. These other methodological challenges include:

1. The problem of data availability. Data on elections and democratization is often unavailable or of poor quality. It can make it difficult to conduct rigorous research on these topics.
2. The problem of bias. Researchers who study elections and democratization may be biased in their findings. It can happen if they


are from a particular country or region or have a particular political ideology.

3. The problem of context. Elections and democratization occur in various contexts, and what works in one context may not work in another. It can make it challenging to generalize findings from one study to another.

Figure 1 indicates that five independent variables are assumed to affect democratization, and Libya is no exception. However, this study's methodological limitation is examining the impact of delayed elections on democratization in Libya since 2015. Thus, this book may be divided into the following chapters:

- Introduction
- Democratization in Libya Post-Kaddafi Era
- Elections in Libya Post-Kaddafi Era
- The Impact of Delayed Election on Democratization in Libya
- Conclusion: Results

Figure: 1
Relationship between Elections and Democratization in Libya



Chapter One

Democratization in Libya Post-Kaddafi Era

Democracy is a form of government in which the people hold power. This process is usually achieved through many factors, such as political culture and participation, the functioning of government, elections, and civil liberties. Thus, democracy may be achieved through elections and other factors in which citizens' vote for their representatives. Democracy is relevant to Libya's elections because it is the only way to ensure that the government is truly representative of the people. Nevertheless, Libya has been in a state of transition since the overthrow of Kaddafi in 2011. The country has held three general elections and many sub-national elections since then, but neither has been able to stabilize the country or establish a lasting democracy fully. In this chapter, the focus will be on five dimensions of democratization in Libya post-Kaddafi as follows:

- Historical Background of Democracy
- Democracy Concept
- Externalization of Libya's Democratization
- The democracy movement in Libya
- SWOT Analysis of Democratization in Libya
- Conclusion

Historical Background of Democracy:

The concept of democracy has evolved throughout history. The ancient Greeks were the first to develop a government system based on popular rule. The Athenian city-state was a direct democracy in which all citizens had the right to participate in government. The Roman Republic was also a democracy, but it was an indirect democracy in which citizens could vote for their representatives to make decisions on their behalf. The Roman Republic eventually collapsed, but its ideas about democracy had a lasting impact on Western civilization.

In the middle ages, democracy was largely forgotten. Most of Europe was ruled by monarchs who claimed to rule by divine right. However, there were some pockets of democracy, such as the Italian city-states of Venice and Florence. The Renaissance saw a revival of interest in democracy. The Italian political philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) argued that

democracy was the best form of government because it was the most likely to lead to good government. However, the Muslim civilization practices democracy through consultation. (See Potter, *et al.*, 2001, pp.95-117)

The ideas of democracy inspired the American Revolution. The United States of America's Founding Fathers created a constitutional republic, a form of democracy where the people vote for a candidate who makes decisions on their behalf. The French Revolution also had a vital impact on the development of democracy. The revolutionaries overthrew the monarchy and established a republic. However, the French Revolution eventually descended into chaos and dictatorship.

The 19th century was a time of significant expansion for democracy. Many countries in Europe and Latin America adopted democratic constitutions. However, there were also setbacks, such as the rise of fascism and Nazim in Italy and Germany. The 20th century saw the triumph of democracy over fascism, Nazism, and communism. The United States and its allies defeated the Axis powers in World War II (1939-1945), and the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Today, democracy is the most common form of government in the world.

However, democracy is not without its challenges. There are many countries where democracy is fragile or under threat. It is vital to continue to work to strengthen democracy and to ensure that it is the dominant form of government in the world. In short, many independent variables have affected the development of democracy throughout history, such as the rise of individualism, the Industrial Revolution, the improvement of education, and the advancement of technology.

Thus, democracy is a complex and evolving concept. The history and culture of different countries has shaped it. However, some core principles are common to all democracies, e.g., the binding law, separation of powers, and the protection of human rights. Democracy is considered a human heritage because it is a form of government based on equality, freedom, and participation. These principles are essential for human dignity and well-being.

Thus, democracy allows the public, regardless of their background or beliefs, to have a view of how they are governed. This public view is critical because it gives people a sense of ownership over their government and makes them more likely to support it. Democracy protects all citizens' rights, including free speech, assembly, and religion. These rights are essential for people to live freely and to develop their full potential.

Nevertheless, democracy is not without its challenges. It can be slow, inefficient, and vulnerable to corruption and instability. However, the benefits of democracy far outweigh the challenges. Democracy is our best form of government and is worth fighting for. The previous review of democracy's historical background demonstrates some reasons why democracy is considered a human heritage. First, democracy is based on the principles of equality and freedom. Second, democracy protects human rights and civil liberties. Third, democracy is a form of self-government and a system of checks and balances. Finally, it is a system of peaceful change. (See UN Human Rights. "About Democracy and Human Rights")

Democracy Concept:

Examining democracy's background shows it is rooted and practiced intensely in history. Therefore, the concept of democracy, in the Greek words "demos" (people) and "Kratos" (rule or power), is a form of government in which the citizens exercise power directly or through elected representatives. Furthermore, democracy is a complex concept with a long history. The first democracies emerged in ancient Greece and Rome, but they were limited to small, wealthy groups of citizens. Over time, democracy has evolved to include a broader range of citizens and to take on new forms. (For more details, see Ranatunga, 2022)

There are many types of democracy, e.g., direct, semi-direct, and indirect. They all share some standard features, such as voting rights, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and the dominance of rule and law. Democracy is not perfect, but it is the best form of government that has been devised. It allows citizens to view how they are governed and protects their rights and freedoms. Nevertheless, there are many challenges to democracy. These challenges include corruption, inequality, and polarization.

Despite these challenges, democracy is still the best form of government that we have in our time. It is essential to work to overcome these challenges and to strengthen democracy so that it can continue to benefit all citizens. There are many benefits of democracy. For example, democracy allows citizens to choose their governments; it protects the rights and freedoms of citizens, promotes peace and stability, and encourages economic development and prosperity. (See the Chathamhouse.org, 2021)

However, democracy is not always ideal; thus, there are some challenges, such as being slow and inefficient, being vulnerable to corruption, and lacking accountability and consensus. In short, democracy is a complex and imperfect form of government, but it is our best form. It is essential to work to overcome the challenges of democracy and strengthen it to continue to benefit all citizens. To avoid such challenges, we may review in this regard different perceptions of democracy, e.g., Islamic, Arabic, Libyan, and Western perceptions of democracy.

The Islamic view of democracy is complex and contested. There is no unified Islamic view on democracy, as different interpretations of Islamic texts and principles have led to different views on the subject. Some Muslim scholars believe that democracy is compatible with Islam, arguing that it is a form of government that allows citizens to participate in decision-making and hold their leaders accountable. They point to verses in the Quran that emphasize the importance of consultation and consensus and argue that democracy is a way of putting these principles into practice. (See Ayubi, 2001, pp.345-366)

Other Muslim scholars believe that democracy is incompatible with Islam, arguing that it is a system of government based on human will and reason rather than on divine law. They point to verses in the Quran that emphasize the sovereignty of God and the importance of following His laws, and they argue that democracy is a system that elevates human beings above God. (Hickman, 2008)

There is also a third scholar view, which holds that democracy is a tool that can be used to achieve Islamic goals. This view argues that democracy can be used to create a just and equitable society and can be reconciled with Islamic principles through the reinterpretation of Islamic law. (See Tessler, 2002, pp. 337-354)

In short, the debate over the Islamic view of democracy will likely continue. Ultimately, it is up to each Muslim to decide whether they believe democracy is compatible with Islam. We may mention some of the arguments favoring the Islamic view of democracy. Muslim scholars argue that democracy is a form of consultation and a way of holding leaders accountable. Democracy can be used to achieve Islamic goals, such as establishing a just and equitable society, and it can be reconciled with

Islamic principles through the process of diligence or *ijtihad*. (See El Fadl, 2003)

Thus, there are some of the arguments against the Islamic view of democracy. Democracy is a government system based on human will and reason rather than divine law. It can also lead to corruption and instability, e.g., poverty and violence. Finally, democracy is not the only way to achieve Islamic goals. Ultimately, the Islamic view of democracy is a complex and contested issue. There is no unified Islamic view on democracy, as different interpretations of Islamic texts and principles have led to different views. It is up to each Muslim to decide whether or not they believe that democracy is compatible with Islam. (See Voll, 2007, 170-178)

The concept of democracy has been interpreted differently by Muslim and Western scholars. Muslim scholars often emphasize the importance of consultation (*shura*) and consensus in Islamic governance. They argue that these principles are compatible with democracy, allowing citizens to participate in decision-making and holding leaders accountable.

Western scholars, on the other hand, typically define democracy as a system of government in which the people hold power. They argue that this definition is incompatible with Islam, as it elevates the will of the people above the will of God. A growing body of work by Muslim scholars is trying to reconcile the Islamic concept of governance with the Western concept of democracy. These scholars argue that democracy can be compatible with Islam if it is understood as a system of government based on consultation, consensus, and justice principles. (See Tassaduq and Jillani, 2006, pp. 727-754)

However, some key differences exist between the Islamic and Western concepts of democracy. The following points reflect the Islamic concept of democracy. While Islamic views focus on consultation (*shura*), consensus (*ijma*), and justice on the one hand, the Western concept emphasizes who holds power (e.g., Peoples), freedom, equality, and separation of powers on the other.

The Islamic and Western concepts of democracy are not entirely incompatible. There are some similarities between the two concepts, such as the importance of consultation and consensus. However, there are also some key differences, such as the role of the people and the relationship between religion and government. The differences over the compatibility of

Islam and democracy will likely continue. It is a complex matter with no easy answers.

In addition, there is a long-standing debate between Arab and Western scholars about the compatibility of Arabism and Islam on the one side and democracy on the other. Arab scholars often argue that democracy is incompatible with Islam because it elevates the will of the people above the will of God. Western scholars, on the other hand, typically argue that democracy is compatible with Islam if it is understood as a system of government that is based on the principles of consultation, consensus, and justice. However, some critical arguments from Arab scholars against democracy, e.g., democracy are a Western concept. Arab scholars often argue that democracy is a Western concept incompatible with Islamic values. They point out that the term "democracy" does not appear in the Quran or the Hadith and that the early Muslim community did not practice democracy, and it was based on human will rather than on the will of God. They believe the government should be based on Islamic law and the people should not have the right to make laws. As mentioned before, democracy can lead to corruption because it gives too much power to the people. In short, some Arab scholars argue that the government should be ruled by a strong leader accountable to God.

On the other hand, there are also some critical arguments from Western scholars in favor of the Arab scholar's view of democracy. They argue that democracy is based on Islamic values, such as consultation (shura), consensus (ijma), and justice. They point out that the Quran emphasizes the importance of consultation and that democracy is a system of government that allows for the participation of citizens in decision-making processes. Western scholars also argue that democracy is compatible with Islamic law. They point out that Islamic law does not explicitly prohibit democracy and that a growing body of Islamic scholarship argues that democracy is compatible with Islamic values. Shavit, 2020, pp. 149-374)

Finally, Western scholars argue that democracy is the best form of government because it protects human rights and the rule of law. They believe that democracy is the only system of government that can ensure that all citizens have a say in how they are governed. In short, the debate between Arab and Western scholars about the compatibility of Islam and

democracy will likely continue for some time. It is a salient issue with no easy answers.

Although the Libyan scholars and elites share the Arabic view of democracy, it may be argued that their view on democracy will add more to the concept of democratization. (See Shavit, 2020, pp. 149-374) Moreover, the debate between Libyan and Western scholars about the compatibility of Islam and democracy is similar to that between Arab and Western scholars. Libyan scholars often argue that democracy is incompatible with Islam, while Western scholars typically argue that democracy is compatible with Islam. Similar to their Arab colleague's argument, some Libyan scholars stand against democracy for many reasons, such as democracy being an external concept that requires new changes for the Libyan milieu. They argue that democracy is a Western concept incompatible with Islamic values. They point out that the term "democracy" does not appear in the Quran or the Hadith and that the early Muslim community did not practice democracy in the real sense. (See Midlarsky, 1998, pp. 485-511)

Furthermore, Libyan scholars also argue that democracy is based on human will rather than on the will of God. They believe the government should be based on Islamic law and the people should not have the right to make laws. They agree with their counterpart that democracy can lead to corruption, as it gives too much power to the people. They believe the government should be ruled by a strong leader accountable to God.

The debate between Libyan and Western scholars about the compatibility of Islam and democracy will likely continue for some time. In short, it is a challenging issue with no easy answers. One may argue that some additional points are relevant to the debate between Libyan and Western scholars on democracy. Firstly, Libya has a long history of authoritarian rule, and many Libyans are skeptical of democracy. Secondly, religion plays a vital role in Libyan society, and many Libyans believe that Islam should be the basis of the country's laws and government. They are concerned that democracy will lead to the secularization of Libya and the erosion of Islamic values. Finally, Libya is a country that has been through much turmoil in recent years. Many Libyans are concerned about the country's stability and believe democracy is too risky. They believe a strong leader is needed to bring order to the country and rebuild its economy. (See Adibe, 2019)

The debate between Libyan and Western scholars on democracy is also complex. There are strong arguments on both sides of the issue.

Considering all the arguments before forming an opinion on this issue is essential. In short, democracy in Libya and other developing countries is a new process of learning, and it imposes real challenges and requires the elite's political will, vision, and public support.

Nevertheless, we may argue that democracy in Libya and Western countries is semi-similar. Both have elected governments, free and fair elections, and a separation of powers. However, there are also some key differences, such as stability, the spread of weapons, social cohesion, and economic development. Libya is still a rentier economy and suffers from various economic and financial crises; therefore, democracy is a long process to achieve by the Libyans.

Despite these differences, there is hope for democracy in Libya. The country has a long history of resistance to dictatorship, and there is a growing desire for democracy among the people. With international support, Libya can overcome its challenges and build a democratic future. However, there are some calculated steps that Libya can take to increase its chances of success in its transition to democratization. At this stage, Libya needs a solid and legitimate government to disarm and demobilize armed groups, promote social cohesion, and implement economic reforms.

Externalization of Libya's Democratization:

The international society has a role in supporting Libya's transition to democracy. The United Nations, the European Union, and the United States of America can provide the Libyan government with financial assistance, technical support, and political backing. They can also help to disarm and demobilize armed groups and to promote economic development and social cohesion. With international support, Libya can overcome its challenges and build a stable democracy.

The externalization factor has been prominent since political independence in 1952 and the February Revolution in 2011. The external intervention began with the United States leading alliance called "Odyssey Dawn" in 2011. Then NATO continued its operation until the fall down of Kaddafi's regime in October 2011. The democratization process entered a take-off stage, and the Interim National Council issued an Interim Constitutional Declaration "ICD" for transitional democracy. The ICD set up a roadmap for transitional democracy; thus, popular national elections

were held in 2012 and 2014. In short, external intervention can be a delay factor for democratization in some ways. (Ponzo, 2011; and Ho, 2022)

1. It can create dependency: When a country depends on external actors for its security or economic development, it can be difficult to develop its democratic institutions. The dependency may exist because external powers may have their interests and may not be interested in promoting democracy in the country.
2. It can undermine local ownership: When external actors promote democracy in a country, it can undermine local ownership of the process because local actors may feel they are not in control of their destiny. They may not be as committed to the process of democratization.
3. It can create divisions: External intervention can create divisions within a country because different groups may have different interests and may not agree on achieving democracy. External Intervention can lead to conflict and instability, which can make it challenging to consolidate democracy.

In the case of Libya, external intervention has played a role in delaying democratization. The country has been subject to some interventions since the overthrow of Kaddafi in 2011. These interventions have come from various countries, including the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States of America. These interventions have had a mixed impact on the democratization process in Libya. On the one hand, they have helped to prevent the country from falling back into chaos. On the other hand, they have also created divisions within the country and undermined local ownership of the process.

It is still too early to say what external intervention's long-term impact on democratization in Libya is. However, these interventions have played a role in delaying the process. It is important to note that external intervention is not always a negative factor in democratization. In some cases, it can be helpful to support local actors working to promote democracy. However, it is crucial to be aware of the potential risks of external intervention and to ensure that it is done in a way that supports local efforts.

It may be argued that the neighboring and regional countries have played a role in delaying democratization in Libya in several ways. (See Randall, 2015, pp. 199-221)

1. Supporting rival factions: Some regional countries have supported rival factions in Libya, which has helped to prolong the conflict and made it difficult to achieve a political settlement. For example, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates have supported the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Khalifa Haftar. In contrast, Turkey has supported the Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Fayeza al-Sarraj and then the Government of National Unity “GNU) led by Abdulhamid Dabaiba.
2. Refusing to cooperate: Some regional countries have refused to cooperate with the United Nations to promote democracy in Libya. The regional intervention has made it difficult to reach a consensus on the way forward and to implement the necessary reforms. For example, Egypt and Turkey have been at odds over Turkey's role in Libya, making it difficult for them to cooperate to promote democracy.
3. Undermining the rule of law: Some regional countries have undermined the rule of law in Libya by supporting armed groups outside the government's control. This regional intervention has made it difficult to establish a stable and secure environment where democracy can flourish. For example, the United Arab Emirates has been accused of supporting militias loyal to the LNA.

The role of regional countries in delaying democratization in Libya is a complex issue. Many factors have contributed to this situation, and it is difficult to say which countries have played the most significant role. However, it is clear that regional countries have played a role in delaying the democratization process in Libya and will need to play a more constructive role in the future if the country is to achieve democracy.

It is important to note that not all regional countries have played a negative role in Libya. Some countries, such as Tunisia and Algeria, have supported efforts to promote democracy in Libya. However, countries that have played a more damaging role have significantly impacted democratization.

The data of the Fragile States Reports refers to an increase in the external intervention in Libya since 2011. Furthermore, the data of

Democracy Index Reports also indicate a setback in democratization since 2015. By comparing the previous data, it may be concluded that the externalization of the Libyan crisis is strongly related to the slowdown of democratization in Libya. (See the data of Figure: 1-1 and Table: 1-1) Some statistical analysis may be involved to examine the impact of the external intervention on democratization in Libya post-Kaddafi era.

Thus, this chapter examines the annual data (2006-2019) of the Fragile State Index Report, which has developed an operational definition for external intervention. The Fragile State Index Report (2019) defines external intervention in the internal affairs of any country as the influence of foreign states in security, economic, and humanitarian fields (Fragile State Index Report, 2019, p. 41)

Firstly, Security refers to "covert and overt" engagement from foreign states. Intervention in the internal affairs of a state by governments, military personnel, intelligence organizations, pressure groups, or other forces that may affect the balance of power (or the resolution of conflict) within a state."

Secondly, foreign economic intervention includes "international and regional organizations, through financial assistance such as loans, economic business, or external financial assistance, e.g., budget, governance, and creating economic dependency."

Thirdly, the external intervention is also considered "humanitarian intervention," e.g., the presence of an international peacekeeping mission." Thus, the three pillars of external intervention are political, force, and economic interventions.

In this regard, many questions may ask such as: "Is there external support for the anti-revolutionary movement? Are foreign troops present? Are military attacks from other countries occurring? Is there external military assistance? Are there military training exercises with other nations or military training from other states? Is there a peacekeeping operation on the ground? Is there external support for police training?

Moreover, are covert operations taking place? Is the country receiving economic intervention or aid? Moreover, is the country dependent on economic aid?²

Figure 1-1 indicates the relationship between external intervention and democratization in Libya during 2006-2019. The measurement scale adopted by the Democracy Index and Fragile State Index is between (0-10). The zero score means neither democratization nor external intervention,

² - **Fragile States Index: Annual Reports 2019**. (Washington, DC: The Fund for Peace, 2019), p. 41.



and the ten score means perfect levels of democracy and intervention.³ By examining the data of Figure: 1-1 and Table: 1-1, several points may be reported as follows: (See Kashiem, 2022)

1. Democratization was a limited process during the late years of the Kaddafi regime; thus, its scores were less than two points. The absence of democratization during the Kaddafi regime is due to the adopting of the authoritarian political system. There was neither a constitution nor local and parliamentary elections during the Kaddafi era. Nevertheless, the late political reforms by Kaddafi and his older son did not match the Democracy Index criteria. The political reforms of the Kaddafi regime improved the democracy index from (1.84/10) in 2006 to (2/10) and (1.94/10) in 2008 and 2010, respectively. The failure of political reforms resulted in a minor decline in democratic scales (from 2 to 1.94). In short, an authoritarian regime contradicts democratization because it is a process for surviving and continuation.⁴
2. Furthermore, there was a middle range of external intervention in Libyan affairs during the Kaddafi era. The Kaddafi regime involved direct and indirect conflicts with regional and global countries, e.g., wars with Chad and Egypt and the Lockerbie crisis. External intervention during the Kaddafi regime emerged due to uncalculated foreign policy toward other countries rather than alerting his authoritarianism.
3. The democracy curve shown in Figure 1-1 does not reflect a regular pattern but represents a fluctuation model. Political reforms during the Kaddafi era did not improve the democratic process. The Interim Institutional Declaration (2011) and the parliamentary elections (2012-2014) improved the Libyan image as a transitional democratic country. The coup of Haftar in 2014 and his wars against Benghazi, Derna, and Tripoli resulted in an increased level of external intervention and a democratization crisis.
4. Although democratization witnessed a noticeable setback in Libya post-Kaddafi era after 2014, foreign intervention increased dramatically. Figure 1-1 shows Libya's maximum external


³ - According to the Democracy Index of 2019, no perfect score (10/10) is registered by any country (2006-2019). For example, while the five Scandinavian countries have recorded the highest scores on the international level (9-9.5/10), the USA has recorded only (7.96/10) in 2019. The world average democracy index score in 2019 reached only (5.44/10). (Democracy Index Report, 2019, pp. 18 and 22)

⁴ - David Easton (1979), **A System Analysis of Political Life** (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press)

intervention scores since 2012. While the democratic process slowed down in 2015, and external intervention in Libya's affairs has increased dramatically. From a methodological point of view, other independent variables explain the democracy crisis in Libya post-Kaddafi era.

Figure: 1-1

The Relationship between External Intervention and Democratization in Libya



Data Source: The Fragile State Index and Democracy Index Reports. (Different Issues)

Table: 1-1

Pearson Correlation between Democracy and External Intervention, 2012-2019

	Democratization	External Intervention
Pearson Correlation	1	**
Sig. (1-tailed)		
N	8	
Pearson Correlation	-.892**	
Sig. (1-tailed)	.001	
	8	

** . Correlation is very significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)

5. External intervention is not limited to the Libyan crisis. It has extended to other Arab Spring countries like Yemen, Egypt, and Tunisia. Nevertheless, the level of external intervention reaches the maximum in Yemen and Libya. The recorded scores in 2019 recorded total scores in Yemen and Libya (in 2017-2018). The



lowest score of external intervention in 2019 was in Tunisia (5.8/10). In short, the lower the level of external intervention in the Arab Spring countries means the more successful the experience of democratization, e.g., Tunisia. External intervention neither slows down the process of democracy nor encourages anti-democratization movements to establish authoritarian regimes, e.g., Egypt. In this regard, regional and global powers support the anti-democratic process, e.g., France, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt, for political reasons rather than moral values.

6. Table 1-1 data indicates a significant (.001) negative relationship (-0.892) exists between external intervention and democratization. According to the chapter data, external intervention increases concurrently with democratic process setbacks. Examining a causal relationship between external intervention and democratization requires further statistical analysis.
7. A regression test indicates a significant impact of the external intervention on democratization in Libya post-Kaddafi since 2012. The values of $B = 26.229$, $R = .892$, $R \text{ Square} = .796$, and adjusted $R \text{ Square} = .762$ indicate that the two variables' relationship is negative and strong at a significant level of (.003). The adjusted $R \text{ Square}$ (.762) means that the external intervention since 2012 explains 76.2% of Libya's democratization setback. The remaining variance (23.8%) means other independent variables affect democratization in Libya post-Kaddafi era. Consequently, further comparative research is required to examine the impact of internal factors on democratization in Libya post-Kaddafi era.⁵

Democracy Movement in Libya

The development of the democratic movement in Libya since independence in 1951 has been a long and complicated process. There have been periods of progress and periods of setbacks, but the overall trend has been toward greater democracy. (See El-Kikhia, 2013) The first steps towards democracy in Libya were taken after independence in 1951. A constitution was adopted that established a constitutional monarchy with a

⁵ - Various issues of the Democratic and Fragile States indexes (2006-2019) are the primary sources of this study. The outputs of the "SPSS" program (Version 19) include correlation and regression data on both variables ($Y = \text{democratic index}$ and $X1 = \text{external Intervention}$). Since the first parliamentary election was in 2012 (See the data of Figures 1-1 and Table 1-1), the analysis is restricted to 2012-2019. As mentioned before, comprehensive and comparative studies on the impact of ecological factors on democratization in Libya and other Arab Spring countries require further research.



bicameral legislature. However, the monarchy was overthrown in a coup in 1969, and the country was ruled by a military dictatorship (1969-2011).

The democratic movement in Libya is still in its early stages, but there have been some significant gains. The country has held three national and several sub-national elections since the fall of Kaddafi, and numerous groups are working to promote democracy and human rights. It is too early to say whether Libya will be able to establish a stable democracy, but the future of the country depends on the success of the democratic movement.

The Kingdom of Libya was a constitutional monarchy established in 1951 after the country gained independence from Italy. The constitution guaranteed certain rights, such as freedom of speech and assembly, and the country held elections for a parliament. However, the king had great power, and his supporters often dominated the parliament. There were also restrictions on political parties and the media. Despite these limitations, there were some democratic aspects to the Kingdom of Libya. For example, the country held regular parliamentary elections. The parliament had the power to pass laws, and the king was the head of state. There was also a free press, although the government did censor some material.

The democratic aspects of the Kingdom of Libya were not perfect, but they were a step forward for the country. The country had recently achieved independence and was eager to build a democratic future. The democratic movement in Libya during the Kingdom era was largely unsuccessful, but it did lay the groundwork for future struggles for democracy. There are some of the democratic aspects of the Kingdom of Libya in 1951-1969, such as the 1951 constitution, elections, a free press, political parties, and a growing civil society movement that advocated for democracy and human rights.

Despite these democratic aspects, the Kingdom of Libya was not fully democratic. The king had great power, and his supporters often dominated the parliament. There were also restrictions on political parties and the media. The military coup of 1969 overthrew the monarchy and established the Libyan Arab Republic. The new regime was even more repressive than the monarchy, and the democratic movement was effectively crushed.

However, there were some democratic aspects to mention during the Kaddafi era. First, the country held regular elections for local councils and the General People's Congress (GPC), the country's supreme legislative body. However, these elections were not free or fair, as the only legal political party was the Libyan Arab Socialist Union (LASU), controlled by

Kaddafi. Second, the systems of popular committees were supposed to be made up of ordinary citizens who would participate in decision-making at the local level. However, in practice, the popular committees were controlled by the LASU and were not truly independent. Finally, Kaddafi also promoted the idea of direct democracy or rule by the people. He argued that the GPC was not a parliament but a forum for the people to express their views. However, in practice, the GPC was little more than a rubber stamp for Kaddafi's decisions. In short, there were some democratic aspects to Libya during Kaddafi's era, but they were largely superficial. The country was not a true democracy, as Kaddafi held all the power and had no political participation. (See Yahya, 2020)

As mentioned, the Constitutional Declaration set up a roadmap for transitional democracy in 2011. The democratic movement in Libya gained momentum in 2011 when a popular uprising overthrew the Kaddafi regime. The National Transitional Council (NTC), formed by the rebels, promised free and fair elections once the country was stabilized. (Kashiem, 2012, pp. 556-570)

On August 3, 2011, the ITNC, as a first step to building the new Libya according to democratic values and principles, announced an Interim Constitutional Declaration. The Constitutional Declaration consists of (37) articles that govern the interim period on the one hand and set up a road map to democratic transition in the new Libya on the other hand. In this regard, article (30) explained in detail the processes of transforming Libya post-Kaddafi into a democratic country, in which the people determine their future and elect their government through the ballot for the first time since the last fraud election in 1964-1965. (See Kashiem, 2022)

During the interim period, the ITNC was the supreme authority that succeeded in the process of managing the country until the National Public Conference "NPC" was elected on July 7, 2012 and exercised power since August 8, 2012. The election of the "NPC" was several weeks behind according to the road map due to political and logistical management problems. (Kashiem, 2012: 556-570)

The ITNC appointed an interim executive office to manage the crisis during the revolutionary era (2011-2012). After the liberation of Libya, an interim government was mandated to prepare for the second phase of the democratic transition by holding the first election since 1965. When the NPC resumed power on August 8, 2011, it elected an interim government to prepare for building the Libyan institutions. (Kashiem, 2012: 556-570)

Although the Constitutional Declaration gave power for the NPC to formulate the Constitutional Draft and submit it on September 8, 2012, later developments led the ITNC to amend the Constitutional Declaration for the second time in March 2012, when it mentioned that a committee of sixty is selecting from the NPC. In the third amendment, the ITNC decided on July 5, 2012, that the committee of sixty may be elected directly by the Libyan people; therefore, it will be equivalent to the NPC regarding legitimacy and power since they are both elected directly by the people. Finally, the fourth amendment regarding the extending period of democratic transition was declared by NPC in late 2012 because of disagreement among its members, who split their views between electing and appointing a committee of sixty. Finally, the NPC decided in mid-February 2013 that the election was the rational choice for the committee of sixty; therefore, it took necessary measures to fulfill this goal.⁶

Despite the delay in the process of democratic transition due to political and security reasons, the Interim Constitutional Declaration (2011) spelled out the process of making a permanent constitution by stating that:

"The National Public Conference shall approve the constitutional draft and shall be referred to the Libyan people for a plebiscite with (Yes) or (No vote) within thirty days from the date of the approval. If and when the Libyans approve the draft by two-thirds, then the constitutional draft becomes the constitution for Libya. In case of the Libyans' disapproval, the constitutional powers shall (then be assigned to) reformulate the Constitution draft, which shall be re-referred to the people for a plebiscite within a period not exceeding one month." (**The Interim Constitutional Declaration**, 2011, Article 30/2)

Another NPC task was preparing for a general election in late 2013; thus, the law of public elections was issued in late 2012. The Interim Constitutional Declaration emphasized that both the NPC and the ICD elected government "*shall oversee the preparation of all the requirements*

⁶ The committee of sixty reflected the political bargaining process during Libyan independence on December 24, 1952, when Libya was divided into three states, namely Barka, Fazan, and Tripoli. Twenty delegates represent each region; therefore, the committee of sixty is called on this basis. Sixty years after Libya's independence on 24-12-1951, the political elites duplicated the same political process regarding the new constitution. The committee of sixty reflects a controversial political issue among supporters and opponents in the new millennium because many things have changed, e.g., the population has increased from one to more than six million. The committee of sixty involves, however, the phenomenon of power-sharing in the new democratic Libya; thus, "calls for the power-sharing system [in Libya] are gaining momentum." For more details on this committee, see, for example (Geha and Doumit, 2012)

of the election process democratically and transparently." (See the **Interim Constitutional Declaration**, 2011)

The High National Election Commission, which the NPC shall reform, shall conduct the general elections under the supervision of the judicial branch, the United Nations, and international and regional organizations. Accordingly, the NPC shall ratify and declare the elections' outcomes and convoke the legislative authority for a meeting by the end of 2013. In the first session, the NPC shall transfer its powers to the new Libyan parliament, which shall exercise its full authority. (Kashiem, 2012: 556-570)

By holding the first session of the legislative power or the new Libyan parliament in late 2013, the named Interim Government led by Ali Zedan shall be deemed and taken as a caretaker government for conducting business until a new permanent government has been appointed under the new constitution. A newly adopted constitution is not expected to widen the scope of human rights and select the best political system that reflects the surrounding environmental conditions. However, it will be a vehicle for national reconciliation. (Rajabany, 2013)

In 2014, the United Nations created the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) to resolve the conflict peacefully. The LPDF succeeded in forming a new government, but the country remains divided and unstable. Libya is still a long way from achieving democracy. The country has a long history of political instability, and many challenges must be addressed before democracy can be fully established. (Kashiem, 2012: 556-570)

The Constitutional Draft of 2015 attempted to establish a more permanent framework for government in Libya post-Kaddafi. It was drafted by a Libyan experts committee and approved by the General National Congress (GNC). The Constitutional Draft of 2015 established some essential democratic principles, e.g., the separation of powers, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights. It also established a roadmap for elections for a new parliament and president. However, the Constitutional Draft of 2015 had its critiques. It was drafted quickly and needed to address some of Libya's critical challenges, such as the power distribution between the country's different regions. The Constitutional Draft of 2015 was also rejected by some Libyans, who felt that it did not go far enough in establishing a democratic government. As a result, the country remained divided and unstable. (Kashiem, 2012: 556-570)

In 2016, a new Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) was established to find a political solution to the country's crisis. The LPDF eventually produced a new draft agreement, which the House of Representatives approved in 2017. However, the new agreement was rejected by the Libyan National Army (LNA), which controls much of Eastern Libya. (Kashiem, 2012: 556-570)

The process of democratic transition in the new Libya is not smooth, as it seems to be due to internal and external factors. The literature identified religion, tribalism, oil, and ideology (Sawani, 2012), as well as a short history of political unity, artificial and long borders, and the division of population on sectarian, ethnic, and regional lines (Gause, 2012), as main factors that affect democratic transition and the political future in Libya post-Kaddafi. The previous factors, among other things, e.g., the spread of weapons, violence, and foreign intervention, are additional elements that will affect the democratic transition and political future of the new Libya. The external factor was prominent during the February Revolution and will continue to do so in the present and future. (For more details on the role of an external factor in the Libyan Spring revolution, see: (Kashiem 2012, 556-570)

The future of the democratic movement in Libya is uncertain. However, the country has made some progress in its democratization process, and many factors could help to promote further progress. The democratization of Libya is a long and challenging process. However, some positive developments have been made in recent years, and some factors could help promote further progress. The future of democracy in Libya is uncertain, but the country has the potential to become a stable and prosperous democracy. Conducting a SWOT analysis may help us predict Libya's future post-Kaddafi by describing and analyzing the internal and external democratization milieu.

SWOT Analysis of Democratization in Libya:

SWOT analysis has two environmental aspects to be examined in this sub-section. While the internal dimension refers to strengths and weaknesses, the external aspects include opportunities and threats. On the internal level, one may identify the strengths and weaknesses of democracy in Libya. One may identify different points of democracy strengths in Libya post-Kaddafi, such as: (For more details, see Gurel and Tat, 2017, pp. 994-1006)

1. Democracy allows citizens to participate in the political process through voting, volunteering, and other forms of civic engagement. Voting can build a sense of ownership of the government and foster a sense of community.
2. Democracy holds elected officials accountable to the people. Elected officials are vital because they can be voted out of office if they do not perform their duties effectively or are corrupt.
3. Democracy protects the rights of citizens, including the right to free speech, the right to assembly, and the right to a fair trial. Citizens' rights can help create a society where everyone is treated equally and has a voice.

Weaknesses of democratization in Libya post-Kaddafi are another dimension that may be examined as follows:

1. Democracy can be unstable, especially in countries new to democracy, e.g., Libya is a good example. More trust in the political system is often needed because competing interests are often vying for power.
2. Democracy can be vulnerable to corruption, especially if there is a lack of transparency and accountability. Corruption may lead to the abuse of power and the enrichment of the tiny elite at the expense of the majority.
3. Democracy can be inefficient, especially in countries with a large bureaucracy. Many checks and balances are often in place, slowing the decision-making process.

Overall, democracy has both strengths and weaknesses. It is crucial to weigh these factors carefully when considering whether or not democracy is a suitable form of government for Libya. It is also important to note that democracy is not a static concept. It can evolve and change over time. In the case of Libya, the country is still in the early stages of its democratic transition. It is, therefore, too early to say what the long-term strengths and weaknesses of democracy in Libya post-Kaddafi. On the external level, one may identify opportunities and threats to democracy in Libya. As far as opportunities are concerned, three points may be mentioned in this regard:

1. Democracy can help to improve governance in Libya by making the government more responsive to the needs of the people. Governance

can be achieved by increasing transparency and accountability and providing more opportunities for citizen participation.

2. Democracy can help to promote economic development in Libya by creating a more stable and predictable environment for businesses. Economic development in Libya can be achieved by ensuring the rule of law, protecting property rights, and reducing corruption.
3. Democracy can help to promote social cohesion in Libya by providing a forum for different groups to come together and discuss their differences. Social cohesion can be achieved by ensuring that all citizens have a voice in the political process and by protecting the rights of minorities.

Threats are the final aspect that will be examined briefly, and they reflect the following:

1. Democracy can be unstable, especially in countries that are new to democracy, because there is often a lack of trust in the political system, and competing interests are often vying for power.
2. It can be vulnerable to corruption, especially if there is a lack of transparency and accountability. Corruption may lead to the abuse of power and the enrichment of the tiny elite at the expense of the majority.
3. Democracy can be inefficient, especially in countries with a large bureaucracy. Many checks and balances are often in place, slowing the decision-making process.

Overall, democracy has both opportunities and threats. It is crucial to weigh these factors carefully when considering whether or not democracy is the proper form of government for Libya. It is also important to note that democracy is not a static concept. It can evolve and change over time. In the case of Libya, the country is still in the early stages of its democratic transition. It is, therefore, too early to say what the long-term opportunities and threats to democracy in Libya will be. However, there are also some positive signs. The country has held two general elections since 2011 and has a growing civil society. These are necessary steps forward, and they suggest that there is still hope for democracy in Libya.

Finally, there are some possible scenarios for Libya's future as a democratic country, such as:

1. Libya as a stable democracy: In this scenario, Libya manages to overcome its challenges, e.g., points of weaknesses and threats, and establishes a stable democracy. A stable democracy would require forming a solid and legitimate government that can unite the country and address the needs of the people. It would also require the disarming and demobilizing of the armed groups that have been operating in the country.
2. Libya as a failed democracy: In this scenario, Libya can establish a democracy but remains fragile. The country would continue to face challenges, such as political instability, economic hardship, and social unrest. However, it could maintain its democratic institutions and hold regular elections.
3. Libya as a fragile state: In this scenario, Libya fails to establish a democracy and descends into chaos. The country would be plagued by violence, political instability, and economic hardship. In this scenario, imagining a future for Libya would be challenging.

The most likely scenario for Libya is a fragile democracy shortly. However, the case may be different in the longer term. The country has a long history of democratization, and it will use it to overcome the challenges it faces. Thus, there is still hope for Libya, and with international support and political will, the country could eventually establish a stable democracy. In short, there are some specific steps that Libya can take to increase its chances of success in its transition to democracy (See Margon and Bekdache, 2012; and Harshe, 2022)

1. The Libyan government must be able to unite the country and address the needs of the people. The unification will require building trust with the people and providing them with security.
2. The Libyan government must disarm and demobilize the armed groups operating in the country. The disarmament will require the government to build trust with the people and provide them with security.
3. The Libyan government must implement economic reforms to address the economic challenges that the country faces. The economic reforms will require creating jobs and reducing poverty.

4. The Libyan government must promote social cohesion and tolerance among different social groups. Social cohesion will require building bridges between different communities and providing education and training to all citizens.

Conclusion:

Libya has known democratization since the declaration of the constitution in 1951. However, there have been bad and good days since 1951. For example (1951-1969), Libya was a constitutional monarchy with a hereditary king, Idris I. The country was divided into three provinces, each with its elected Assembly. The king had the power to veto laws, appoint the prime minister, and dissolve parliament. However, in 1969, a military coup overthrew King Idris and established a republic under Kaddafi. Kaddafi abolished the monarchy and provincial Assembly and created a one-party state called the Libyan Arab Republic. He ruled Libya for 42 years, during which time he suppressed dissent and concentrated power in his own hands.

Furthermore, 2011 a popular uprising against Kaddafi's rule began in February 2011. The uprising quickly became a civil war, with Kaddafi's forces fighting against revolutionary groups. The UN Security Council agreed on a military intervention to protect civilians in Libya, and NATO forces played a significant role in helping the revolutionary groups to overthrow Kaddafi in October 2011.

In 2011, the National Transitional Council (NTC) issued an Interim Constitutional Declaration announcing Libya as a democracy with Islam as its state religion. The declaration also guaranteed the rule of law, an independent judiciary, and fundamental rights for all citizens. In 2012, the NTC held elections for a General National Congress (GNC) tasked with drafting a new constitution. Islamist parties dominated the GNC, and its efforts to draft a constitution were hampered by political infighting. In 2014, the GNC held elections for a House of Representatives (HoRs), which was supposed to replace the GNC. However, many Islamist parties boycotted the HoRs, and it could not gain control of the country. Libya has been divided between two governments, e.g., one based in the East and one in the West. The two governments have been unable to agree on a way to unify the country, and the country has been plunged into chaos. In 2021-2023, the United Nations held a series of talks in Geneva aimed at resolving the Libyan conflict. The talks resulted in the formation of a new National Unity Government, which is currently working to restore stability to the country.

In short, from 2011-2023, Libya has been in political turmoil since Kaddafi's overthrow. The country is divided between two rival governments, one in the East and one in the West. There have been several

attempts to hold elections, but they have failed. The country is still struggling to establish a stable democracy. The democratization of Libya has been a long and challenging process. The country has a history of authoritarian rule, and the legacy of Kaddafi's rule remains a significant obstacle to progress. However, the Libyan people have shown a strong commitment to democracy, and there is hope that the country will eventually achieve a stable and prosperous future.

It is still too early to say whether Libya will be able to achieve a stable democracy. However, the country has shown a strong commitment to democracy, and there is hope that the future will be brighter. Democratization in Libya post-Kaddafi is in a state of turmoil and deterioration. Although the external factor explains a high level of variance, one may argue that internal variables are also responsible for the setback of the democracy transition in Libya post-Kaddafi. In the case of Libya, elite fractions have played a role in delaying democratization. The country has a long history of political instability, and several different elite factions are vying for power. These factions have often competed for power, leading to conflict and instability. Although many factors have delayed democratization in Libya, some are more influential than others. The most factors that have delayed the democratization in Libya are: (See Randall, 2015, pp. 199-2011)

1. The legacy of Kaddafi's rule: He was a dictator who ruled Libya for 42 years. During his rule, he suppressed dissent and concentrated power in his own hands. Kaddafi's regime left a legacy of mistrust and instability in Libya, making it challenging to build a democratic system.
2. The political and military divisions in Libya: Since Kaddafi's overthrow in 2011, Libya has been divided between two rival governments, one in the East and one in the West. These two governments have been unable to agree on a way to unify the country, making it difficult to hold elections and build democratic institutions.
3. The rise of armed militias: Following Kaddafi's overthrow, several militias emerged in Libya. These militias have been involved in many clashes, making it difficult for the government to maintain law and order.
4. The lack of economic development: Libya is a wealthy country with abundant oil and gas resources. However, the country's economy has been in a state of decline since Kaddafi's overthrow. The economic situation in Libya has led to widespread poverty, inflation, and

unemployment, which has created fertile ground for instability and violence.

These are just some of the factors that have delayed the democratization of Libya. It is still too early to say whether Libya will be able to overcome these challenges and build a stable democracy. However, the country has shown a strong commitment to democracy, and there is hope that the future will be brighter.

The challenges to democratization in Libya are significant. However, there are also signs of hope. The Libyan people have shown a strong commitment to democracy, and there is a growing consensus among Libyans that the country needs to move forward with the democratic process. In addition, the international community supports the Libyan government and civil society organizations. With continued support and cooperation, Libya may one day be able to achieve a stable democracy.

Chapter Two

Elections in Libya Post-Kaddafi Era

This chapter focuses on the various independent variables, e.g., elections, and other independent variables in general (See Figure: 1). As mentioned in the introduction of this book, many confounding variables affect democratization in Libya post-Kaddafi era. Nevertheless, this book aims to examine the impact of five independent variables on democratization. Figure: 1 indicates that elections, political participation and culture, functioning of government, and civil liberties are assumed to affect democratization in Libya post-Kaddafi. Accordingly, this chapter is divided into the following parts:⁷

- Libya's Elections Background
- Political Theories and the Libyan Elections
 - Relevance of Political Theories to Libya's Elections
 - Critics of Libya's Elections
- Political Participation and Culture
- The Functioning of Government
- Civil Liberties
- Conclusion

Libya's Elections Background:

Libya has a long history of elections, dating back to the early days of its independence in 1952. The first elections in Libya were held in February 19, 1952, and since then, the country has held elections regularly. The first few decades of Libyan elections were relatively peaceful and stable. However, in the 1970s, the country was ruled by an autocratic dictator political regime, which suppressed all opposition and effectively ended free elections.

After Kaddafi's overthrow in 2011, Libya held its first free elections in 2012 since the late 1960s. However, political instability has plagued the country, and elections have been repeatedly delayed after 2015. The most recent general elections in Libya were held in 2014. However, these

⁷ - This chapter adopts the methodology of the Democracy Index Report, which dealt with democracy as the dependent variable and elections, political participation, political culture, functioning of government, and civil liberties as independent variables. The Democracy Index Reports collect data based on previous divisions; thus, this study examines this data in Libya's case. (See Democracy Index Report, 2022)



elections were marred somehow by violence and irregularities, and both sides disputed the results.

As a result of the political instability, Libya has not held a national election since 2014. There are plans to hold elections in late 2023 and early 2024. However, it is still being determined if these elections will be held, as there is still a great deal of uncertainty about the future of Libya. Despite the challenges, Libyans have a long tradition of voting and are eager to see their country return to a stable democracy. The next few years will be crucial for the future of Libyan democracy, and the success of the upcoming elections will be a significant step forward.

There are challenges that Libya faces in holding free and fair elections for the time being. First, Libya is still much divided, and the different political factions have great mistrust. Split Institutions make it challenging to agree on a standard set of rules for elections and make it tough to ensure that the elections are free and fair. Second, Libya is still very insecure, and there is much violence. Insecurity makes it difficult to hold elections in some parts of the country and makes it hard to ensure that the elections are safe for voters. Third, there is a history of fraud in Libyan polls, and there is a fear that this could happen again. This fear makes it vital to have strong safeguards to prevent fraud.

Despite these difficulties, there are also some reasons to be optimistic about the future of elections in Libya. The Libyan people have a long tradition of voting and are eager to see their country return to a stable democracy. The international community is committed to helping Libya hold free and fair elections. If the next elections in Libya are successful, the assistance of the international community in Libya will be a significant step forward for democracy. It will show that Libya is on the path to stability and will give the Libyan people hope for the future.

Political Theories and the Libyan Elections:

Political theories can be relevant to Libya's elections in many ways. For example, they can help understand the different political forces in Libya. In addition, political theories can help explain the various political ideologies and movements in Libya and the other interests these groups represent. Theoretical frameworks may help understand the dynamics of Libyan politics and the country's challenges in holding free and fair elections.

Moreover, political theories help identify the factors that need to be considered in designing an electoral system, such as the size of the electorate, the number of seats in the legislature, and the method of voting. The electoral system can help ensure that it is fair and representative of the people's will. Finally, Political theories can help to identify the different safeguards that need to be in place to ensure that the electoral process is free and fair, such as the need for an independent electoral commission, the need for a transparent voter registration process, and the need for a solid legal framework to protect the rights of voters. In addition to these specific applications, political theories can provide a broader framework for understanding the importance of elections in a democracy. Elections are a fundamental part of the democratic process, allowing citizens to have a say in how they are governed. Political theories explain the value of elections and the challenges countries face in holding them. (See Reilly and Reynolds)

A few political theories are most relevant to Libya's elections, such as Liberalism. Liberalism is a political theory and ideology that emphasizes individual rights and freedoms. It is based on the belief that the government should be limited in its power and that individuals should be free to pursue their interests. This theory is relevant to Libya's elections because freedom emphasizes the importance of free and fair elections to ensure that the government is accountable to the people. (See Bollen, 1993, pp. 1207-1230)

Relevance of Political Theories to Libya's Elections:

These are just a few political theories relevant to Libya's elections, e.g., rational and behavioral theories. By understanding these theories, we can better understand the challenges that Libya faces in holding free and fair elections, and we can also better understand the importance of elections in a democracy.

Rational theories of voting are based on the assumption that voters are rational actors who may vote for the candidate or party they believe will best represent their interests. These theories can be used to understand how voters make decisions in elections, and they can also be used to predict the outcome of elections.

One of the most critical rational theories of voting is the proximity model. This model assumes voters will vote for the candidate or party closest to them on the ideological spectrum. For example, a voter who is a

strong supporter of free markets is likely to vote for a candidate who is also a strong supporter of free markets. Another critical rational theory of voting is the party identification model. This model assumes that voters will vote for the party they identify with most strongly. Party identification is often based on the voter's family background, social class, or religious beliefs. Rational theories of voting have been used to explain the outcome of elections in many countries, including Libya. For example, in the 2012 Libyan general election, the National Congress of Libya was elected. The Islamic party was a coalition of liberal parties, and it was seen as the most moderate and centrist party in the election. This coalition suggests that the Libyan electorate sought a party that could unite the country and bring stability. (See Dow, 1998, pp. 259-270; and Meier, 1975)

Figure 2-1 refers to the general theoretical framework of rationality where votes may be classified based on three categories: The first model assumes that the Libyan voters are extremely rational; thus, they thoroughly review all the available alternatives on the election process and the agenda of potential candidates. The total rational voters are a myth rather than a fact, particularly in the Libyan case, due to the lack of information on candidates and elections.

However, there are some arguments for voters to review all the available alternatives during national elections, such as making an informed decision, holding the government accountable, and promoting democracy. Thus, by reviewing all the available options, voters can learn about the different parties' platforms and policies and the candidates' qualifications and experience. This information can help voters make a more informed decision about whom to vote. Nevertheless, when voters only consider the two main parties, they may need help to hold the government accountable for its actions. By considering all the available alternatives, voters can message the government that they are paying attention and will not vote for a party or candidate not doing a good job. Finally, by participating in the electoral process and voting for the party or candidate they believe is best for the country, voters can help promote democracy. When voters review all the available alternatives, they are more likely to choose a party or candidate representing their interests and values. (See Barry and Hardin, 1982)

In addition to these arguments, there are practical reasons why Libyan voters should review all the available alternatives during the national elections. For example, many small parties may need to be more

well-known to voters in Libya. By reviewing all the available options, voters can learn about these small parties and their platforms. This information can be helpful in close elections, where every vote counts. Ultimately, deciding whether to review all the available alternatives is up to each voter. However, there are several good reasons why voters should do so. By checking all the available options, voters may decide whom to vote for, hold the government accountable, and promote democracy. According to this theory, the Libyan voters are not rational because they need complete information on national and sub-national elections and the vision of Libya's future.⁸

Herbert Simon developed the second model of rationality. Herbert Simon's bounded rationality model argues that humans are not perfectly rational decision-makers. Instead, we have limited cognitive abilities and time, so we often make satisfying decisions, which are decisions that are good enough but could be better. In the context of voting, voters may need more time or resources to review all the available alternatives. Instead, they may rely on heuristics, or mental shortcuts, to make their decisions. For example, voters may vote for the candidate most familiar to them or who they think is most likely to win.

The persuaded voter model is a variation of Simon's bounded rationality model. It argues that voters are more likely to be swayed by information consistent with their beliefs. For example, voters already leaning toward a particular candidate are more likely to be persuaded by information supporting that candidate's policies.

Both Simon's model of bounded rationality and the persuaded voter model suggest that voters do not always make rational decisions when voting. However, these models also indicate that voters are not entirely irrational. They can still make informed decisions but may need to rely on heuristics and persuasion. In short, there are some additional points about Simon's model of bounded rationality and the persuaded voter model: (Alonso and Câmara, 2016, pp. 3590-3605)

1. Both models are based on the idea that humans have limited cognitive abilities.
2. Both models suggest that voters may need more time or resources to review all the available alternatives.

⁸ - When I voted in the Libya elections of 2012 and 2014 as a Libyan citizen, many voters asked me for whom I would vote. When I asked them what about you, their replies, we do not know. Of course, there is enough time to explain the election, candidates, and the role of political parties in the election; therefore, they vote without enough information and less interest.

3. Both models suggest that voters rely on heuristics to make their decisions.
4. The persuaded voter model argues that voters are more likely to be influenced by information consistent with their beliefs.

It is important to note that these are just two models of voter behavior. Many other models have been proposed, and the relative importance of bounded rationality and persuasion is still being debated.

Finally, Figure 2-1 refers to irrational and social voting behavior models, where voters are influenced by their social milieu or formality, not substance. The social model of voting behavior is a theory that suggests that voters are influenced by their social environment, such as their family, friends, tribes, and neighbors. This model is based on the idea that people are social creatures influenced by the opinions of those around them. The social model of voting behavior suggests that voters are more likely to vote for the same candidate as their friends and family because they are more likely to trust the opinions of those they know. Additionally, people may be more likely to vote for a candidate who is famous in their social group. (Ben-Bassat and Dahan, 2012, pp. 193-214)

The social model of voting behavior also suggests that the media coverage of an election may influence voters because the media can shape how people see the candidates and the issues. For example, if the media portrays a particular candidate negatively, it may discourage people from voting for that candidate.

The social model of voting behavior is one of many theories proposed to explain voting pattern, and Libyan voters are not an exception. For example, many Libyans voted in 2012 and 2014 on tribal commitment and affiliation. It is important to note that this model does not suggest that voters are always irrational. However, it indicates that voters are influenced by various factors, including their social environment. It is important to note that this is just one of many rational theoretical frameworks proposed to explain voting behavior. No single theory can fully explain why the Libyan people vote the way they do.

Finally, other classic theories argue in favor of irrational voters on different grounds, e.g., voters are not perfectly rational because humans are limited in their cognitive abilities and time, so we often make decisions that are not perfectly rational. For example, we may vote for a candidate we like personally, even if we disagree with their policies. In addition, voters are

influenced by factors other than the candidates' policies. Voters are also affected by many more factors, such as the candidates' personalities, the media coverage of the election, and their own experiences.

Voting can be a social act; thus, voters may choose a candidate because their friends or family are voting for him. Voting can also be symbolic when voters may vote for a particular candidate to express their dissatisfaction with the current government or to support a specific cause. Non-rational models of voting behavior suggest that voters only sometimes make decisions based on a careful analysis of the candidates' policies. Instead, they may be influenced by various factors, including their personal preferences, the media coverage of the election, and their social and political environment.

However, rational theories of voting have their limitations. One limitation is that they assume that voters are always rational actors. Factors such as emotions, social pressure, or misinformation may influence voters. Another area for improvement is that logical theories of voting only sometimes predict the outcome of an election because a small number of votes often decides elections, and these votes may be affected by a variety of factors that need to be captured by rational theories of voting.

Despite their limitations, rational theories of voting can be a helpful tool for understanding how voters make decisions in elections. They can also be used to predict the outcome of elections, although they should not be used as the only tool for making predictions. A final theoretical framework in this regard will be examined is the game theory, which reflects classical and behavioral views. (See Table: 2-1)

Game theory is a broad field that encompasses both classical and behavioral theories. Classical game theory assumes that players are rational and have perfect information about the game. It means that players can perfectly calculate the costs and benefits of each possible move and choose the move that will maximize their payoff. Classical game theory has been used to great success in economics and other fields, but it has been criticized for being unrealistic in its assumptions about human behavior. Behavioral game theory relaxes the assumptions of classical game theory and allows players to be irrational or to have imperfect information. It makes behavioral game theory more realistic but more challenging to make predictions. Behavioral game theory has been used to explain a broader range of human behavior than classical game theory. Still, it has yet to be widely adopted by economists and other social scientists. In general,

classical game theory is more helpful in making predictions about games in which players are likely to be rational and have perfect information. Behavioral game theory is more practical than its opponents in predicting games where players are likely to be irrational or have imperfect information. Ultimately, the best choice of game theory depends on the situation being analyzed. (See Brow2and Shoham, 2008)

Game theory may be used to analyze the strategies of the different political parties in Libya's elections in 2012 and 2014. In the 2012 election, there were two primary candidates: Mohamed Magariaf, representing the conservative Islamic view, and Mahmoud Gebril, representing the Liberal position. According to game theory, Magariaf would have been better off running a negative campaign against Gebril, highlighting his radical views. However, Magariaf chose to run a positive campaign, focusing on his platform. It may have been because he was worried about alienating voters who supported Gebril. In the end, Gebril's followers won the election of 2012.

The outcomes of Libya's elections in 2012 suggest that the political parties, e.g., the National Alliance Party and the Muslim Brotherhood party led by Gebril and Magariaf, respectively, in Libya, may not be entirely rational actors. They may be more concerned with avoiding alienating voters than maximizing their chances of winning elections. It could make it difficult to predict the outcome of future elections in Libya.

In addition to the strategies of the political parties, game theory can also be used to analyze the strategies of other actors in Libya's political landscape, such as the military, the tribal leaders, and the external states involved in the country. By understanding the different actors' strategies, we can better understand the dynamics of Libyan politics and the challenges facing the country's transition to democracy. In short, the best choice of game theory depends on the specific situation that is being analyzed. (For more details on attitudes toward military, see Abouzzohour and Yousef, 2023)


Furthermore, literature review refers to a behavioral model of voting patterns based on the assumption that voters are not always rational actors. These theories argue that voters are influenced by various factors, including their emotions, social environment, and past experiences. One of the most critical behavioral theories of voting is the party identification model. This model assumes that voters develop a strong attachment to a political party early in their lives and will continue to vote for it even if they disagree with the party's platform on some issues.

Another essential behavioral theory of voting is the socialization model. This model assumes voters learn about politics from their family, friends, and social environment. It means voters are likelier to vote for the same party as their parents, friends, or neighbors. (See Netemeyer and Burton, 1990, pp. 661-680)

Table: 2-1
The key differences between classical and behavioral game theory

Feature	Classical game theory	Behavioral game theory
Assumptions about players	Rational, perfect information	Irrational, imperfect information
Usefulness for making predictions	It is more beneficial for games with rational, perfectly informed players	It is more beneficial for games with irrational, imperfectly informed players
Adoption by economists and other social scientists	More widely adopted	Less widely adopted

Figure: 2-1
General Theoretical Framework of Rationality



Behavioral theories of voting have been used to explain the outcome of elections in many countries, including Libya. For example, in the 2012 Libyan general election, the National Congress of Libya was elected. This party was a coalition of liberal and Islamist parties, and it was seen as the most moderate and centrist party in the election. It suggests that their social environment influenced the Libyan electorate, as this party was the most



popular among young people and urban voters. However, behavioral theories of voting have their limitations. One limitation is that they assume that voters are only sometimes rational actors. Factors such as emotions, social pressure, and misinformation may influence voters.

Another area for improvement is that behavioral theories of voting only sometimes predict the outcome of elections because a small number of votes often decides elections, and these votes may be influenced by a variety of factors that need to be captured by behavioral theories of voting. Despite their limitations, behavioral theories of voting can be a valuable tool for understanding how voters make decisions in elections. They can also be used to predict the outcome of elections, although they should not be used as the only tool for making predictions. In short, the literature review emphasizes some critical differences between rational and behavioral theories of voting: (See McGann, 2016)

1. Rational theories assume that voters are rational actors who will vote for the candidate or party they believe best represents their interests. Behavioral models assume that voters are not always rational actors and are influenced by various factors, such as their emotions, social environment, and past experiences.
2. Rational theories focus on the voter's decision-making process on the one hand and on the social and environmental factors that influence voter behavior on the other.
3. Rational theories are more likely to be used to predict the outcome of elections. Behavioral theoretical frameworks are more likely to be used to understand how voters decide in elections.

Both rational and behavioral theories of voting can be helpful tools for understanding how voters make decisions in elections. However, it is crucial to be aware of the limitations of each theory. It is important to note that these are just two of the most recent voting theoretical frameworks. Many other theories have been developed recently, and more will likely be generated.

In addition, there are many post-behavioral theories of elections and voting. First, some of the most well-known include the social determinism theoretical framework. It argues that voters' choices are determined mainly by their social class, race, ethnicity, gender, and other social factors. Second, rational choice theory argues that voters make rational choices based on their self-interest and their assessment of the candidates and the

issues. Third, the affective intelligence model assumes that voters make decisions based on their emotions and may be wrong feelings rather than rational calculation. Fourth, critical theory argues that elections are not fair or democratic and that elites often manipulate them to serve their interests. Fifth, critical race theory examines the role of race and racism in elections and voting. Sixth, feminist theory examines the role of gender in elections and voting. Seventh, postcolonial theory examines the role of colonialism and imperialism in elections and voting. Finally, postmodernism theory argues that there is no truth about elections and that all knowledge is subjective and provisional. (See Bornschieer, 2021)

Moreover, the most recent voting theories, e.g., post-behavioral theories, consider the role of social media and other digital technologies in influencing voter behavior. These theories argue that voters are increasingly exposed to political information through social media and that this information can have a significant impact on their voting decisions. One of the most critical recent voting theories is the information cascade model. This model assumes that voters are more likely to vote for a candidate or party if they see that other people are voting for that candidate or party because voters often lack the time or resources to do their research on the candidates or parties, so they rely on the information that they see from their social networks. Another crucial recent voting theory is the echo chamber model. This model assumes that voters are more likely to be exposed to information confirming their beliefs because social media algorithms often show users content similar to the content they have already liked or shared. It can make voters increasingly polarized, as they are only exposed to information supporting their beliefs. These recent voting theories have important implications for Libya's elections. With much political polarization, the country is still recovering from a civil war. Social media and other digital technologies will likely influence peoples' voting decisions. (See Poy and Schuller, 2020)

There are some critical differences between the most recent voting theories and the older rational and behavioral theories: (See McGann, 2016; Netemeyer and Burton, 1990, pp. 661-680)

1. The most recent voting theories consider the role of social media and other digital technologies in influencing voter behavior. The older rational and behavioral approaches need to consider the part of these technologies.

2. The most recent voting theories focus on the social and environmental factors influencing voter behavior. The older rational and behavioral theoretical framework focuses on the voter's decision-making process.
3. The most recent voting theories are more likely to be used to understand how voters make election decisions. The older rational and behavioral views are more likely to be used to predict the outcome of elections.

It is essential to be aware of the limitations of each theory. The most recent voting theories are still relatively new and have yet to be tested as extensively as the older rational and behavioral models. However, they offer a unique perspective on voter behavior, and they could help understand how voters make decisions in elections in the future.

Critiques of Libya's Elections:

Since the overthrow of Kaddafi in 2011, Libya has held three general elections marred somehow by violence, irregularities, and accusations of fraud. Some of the most common critiques of Libya's elections include: (Bourhrous, 2022; and Gomati, 2022)

1. According to scholars, some elections have been marred by violence and irregularities, e.g., both the 2012 and 2014 elections were held amid a backdrop of violence, with armed militias clashing in the streets and threatening to disrupt the vote. They have made it challenging to ensure the safety of voters and election officials, and it has also raised concerns about the legitimacy of the results. Moreover, there have been numerous reports of voter fraud, ballot stuffing, and intimidation of voters. They have called into question the fairness of the elections and have made it challenging to ensure that the results accurately reflect the people's will.
2. The elections have been criticized for being too divisive. Libya's political landscape is deeply divided, and the elections have often been seen as a way for different factions to consolidate power. They have made it difficult to build consensus, leading to accusations that the elections are not representative of the people's will.
3. Despite these critiques, Libya's elections are a step in the right direction. They say the elections allow Libyans to express their views

and choose their leaders. They also argue that the elections can help to build trust and stability in the country.

However, Libya's elections have a long way to go before they can be considered free, fair, and legitimate. The country must address the underlying causes of violence and instability and ensure that elections are conducted fairly and transparently. Only then will the elections be able to play a positive role in Libya's transition to democracy. Some issues have affected voting in Libya's elections, including: (Khalifa, 2022 and UN Press Releases, 2023)

1. The security situation in Libya has been unstable for many years, making it difficult to hold free and fair elections. There has been violence and intimidation at polling stations, discouraging people from voting.
2. There have also been allegations of electoral fraud in Libya's elections. In the 2014 elections, there were reports of stuffed ballots and voters being turned away from polling stations. They have undermined public confidence in the electoral process.
3. There needs to be more trust between the different political factions in Libya. It has made it difficult to agree on a standard set of rules for elections, and it has also made it difficult to accept the results of elections.
4. Many people in Libya must know the importance of voting or learn how to vote. It has also made it difficult to get people to participate in elections.
5. By improving access to education, the electorate can be better informed about the issues and the candidates.
6. By enhancing media freedom, the media can effectively inform the electorate and hold the candidates accountable.
7. By fostering political participation, the electorate can become more involved in the political process and better understand the issues and the candidates.
8. By reducing external interference, the electorate can be freer to make informed decisions about who to vote for.

9. The level of conceptualization in Libya elections is a complex issue. Each answer will only apply to some polls in Libya, as the level of conceptualization will vary depending on the specific surrounding milieu of each election. However, many factors can contribute to the level of conceptualization in Libya elections.

Thus, one factor that can contribute to the level of conceptualization in Libya elections is the level of education among the electorate. If the electorate is more educated, they are more likely to have a better understanding of the issues and the candidates, and they are more likely to be able to make informed decisions about whom to vote for. Another factor contributing to the conceptualization level in Libya elections is media freedom. If the media is free and independent, it can help to inform the electorate about the issues and the candidates, and it can help to hold the candidates accountable. (See Smith, 1980, pp. 685-696)

The level of political participation in Libya can also contribute to the level of conceptualization in elections. Suppose people are more involved in the political process. In that case, they are more likely to have a better understanding of the issues and the candidates, and they are more likely to be able to make informed decisions about who to vote for. Finally, the level of external interference in Libya elections can also contribute to the level of conceptualization. If there is much external interference, it can make it more difficult for the electorate to decide who to vote for. (See Converse, 1975, pp.102-105; and Smith, 1980, pp. 685-696)

In conclusion, the level of conceptualization in Libya elections is a complex issue influenced by several factors. By understanding these factors, it is possible to develop strategies for increasing the level of conceptualization in Libya's elections and building a more democratic future for the country. In short, there are some of the ways that the level of conceptualization in Libya elections can be increased. By taking these steps, it is possible to increase the level of conceptualization in Libya's elections and to build a more democratic future for the country.

Political Participation:

Political participation in Libya is the process by which citizens of Libya engage in the political process. It can include voting, running for office, joining political parties, or participating in protests and demonstrations. Political participation is essential in Libya because it gives citizens a say in governing their country. It also helps to ensure that the

government is accountable to the people. However, political participation in Libya has been challenging since the overthrow of Kaddafi in 2011. The country has been plagued by political instability and violence, making it difficult for people to participate in political activities. (Nie and Verba, 1975, pp. 1-74)

Despite these obstacles, many factors could help to promote political participation in Libya in the future. These factors include: (See Ragrag, 2021; and United Nations Youth, 2013)

1. A robust civil society can promote political participation by allowing people to organize and advocate for their interests.
2. Holding free and fair elections can legitimize the political process and encourage people to participate.
3. Establishing a solid rule of law can help protect citizens' rights and create a more conducive environment for political participation.
4. Voting is the most basic form of political participation. It allows citizens to have a say in who governs them.
5. Running for office is another way to participate in politics. It allows citizens to put their ideas into practice and represent their constituents' interests.
6. Joining political parties is a way to become involved in the political process and to support a particular set of ideas.
7. Protests and demonstrations are a way to express dissatisfaction with the government or to demand change.
8. Civic education is vital for political participation. It helps citizens to understand their rights and responsibilities and to become involved in the political process.

Political participation is essential for a healthy democracy. It allows citizens to have a say in how their country is governed and to hold the government accountable. Political participation has several challenges in Libya, but some mentioned factors could help promote participation in the future. (Isa and Yucel, 2022)

In this chapter, political participation may be dealt with as a second independent variable affecting democratization in Libya's post-Kaddafi era. (See Figure: 1-1) However, this subsection focuses on the relevance of political participation to an election on the one hand and how it correlates to democratization in Libya post-Kaddafi era on the other. Political participation is the process by which citizens of a country engage in political activities, such as voting, running for office, and participating in

protests or demonstrations. It is an essential part of a democratic society, giving citizens a say in how they are governed. Political participation has been a critical issue in Libya in the post-Kaddafi era. The country has held several elections since Kaddafi's overthrow in 2011, but these elections have been marred by some violence and irregularities. It has led to many Libyans needing more trust in the political process.

Since the first elections in Libya in February 1952, the average voter turnout was estimated at 50-60%. The number of registered voters in Libya's 2012, 2014, and 2022 elections was 2,865,937, 1,509,291, and more than 2, 500,000, respectively. The number of registered voters dropped by around 50% in 2014 and then increased by 100% in 2022. The disappointment of the Libyan voters decreased the voter turnout in the first instance and raised it again to a considerable level in the second example. (For more data, see the site of the High National Election Commission of Libya or HNECL.)

It is important to note that these are just the number of registered voters, and the number of people who voted in each election may have been lower. Additionally, the voter registration process in Libya has only sometimes been transparent, so it is difficult to say with certainty how many people were eligible to vote in each election.

However, the number of registered voters in Libya has declined in recent years due to several factors, including the ongoing political instability in the country. The 2023 or 2024 elections have yet to be held, so how many people will be registered to vote is still being determined. There are various reasons why political participation is so vital in Libya. First, it is essential for building a strong and stable democracy. When citizens can participate in the political process, they are more likely to feel that they have a stake in their country and that their voices are being heard. Citizens can help to reduce conflict and instability. Second, political participation can help to promote peace and reconciliation. When different groups can come together to build a better future for their country, it can help heal the divisions created during the conflict. Finally, political participation can help to improve the lives of ordinary Libyans. When citizens can hold their leaders accountable, they can demand better services and more opportunities. That can lead to a better quality of life for everyone. (Randall, 2015, pp. 199-2015)

Several challenges need to be overcome to increase political participation in Libya. These difficulties include the legacy of Kaddafi's

authoritarian rule, the lack of a robust civil society, and the lack of trust in the political process. The first obstacle to political participation is the heritage of the Kaddafi regime, which suppressed political dissent for decades, and many Libyans are still afraid to speak out or participate in politics. The second problem is that irregularities and violence marred in recent elections have led many Libyans to lose faith in the political process. Finally, a robust civil society can promote political participation by giving citizens the information and resources they need to get involved. However, Libya's civil society needs to be more robust; only some organizations can mobilize citizens effectively. (Harb, 2021)

Despite these difficulties, there are numerous reasons to be hopeful about the future of political participation in Libya. The country's young population is increasingly engaged in politics, and there is a growing demand for democracy and accountability. With time and effort, it is possible to build a more inclusive and participatory political system in Libya. (See Harb, 2021)

Although this chapter deals with elections and political participation as independent variables and democratization as the dependent variable, it finds out that we may treat the election as an intermediate factor and political participation as the cause and democratization as a result. Thus, we may conclude that more political participation results in an effective election, more democracy is achieved, and vice versa. Low levels of political participation can harm elections. Ensuring the elections are free and fair is more challenging when fewer people participate. Additionally, low levels of involvement can lead to a lack of legitimacy for the elected government.

Democratization is moving from an authoritarian to a democratic political system. It is a complex process that involves many factors, including political participation, elections, and the rule of law. Political participation is essential to democratization, as it gives citizens a say in how they are governed. When citizens can participate in the political process, they are more likely to feel that they have a stake in their country and that their voices are being heard. That can help to reduce conflict and instability, and it can also help to promote peace and reconciliation. Elections are also vital to democratization, allowing citizens to choose their political leaders and hold them accountable. When elections are free and fair, they help ensure that the government represents the people. It can help to build trust between the government and the people, and it can also help to promote good governance.

The relationship between political participation, elections, and democratization is complex in Libya. The country has a long history of authoritarian rule, and there is still a lack of trust in the political process. However, there are many Libyans who are committed to democracy, and they are working to increase political participation and hold elections that are free and fair. With time and effort, Libya can achieve a higher level of political participation and democratization.

Political Culture:

Political culture is people's values, beliefs, and attitudes about politics and government. Democratization is moving from an authoritarian to a democratic political system. This study deals with elections and political culture as a cause and democratization as a result. Thus, we will examine in the next chapter the correlations coefficient between political culture on the one side and democratization on the other. The relationship between political culture and democratization is complex, and there is no single answer. However, there are many ways in which political culture can influence democratization. (Almond and Verba, 1963)

One way is that political culture can affect the level of support for democracy. If people strongly believe in the values of democracy, such as freedom, equality, and the rule of law, they are more likely to support democratic reforms. Conversely, people with a weak belief in these values are more likely to support authoritarian rule. Another way political culture can influence democratization is by altering how people participate in the political process. If people have a positive attitude towards democracy, they are more likely to participate in political activities, such as voting, running for office, and joining political parties.

Conversely, if people have a negative attitude toward democracy, they are less likely to participate in political activities. Finally, political culture can also influence how people view the government. If people have a high level of trust in the government, they are more likely to accept the results of elections and support the government's policies. Conversely, if people have low faith in the government, they are more likely to challenge the results of elections and oppose the government's policies.

In short, the relationship between political culture and democratization is complex, and there is no single answer. However, there are several ways in which political culture can influence democratization in Libya post-Kaddafi. Thus, political culture can affect democracy in Libya in many ways: the level of support for democracy, how people participate in the



political process, and how they view the government. When the people strongly believe in the values of democracy, such as freedom, equality, and the rule of law, they are more likely to support democratic reforms. Conversely, people with a weak belief in these values are more likely to support authoritarian rule. (See Doherty, 2011)

Moreover, when people have a positive attitude towards democracy, they are more likely to participate in political activities, such as voting and running for office. Conversely, if people have a negative attitude toward democracy, they are less likely to participate in political activities. Finally, if people have a high level of trust in the government, they are more likely to accept the results of elections and support the government's policies. Conversely, if people have low faith in the government, they are more likely to challenge the results of elections and oppose the government's policies.

In Libya, the political culture has been shaped by some factors, including the country's history of authoritarian rule, the legacy of Kaddafi, and the ongoing political instability. As a result, there is a mixed attitude towards democracy in Libya. Some people have a strong belief in the values of democracy, while others are more sceptical of it. That has made it difficult to build a strong foundation for democracy in Libya. (See Lama, 2017)

However, there are several Libyans who are committed to democracy, and they are working to change the political culture. They promote the values of democracy, such as freedom, equality, and the rule of law. They are also working to increase political participation and build trust in the government. With time and effort, Libya can achieve a more democratic political culture.

Some specific examples of how political culture has affected democracy in Libya: First, Kaddafi's authoritarian rule for over 40 years left a deep imprint on Libyan political culture. Many Libyans are still distrustful of the government and political institutions. They have made it challenging to build a strong foundation for democracy in the country. Second, the political instability in Libya has also made it hard to build a strong foundation for democracy. Libya has been plagued by violence and conflict since the overthrow of Kaddafi in 2011. It has made it difficult to hold free and fair elections and also made it hard to build trust in the government.

Despite these challenges, there are many Libyans who are committed to democracy. They are working to change the political culture and to build a more democratic Libya. With time and effort, Libya can achieve a more democratic political culture and create a more stable and prosperous country. Furthermore, there is a strong association between elections and political culture. As mentioned, Political culture is people's values, beliefs, and attitudes about politics and government. Elections are crucial to political culture, allowing citizens to choose their politicians and hold them accountable.

Some examples of how elections and political culture are correlated include:

First, countries with a strong democratic political culture are likelier to have high voter turnout in elections. People in these countries believe that elections are significant and have a stake in the outcome.

Second, countries with a strong democratic political culture are more likely to have a variety of political parties and civil society organizations. People in these countries believe it is vital to be involved in the political process and hold their leaders accountable.

Third, countries with a strong democratic political culture are more likely to have high levels of trust in the government. People in these countries believe the government is legitimate and represents their interests.

Of course, there are also some countries where there is a disconnect between elections and political culture. For example, some countries hold elections regularly, but the elections are not free and fair. In these countries, the political culture may be authoritarian, even though elections are held. Overall, there is a strong correlation between elections and political culture. Elections are essential to political culture and can help strengthen democratic values. However, it is important to note that some countries also have a disconnect between elections and political culture.

The Functioning of Government:⁹

This chapter deals with the functioning of government in Libya post-Kaddafi as a third independent variable affecting democratization in Libya post-Kaddafi. As mentioned, political instability and violence have made it difficult to establish a stable political system and implement effective

⁹ - A government's primary functions are providing leadership, security, public services, and protecting democracy.



government policies. The current government of Libya is a parliamentary republic. The current government is transitional because Libya did not have a permanent constitution. Figure 2-2 clarifies the structure of contemporary government in Libya since 2015. Like other countries, it is based on the principle of separation of powers, namely the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.

As far as the executive branch is concerned, the data in Table: 2-2 shows that thirteen prime ministers have held power since 2011. The transitional periods for those prime ministers supposedly ended in 2015 when the constitution draft was ready for vote.

The current executive branch in Libya is the Government of National Unity (GNU) and the Presidential Council (PC). Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dabaiba heads the GNU. He is responsible for the day-to-day running of the government and overseeing the implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA). Mohamed al-Menfi heads the PC. He represents Libya internationally and oversees the military and security forces. The GNU and the PC are part of the Libyan Political Agreement, signed in 2015. The agreement was designed to end Libya's civil war and create a unified government. The GNU and the PC have faced some challenges since their inception. These challenges include a weak security situation, a divided political landscape, and a struggling economy. However, they have also progressed, including holding the first round of parliamentary elections in December 2022 by ending the stage of the vote registration process. The success of the GNU and the PC will depend on their ability to address Libya's challenges and build a more prosperous and democratic future for the country.

Table: 2-2
A List of Prime Ministers who held Power since 2011

No.	Prime Ministers	Durations
1	Mahmud Gebril	2011 March to October
2	Ali Atarhoni	2011 October November
3	Abd-rahiem El-Keeb	2011-2012 One Year
4	Ali Zedan	2012-2013 One Year
5	Abdalla Al-Tanee	201402021
6	Ahmed Meateq	2014 Two Weeks
7	Omer Al-Al-Hasee	2014-2015
8	Kalifa El-Gawel	2015-2016
9	Fayz Al-Saraj	2016-2021
10	Kalifa El-Gawel	2016-2017
11	Abd-Alhamed Dabiaba	2021-2023
12	Fathi Bash Aga	2022-2023
13	Osama Hamad	2023-

As far as the executive branch is concerned, the data of Table: 2-2 show that thirteen prime ministers held power in the Western and Eastern regions during 2011-2023. This succession of transitional prime ministers in Libya post-Kaddafi has had a negative impact on the country's democratization because a stable government is essential for any democracy to function effectively. Frequent changes in government can lead to uncertainty, instability, and a lack of accountability. Implementing reforms and addressing the country's many challenges can make it difficult. In Libya's case, the rapid turnover of prime ministers has been due to several factors, including: (See United Nations, Libya, 2021)


1. The country's deep political divisions have made it difficult to form a government that is acceptable to all sides.
2. The role of armed groups has often interfered in the political process and prevented the establishment of a strong elected central government.
3. The lack of experience of Libyans in democratic governance.
4. The instability caused by the frequent changes of the prime minister has made it difficult for Libya to progress on its transition to democracy.

5. The country has been plagued by political violence, economic hardship, and a lack of security.

Thus, in order to achieve democracy, Libya must establish a stable government to unite the country and address its many challenges. This will require a negotiated settlement between the country's rival factions and the disarming of armed groups. It will also require the development of solid democratic institutions and the participation of all Libyans in the political process.

The legislative branch is also the other body that delay democratization in Libya because there should be a permanent constitution and a newly elected parliament since 2015. The House of Representatives “HoRs” and the Supreme Council of the State or the Senate are the two chambers of the Libyan Parliament. The House of Representatives has 200 members, elected by popular votes since 2014. The Senate was also elected by popular vote in 2012. Both chambers can pass laws, approve the Prime Minister, oversee the executive branch, declare war, and ratify treaties. The House of Representatives and the Senate are co-equal branches of government, and each has the power to check and balance the other. The system of checks and balances is formed to prevent any formal branch from becoming too dominant. However, the current role of the House of Representatives and the Senate in Libya is limited. The country is transitional, and the Parliament needs to be fully functional. The House of Representatives is based in Tobruk in the East, while the Senate is based in Tripoli in the West. The two chambers have been unable to agree on many national issues, including forming a government and holding elections.

The conflict between the legislative bodies in Libya since 2014 has also had a negative impact on the country's political stability and ability to achieve democracy. The two bodies have been deadlocked in a power struggle since 2014, each claiming to be the legitimate government of Libya.



The conflict between the HoRs and the HCS has led to several problems, including: (See United Nations, Libya, 2021)

1. The two bodies have been unable to agree on a unified government, which has led to a vacuum of power in the country. This has made it difficult to address the country's many challenges, such as the election, the security situation, the economy, and the provision of essential services.
2. The conflict between the HoRs and the HCS has led to political unrest in Libya. Some armed clashes have rocked the country, and there is a risk of civil war and division.
3. The political instability has also had a negative impact on the economy. Foreign investment has dried up, and the country's oil production has been disrupted. This has led to high unemployment, inflation, and poverty.
4. The conflict has also had a devastating impact on the humanitarian situation in Libya. Millions of people have been displaced from their homes, and there is a shortage of food, gasoline, water, and medical supplies. The conflict has led to the spread of arms and militias in Libya. This has made it difficult to maintain security and law and order.
5. The conflict has also weakened state institutions, such as the police and the judiciary. This has made it difficult to provide basic services to the people.
6. The conflict has eroded trust in the political process among Libyans. This has made it difficult to build a consensus on the country's future

7. The conflict between the HoRs and the HCS is a significant obstacle to Libya's transition to democracy.

Regarding the judicial branch, one may argue that it has struggled to assert its independence since the overthrow of Kaddafi in 2011. The country's new constitution draft, adopted in 2015, establishes the judiciary as an independent branch of government, but it has been difficult to implement this in practice. One of the main difficulties facing the judiciary is the lack of a clear separation of powers. The executive branch has often interfered in the judicial process, and there have been reports of judges being pressured to rule a certain way. The security forces have also been accused of interfering in the judiciary, and judges have been arrested or attacked. Another challenge facing the judiciary is the lack of resources. The courts are typically understaffed and underfunded, making it difficult to function effectively. There is also a lack of training for judges, leading to inconsistent rulings. (The Reform of Judiciaries in the Wake of the Arab Spring, 2012)

Despite these obstacles, the judicial branch in Libya is slowly but surely asserting its independence. There have been many high-profile cases in recent years when judges have ruled against the government or powerful individuals. This is a positive development, and the rule of law needs to be established in Libya.

The current impact of the judiciary branch on democratization in Libya post-Kaddafi is limited. The judiciary still struggles to assert its independence from the executive branch and the security forces. This has made it difficult for the judiciary to play a meaningful role in upholding the rule of law and protecting human rights.

However, there are some positive signs that the judiciary is slowly asserting its independence. In recent years, there have been some high-profile cases in which judges have ruled against the government or powerful individuals. This is a positive development, and the rule of law needs to be established in Libya.

Nevertheless, the future impact of the judiciary branch on democratization in Libya will depend on several factors, including the success of the ongoing reforms to strengthen the independence of the judiciary. If these reforms are successful, the judiciary can play a significant role in consolidating democracy in Libya. There are some specific ways in which the judiciary can affect democratization in Libya:

1. By upholding the rule of law and protecting human rights, the judiciary can help create a stable and secure environment where democracy can flourish.
2. The judiciary can help build citizens' trust and confidence by providing a fair and impartial forum for resolving disputes.
3. Holding government officials accountable for their actions, the judiciary branch can help to prevent corruption and abuse of power.
4. Promoting transparency and accountability, the judiciary can help to build a more democratic and just society.

In short, the judiciary is an essential part of any democracy. In Libya, the judiciary has a long way to go before it can fully assert its independence and play a meaningful role in democratization. However, the positive signs in recent years suggest that the judiciary is slowly but surely moving in the right direction. Thus, one may argue certain reforms to strengthen the independence of the judiciary in Libya: (The Reform of Judiciaries in the Wake of the Arab Spring, 2012)

1. Establish a Judicial Council to oversee the appointment and promotion of judges.
2. The creation of a system of checks and balances between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government.
3. Providing adequate resources to the courts, including training for judges and staff.
4. The strengthening of the independence of the security forces from political interference.

These reforms are essential if the judiciary is to play a meaningful role in consolidating democracy in Libya. In order to achieve democracy, the three branches of the Libyan government need to reach a negotiated settlement and agree on a unified government and urgent election. This will be a difficult task, but it is essential for the future of Libya. In short, the three branches of government are responsible for making either laws, or enforcing laws, and providing services to the people. For example, while the GNU is responsible for the day-to-day affairs and overseeing the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) implementation, the PC is responsible for representing the country internationally and managing the military and security forces.

However, the government has been unable to effectively carry out these functions due to ongoing political instability and violence. Some factors have contributed to the difficulties facing the government of Libya



post-Kaddafi. These factors include: First, Kaddafi's regime was characterized by authoritarianism and corruption. They have left a legacy of distrust and instability in Libyan society. Second, there needs to be a strong central government; thus, Libya is divided between rival political factions, each with its armed forces. They have made establishing a strong central government that can enforce the rule of law difficult. Finally, the influence of foreign powers, such as Turkey and Russia, has been involved in the conflict in Libya. They have complicated the political situation and made it difficult to reach a peaceful resolution. (The World Bank in Libya, 2023)

Nevertheless, many factors could help improve the government's functioning in Libya. These factors include: First, holding free and fair elections could legitimize the government and create a more stable political system that can convert inputs into output effectively. Second, establishing a solid rule of law could help protect citizens' rights and create a more conducive environment for economic development. Finally, promoting national reconciliation could help heal the divisions in Libyan society and create a more united country. (The World Bank in Libya, 2023)

The future of the government in Libya is uncertain. However, several factors could help improve government functioning in the future. The functioning of government in a democratic country is based on the principles of democracy, e.g., the rule of law, separation of powers, and checks and balances. The functioning of government in a democratic country is also based on the principles of accountability and transparency. That means that the government must be transparent and accountable to the people. It means that the government must be open about its decisions and actions and allow the people to hold it responsible. Moreover, the functioning of government in a democratic country is a complex process, but it is essential for maintaining democracy. Law enforcement, separation of powers, checks and balances, accountability, and transparency are necessary to ensure that the government cannot abuse its authority.

Among the critical functions of a government in a democratic country: First, the government is responsible for making laws that govern the country. That includes rules that protect the rights of citizens, laws that regulate the economy, and laws that promote the common good. Second, the government is responsible for implementing the laws that it has passed. It includes providing services to citizens, such as education, healthcare, and infrastructure. It also includes enforcing the rules by apprehending criminals and bringing them to justice. Third, the government is

responsible for interpreting the laws and settling disputes. That includes hearing cases from citizens, businesses, and the government itself. The judicial authority also ensures that the government complies with the law. Fourth, the government represents the country internationally. It includes negotiating treaties, conducting diplomacy, and deploying troops abroad. (For more listed government functions, see Nyadzi, 2021))

Thus, the functioning of government in a democratic country is a complex process, but it is essential for maintaining democracy. Moreover, the relationship between the functioning of government and democracy in Libya is complex and multifaceted. However, there are several key ways in which these two concepts are interrelated. (See Cook, 1948; and National Democratic Institute, 2011)

First, the functioning of government is essential for establishing and maintaining a democratic system. That is because a democratic government must be able to provide for the basic needs of its citizens, such as security, healthcare, and education. It must also be able to enforce the law and protect its citizens' rights. If the government cannot do these things, it will be challenging to build a stable and prosperous democracy.

Second, the functioning of government can also help to promote democratic values because a well-functioning government may allow citizens to participate in politics and hold their leaders accountable. It can also help to build trust between the government and the people. When citizens believe that their government is responsive to their needs and responsible to them, they are more likely to support the democratic system.

Third, the functioning of government can also help to prevent the rise of authoritarianism. That is because a well-functioning government can provide citizens with a legitimate alternative to authoritarian rule. It can also build a robust civil society, which serves as a check on the power of the government. When citizens have a robust civil society, they are more likely to be able to resist the temptation to support authoritarian leaders.

Of course, some problems can arise when government and democracy interact. For example, if the government is responsive to the needs of its citizens, then it may be challenging to build trust between the government and the people. It can lead to instability and conflict. Additionally, if the government is not accountable to the people, then it may be more likely to abuse its power. The instability can also lead to conflict.

Overall, the relationship between the functioning of government and democracy in Libya is complex and multifaceted. However, there are some critical ways in which these two concepts are interrelated. A well-functioning government can help to promote democratic values and prevent the rise of authoritarianism. However, if the government is not responsive to the needs of its citizens or accountable to them, then it can be challenging to build a stable and prosperous democracy.

In Libya, the relationship between elections, the functioning of the government, and democracy has been complex. The country has held several elections since the overthrow of Kaddafi in 2011, but violence, irregularities, and accusations of fraud have marred these elections. They are mainly because the government has been unable to provide security effectively or ensure that the electoral process is fair and accessible.

However, there have been some positive developments in recent years. In 2021, the United Nations helped to broker a political agreement between the two rival governments in Libya. This agreement has helped pave the way for holding new elections in 2023-2024. If these elections are successful, they could help to result in a new era of stability and democracy in Libya.

In short, the functioning of the Libyan government and democracy are closely related. If the government can function effectively, it can help ensure that elections are fair and accessible. That could help to build trust between the government and the people, and it could also help to promote democracy in Libya.

Civil Liberties:

Civil liberties are the final independent variable that examines its relation to democratization. They are the rights that exist when the government does not interfere arbitrarily. In a democracy, the law protects civil liberties. It is essential for a free society's functioning, e.g., the right to express opinions, express one's views or protest against government policies, join or form organizations, participate in elections, and choose one's government. These are just some of the most important civil liberties.

In a democracy, these rights are essential for the protection of individual freedom and the functioning of a free society. Civil liberties are not absolute, and there are sometimes exceptions to these rights. For example, the government may restrict freedom of speech to protect national security or prevent the spreading hate speech. However, these exceptions

must be narrowly tailored and justified by a compelling government interest. The government's respect for civil liberties and human rights is essential for the functioning of a democracy. When the government can interfere arbitrarily in the lives of its citizens, then democracy cannot thrive. Civil liberties are the foundation of a free society and must be protected at all costs. (See Siegle, 2012, pp. 471–506)

Civil liberties and democracy are inextricably linked. Civil liberties are the rights that exist when the government does not interfere arbitrarily, and democracy is a system of government in which the people hold power. In a democracy, civil liberties are protected by the law and essential for a free society's functioning. (Siegle, 2012) There are several reasons why civil liberties are necessary for democracy. (See Russell, 1969, pp. 109-131)

First, civil rights allow citizens to participate in the political process. For example, freedom of speech will enable citizens to express their views on political matters, and freedom of assembly allows citizens to express their opinions or to protest against government policies. These rights are essential for ensuring that the government is accountable to the people.

Second, civil liberties protect citizens from the government. For example, the right to privacy protects citizens from government intrusion into their private lives, and the right to due process protects citizens from being arbitrarily arrested or detained. These rights are essential for ensuring that the government does not abuse its power.

Third, civil liberties promote tolerance and understanding. For example, freedom of expression allows citizens to oppose controversial issues without interference from the government, and freedom of association enables citizens to join or form organizations with people who share their views. These rights are essential for ensuring that democracy is a diverse and tolerant society.

In short, the relationship between civil liberties and democracy is close. Civil liberties are essential for the functioning of a democracy, and democracy is critical to protecting civil rights. There are some examples of how civil liberties have been used to promote democracy (See Lewczuk, 2021, pp. 287-217)

First, the American colonists used their right to free speech to criticize the British government and their right to assembly to protest against British rule. These rights were essential for the success of the American Revolution.

Second, the African American civil rights movement used their right to free speech to demand equal rights and their right to assembly to protest against segregation. These rights were essential for the success of the civil rights movement.

Third, the Arab Spring was a real protest and revolution sweeping the Arab world in 2011. The protesters used their right to free speech to criticize their governments and their right to assembly to demand political reform. These rights were essential for the success of the Arab Spring.

These are just a few examples of how civil liberties have been used to promote democracy. Civil rights are essential for the functioning of a democracy, and they must be protected at all costs. Civil liberties and elections are closely related. The privileges are the rights that exist when the government does not interfere arbitrarily, and elections are a way for citizens to choose their leaders. In a democracy, civil liberties are protected by the law and essential for a free society's functioning.

There are several reasons why civil liberties are essential for democracy and elections. First, civil rights allow citizens to participate in the electoral process. For example, freedom of speech will enable citizens to express their views on candidates and issues, and freedom of assembly allows citizens to gather together to campaign for their preferred candidates. These rights are essential for ensuring that the government is accountable to the people.

Second, civil liberties protect citizens from the government. For example, the right to privacy protects citizens from government interference in their voting decisions, and the right to due process protects citizens from being arbitrarily denied the right to vote. These rights are essential for ensuring that the government does not abuse its power.

Third, civil liberties promote tolerance and understanding. For example, freedom of association enables citizens to join or form organizations with people who share their views. These rights are essential for ensuring fair elections and that all citizens have a voice.

In short, the relationship between civil liberties and elections is close. Civil rights are essential for the functioning of a democracy, and democracy is crucial in protecting civil liberties. There are also some examples of how civil liberties have been used to promote democracy and elections. The Arab Spring movement, such as the February Revolutionists in Libya, was a series of revolts that swept through the Arab world in 2011. The protesters used their right to free speech to criticize their governments and their right to assembly to demand political reforms. These rights were

essential for the success of the Arab Spring and the establishment of democratic governments in some countries. (Russel, 1968, pp. 109-131)

By the end of this section, we may argue that civil liberties and human rights are crucial concepts protecting individuals from harm and discrimination. However, there are some critical differences between the two concepts. (Vuleta, 2022)

1. Both civil liberties and human rights are inherent to all human beings. Governments or other institutions do not grant them but are based on all people's intrinsic dignity and worth.
2. Both concepts are protected by law. In democratic countries, for example, civil liberties are protected by the constitution. Human rights are protected by international law, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
3. Both rights are essential for a just and free society. They allow people to live free from fear and oppression and participate fully in the community.
4. Civil liberties tend to be more specific than human rights. For example, the right to free speech is a civil liberty, while the right to life is a human right.
5. Civil liberties are typically enforced by domestic law, while human rights are enforced by international law. It means there is often more recourse for civil liberties than human rights violations.
6. Civil liberties are typically protected for all citizens, regardless of race, gender, religion, or other personal characteristics. On the other hand, human rights may be protected for certain people vulnerable to discrimination, such as women, children, or people with disabilities.

In short, despite their differences, civil liberties and human rights are essential for protecting all people's rights and freedoms in democratic countries. We should strive to achieve essential goals in democratic political systems.

Conclusion:

Elections and democracy are closely related in Libya. Elections are crucial to the democratic process, allowing Libyans to select their politicians and hold them accountable. However, the relationship between elections and democracy in Libya has been complex. The country has held several elections since the overthrow of Kaddafi in 2011. Still, violence, irregularities, and accusations of fraud have marred these elections because Libya has been plagued by political instability and armed conflict since the revolution.

Despite these difficulties, there are various reasons why elections are essential for democracy in Libya. First, elections can help to build trust between the government and the people. When citizens believe their votes matter and can make a difference, they are more likely to support the democratic process. Second, elections can promote stability and peace. When the people select a legitimate government, there will be less likely to be violence or conflict. Third, elections can help to protect human rights. When citizens have a say in who governs them, they are more likely to be able to hold their leaders accountable and defend their rights.

Of course, elections are not the only factor that is important for democracy in Libya. Other factors, such as the rule of law, the protection of human rights, and the existence of a robust civil society, are also critical. However, elections are a vital part of the democratic process and can be essential in promoting democracy in Libya.

Some obstacles have made it difficult to hold free and fair elections in Libya: First, Libya has been plagued by political instability since the revolution in 2011, making it difficult to hold elections in a safe and secure environment. Second, there has been ongoing armed conflict in Libya since the revolution, making it difficult to hold elections. Third, there have been allegations of fraud in previous elections in Libya, which has damaged public trust in the electoral process. Finally, Libya needs more resources for free and fair elections, such as a reliable voter registry and a well-functioning electoral commission.

Despite these complex circumstances, there have been some positive developments in recent years. In 2021, the United Nations helped to broker a political agreement between the two rival governments in Libya. This agreement has helped pave the way for holding new elections in 2023. These successful elections could result in a new era of stability and democracy in Libya.

Overall, the relationship between elections and democracy in Libya is complex. Elections are a vital part of the democratic process. Still, they have been challenging to hold in a safe and secure milieu due to the country's political instability and armed conflict. However, there have been some positive developments in recent years, and there is hope that free and fair elections can be held in Libya. Civil liberties, e.g., the freedom of speech and right to assembly, may also influence the relationship between elections and political participation in Libya. For example, in a country where citizens have the right to freedom of speech, they are more likely to be able to express their political views and participate in political activities. Conversely, in a country where citizens do not have the right to freedom of speech, they are less likely to be able to express their political views and participate in political activities.

The upcoming elections in Libya are still a long way off, but three possible scenarios could play out. Here are a few of the most likely:

First is the optimistic scenario, which may argue that elections may be held on time, e.g., 2023-2024, and are free and fair. That would be the best-case scenario for Libya, allowing the country to step forward in its transition to democracy. However, it is essential to note that this scenario has challenges. Libya is still recovering from internal war, with much political polarization. Ensuring that the elections are genuinely free and fair will be challenging.

Second, a pessimistic scenario argues that the elections may be delayed or postponed forever. This scenario is more likely, as many factors could lead to delays or postponements. These include security concerns, logistical challenges, and political disagreements. If the elections are delayed or postponed, it could further wait for Libya's transition to democracy.

Third, the elections are held but not free and fair. That is a worst-case scenario, as it would only divide the country further and prolong the political instability. If the elections are not free and fair, it could lead to violence and unrest.

It is impossible to say what will happen in Libya's upcoming elections. However, the country faces some challenges. The elections will test Libya's ability to overcome these problems and move forward in its transition to democracy. There are also other possible scenarios, such as the elections are held, but a clear winner has yet to be. That could lead to a political deadlock as different factions compete for power. That could further delay

Libya's transition to democracy, and the elections are held, but the results are disputed. They could lead to violence and unrest as different factions contest the results. The polls could further destabilize the country.

These are a few possible scenarios that could play out in Libya's upcoming elections. The actual outcome will depend on some factors, including the security situation, the political landscape, and the international community's involvement.

In short, the relationship between elections, political participation and culture, the functioning of government, and civil liberties is complex and multifaceted. However, these factors are all interrelated, and they can all influence the level of political participation in a country. The third chapter will examine the correlation coefficient between elections, political participation, political culture, the functioning of government, and civil liberties on the one hand and democratization on the other.

Chapter Three

The Impact of Elections on Democratization in Libya

The impact of elections and other independent variables on democratization in Libya has been mixed. On the one hand, elections have provided a way for Libyans to express their political will and choose their leaders. The election has been essential in the country's transition to democracy. On the other hand, elections have also been divisive, leading to political instability and violence.

The first elections in Libya post-Kaddafi were held in 2012. The National Transitional Council (NTC), which had led the country through the revolution, was dissolved, and a new parliament, the General National Congress (GNC), was elected. The GNC was a diverse body, with representatives from various political parties and factions. However, it could not unite the country or address Libya's many problems. The GNC was theoretically dissolved in 2014, and new elections were held. However, these elections were marred by violence and fraud. As a result, two rival governments emerged, one in Tripoli and one in Tobruk. The country has been in a state of political deadlock ever since.

The failure of elections to bring stability to Libya has led some to question the value of democracy in the country. However, it is essential to remember that democracy is a process, not an endpoint. It takes time and effort to build a robust democratic system. Libya is still in the early stages of its democratic transition, and it is too early to say whether elections will ultimately lead to a stable and prosperous democracy. There are some of the obstacles that Libya faces in its quest for democratization, such as political fragmentation, split institutions, and external intervention. First, the country is divided along political, tribal, and regional lines. This division requires more work to build a consensus on essential issues. Second, the Libyan state needs to be stronger and have a limited capacity to deliver essential services. These services make it hard to provide security and stability for the population. Finally, regional and global powers have been involved in Libya's internal affairs, further complicating the country's political situation. (See Wehrey, 2016)

Despite these obstacles, there are optimistic reasons about Libya's future. The country has a young and educated population that is eager for change. A growing civil society is also working to promote democracy and

human rights. If Libya can overcome its challenges, it has the potential to become a thriving democracy. However, all Libyans will need time, effort, and cooperation to achieve this goal. By examining the impact of elections and other explanatory variables on democratization in Libya, this chapter will be divided into the following two parts:

- Aggregates Data and Democratization in Libya
- Statistical data analysis

Aggregates Data and Democratization in Libya:

This chapter focuses on measuring the correlation between democratization on the one hand and elections and the other four independent variables on the other, e.g., political participation and culture. (See Figure 1) According to the global annual published collected data, Libya is still in a slow process of democratic transition. For example, in the V-Dem Institute's data, Libya's democracy score in 2023 is (0.34 out of 1), considered a "hybrid regime." This score means the country has some democratic elements. However, preventing the government from becoming authoritarian must be more vital. (See the V-Democracy Institute Report, 2023)

According to the V-Dem Institute, democracy score is based on several factors, including elections, pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of government, political participation, and political culture. In Libya, these factors are all weak. It is important to note that the V-Dem Institute's scores are based on many factors, including the following:

- The fairness of the electoral process
- The degree of pluralism in the political system
- Respect for civil liberties
- The effectiveness of the government
- The level of political participation
- The quality of political culture

Therefore, the low scores for Libya suggest the country has serious problems with its elections, political system, and civil society. The electoral process is not free and fair, and there needs to be more pluralism in the political system. Civil liberties are also restricted, and the government sometimes uses violence to suppress dissent. The functioning of the

government is weak, and there is a high level of corruption.¹⁰ Political participation is low, and there needs to be more trust in the political system.¹¹

Thus, according to the V-Dem Institute, the democracy score for Libya has been declining in recent years. In 2011, the country's score was 0.49, considered a "flawed democracy." However, the overthrow of Kaddafi in 2011 led to a period of instability and violence, which eroded the country's democratic institutions. Thus, the future of democracy in Libya is uncertain. Libya has been divided between two split governments since 2014, and there is a risk of further violence. However, some positive signs exist, such as holding another parliamentary election in 2023. If the country can overcome its current challenges, there is a possibility that it could become a more democratic country in the future.

In addition, according to the Freedom House's Report (2023), Libya is rated as "Not Free" with a score of 28/100. It means the country needs help with political rights and civil liberties issues. The Report highlights the following critical problems in Libya:¹² (the Freedom House's Report 2023). First, the ongoing conflict between two rival governments has led to widespread violence and instability. Second, the government has restricted freedom of speech and the press. Third, there is a lack of accountability for human rights abuses. Finally, the rule of law is weak, and corruption is widespread.

Nevertheless, the Freedom House Report concludes that Libya's political and human rights situation is "deeply troubling" and that the country "remains a long way from becoming a free society." (See Freedom House Report, 2023) Furthermore, The Economist Intelligence Unit Reports "EIU" reflects the most pessimistic view on democratization in Libya, especially since 2014. According to the EIU data of Democracy Index 2022, Libya is ranked 151 out of 167 countries, with a score of 2.06. It means that the country is considered a "dictatorship regime." (Democracy Index 2022, p. 11)

¹⁰ Libya's score in corruption reached (17/100), see the Corruption Perception Index 2022, p. 5.

¹¹ - According to the Global State of Democracy Report 2022, Libya gained (0.00) in representation, (0.25) in human rights, (0.48) in political participation, and (0.15) in the rule of law during (2013-2022). Thus, the zero score of elections decreased the total level of democratization in Libya post-Kaddafi era. Although the criteria differ from one index to another, they agree on the setback of democratization in Libya post-Kaddafi period.

¹²- The Democracy Index is a composite measure of democracy in countries worldwide. It is based on five categories: elections, civil liberties, functioning of government, political participation, and political culture. (See The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2023)

Libya scores poorly in all five categories of democracy. The electoral process is not free and fair, and there needs to be more pluralism in the political system. Civil liberties are also restricted, and the government uses violence to suppress dissent. The functioning of the government is weak, and there is a high level of corruption. Political participation is low, and there needs to be more trust in the political system.

According to the Economist Intelligence Unit Report (2023), the future of democracy in Libya is uncertain. It has been split between two rival governments since 2014, and there is a risk of further violence. However, some potential positive signs exist, such as holding likely parliamentary elections in 2023-2024. If the country can overcome its current challenges, there is a possibility that it could become a more democratic country in the future.

If we shift to examining Libya's election scores, it is clear that different data have different views. Although the Economist Intelligence Unit Reports are the primary data source of this book, other references are considered, primarily Freedom House and the V-Dem Institute reports. Therefore, the low scores for Libya in different reports suggest the country has serious problems with its elections, political system, and civil society. Dealing with elections as an independent variable requires further data description and analysis. Thus, this chapter will focus on a more in-depth examination of different resources.

Firstly, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Libya's elections have been consistently poorly scored in recent years. The EIU's electoral process and pluralism score for Libya have been between 0.1 and 0.2 out of 10 since 2011, indicating that the elections are not free and fair and lack pluralism in the political system. The EIU's civil liberties score for Libya has been consistently low, between 0.3 and 0.4 out of 10, since 2011. This score indicates that civil liberties are restricted in Libya and that the government often uses violence to suppress dissent.

The EIU's functioning of government score for Libya has also been consistently low, between 0.2 and 0.3 out of 10 since 2011. This score indicates that the government is weak, ineffective, and corrupt. The EU's political participation score for Libya has been between 0.2 and 0.3 out of 10 since 2011. This score indicates that political participation is low in Libya and that there is a lack of trust in the political system. The EIU's political culture score for Libya has been between 0.3 and 0.4 out of 10

since 2011. It indicates that the political culture in Libya is not conducive to democracy and that there is a lack of respect for democratic values.

The only category where Libya's scores have improved slightly in recent years is civil society. Some efforts have been made to support civil society organizations in Libya. However, the overall picture is still one of a country where elections are not free and fair and where there is a lack of pluralism, civil liberties, functioning of government, and political culture. It is important to note that the Freedom House's scores are based on several factors, including the following (The Freedom House, 2013)

- The fairness of the electoral process
- The degree of pluralism in the political system
- Respect for civil liberties
- The effectiveness of the government
- The level of political participation
- The quality of political culture

In short, Libya's elections have been consistently poorly scored by the EIU in recent years. The EIU suggests that the elections are not free and fair and that there needs to be more pluralism, civil liberties, functioning of government, political participation, and political culture in Libya post-Kaddafi era.

Secondly, according to the V-Dem Institute data, Libya's election scores have remained consistently low recently. It suggests that the elections are not free and fair and that there needs to be more pluralism, civil liberties, functioning of government, political participation, and political culture in Libya. The only category where Libya's scores have improved slightly in recent years is political participation. These scores may be because there have been efforts to increase voter turnout in recent elections. However, the overall picture is still one of a country where elections are not free and fair and where there is a lack of pluralism, civil liberties, functioning of government, and political culture.

Thirdly, according to Freedom House's Reports, Libya's election scores have remained consistently low recently. Libya's election scores (below 0.4) have remained consistently low since 2015. This score suggests that the elections are not free and fair and that there needs to be more pluralism, civil liberties, functioning of government, and political culture in Libya.

Theoretically, elections can, directly and indirectly, impact democratization in Libya. Qualitative analysis indicates that too many factors affect democratization in Libya and other countries. It may mention the direct impact of elections on democratization: First, elections allow citizens to elect their candidates, who then make decisions on their behalf. The election is a critical element of democracy, giving citizens a voice in the political process. Second, elections can legitimize the government, as they demonstrate that the government has the support of the people. It can help to reduce conflict and instability. Finally, elections can promote civic engagement, encouraging citizens to participate in politics. It can help to build a more democratic society.

The indirect impacts include the following factors: First, elections can help strengthen the rule of law, requiring the government to respect the people's will. The government can help to create a more just and equitable society. Second, elections can help to protect human rights, as they require the government to respect the rights of all citizens. Protecting human rights can create a more complimentary and open society. Finally, elections may promote economic development, creating a more stable and predictable business environment. It can help create jobs and improve citizens' living standards. However, it is essential to note that elections do not guarantee democracy. In order for elections to have a positive impact on democratization, they must be free and fair. The election means that all citizens must have the right to vote, and the results must be respected. elections that are not free and fair can harm democratization, leading to conflict and instability. (See Tommasoli, 2012)

Libya faces various obstacles in holding free and fair elections in 2023-2024. First, Libya is still deeply divided, and the country's future must be more consensuses. This division makes it difficult to hold a free and fair election. Second, Libya is still a violent country, and there is a risk of violence during elections. This violence can discourage people from voting and make it difficult to hold a free and fair election. Finally, Libya is corrupt, and there is a risk that elections will be rigged. This corruption would undermine the government's legitimacy and make it hard to build a stable democracy. (See Emig, 2023)

Despite these challenges, Libya has held several national and sub-national elections since the fall of Kaddafi in 2011. These elections have been marred to some extent by violence and low turnout, but they have also helped to legitimize the government and promote civic engagement. It



remains to be seen whether Libya will overcome the challenges it faces and establish a stable democracy, but elections will play a vital role in this process.

On the quantitative level, one may argue that there is no one-size-fits-all answer to the impact of elections on democratization in Libya. However, the impact of elections on democratization in Libya will vary depending on many factors, including the specific electoral system used, the level of political participation, and the degree of civil conflict. However, some studies have found that elections can positively impact democratization in Libya, mainly when they are held freely and fairly. (UN Security Council, Press Releases No 15327, June 19, 2023)

For example, a study by the National Democratic Institute “NDI” found that the 2014 Libyan parliamentary election helped to increase political participation and civic engagement among Libyan citizens. The study also found that the election helped to legitimize the government and promote stability in the country. (NDI, 2023) However, other studies have found that elections can have a more mixed impact on democratization in Libya. For example, a study by the International Crisis Group found that the 2012 Libyan parliamentary election was marred by violence and low turnout and did not do much to promote stability in the country. (International Crisis Group, 2020-2021)

Overall, the quantitative impact of elections on democratization in Libya is still unclear. However, some evidence suggests that elections can positively impact democratization, mainly when held freely and fairly. Here are some quantitative indicators that can be used to measure the impact of elections on democratization in Libya (The Global State of Democracy Report 2022). First, the level of voter turnout is often seen as an indicator of the legitimacy of an election. A high turnout suggests citizens are engaged in the political process and believe their vote matters. Second, the level of electoral participation can also be measured by looking at the number of people who register to vote and the number of people who cast a ballot. A high level of electoral participation suggests that citizens are interested in the political process and willing to participate. Finally, the level of civil conflict can also be used to measure the impact of elections on democratization. A high level of civil conflict suggests that elections do not positively impact democratization and do not lead to a more peaceful and stable society. (The Global State of Democracy Report 2022)

It is essential to note that these are just a few quantitative indicators that can be used to measure the impact of elections on democratization in Libya. According to Democracy Index Reports, Libya achieved a middle-level rank in overall democracy in 2012-2014. However, the Libyan rank in democracy has declined since 2015 due to delayed elections and corrupted governments. More statistical techniques may be used to test the relationship among the components of democratization variables. (See Figure: 3-1)

Statistical data analysis:

Statistical data analysis is the process of collecting and interpreting data in order to uncover political patterns. In addition, statistical analysis can be used in situations like collecting data, statistical modeling, or designing research studies. There are many different types of statistical analysis, but some of the most common include: (Babbie, 2008, pp. 442-469)

1. **Descriptive analysis:** This type of analysis describes the data. It can summarize the data, identify trends, and look for patterns, e.g., the means and standard deviations.
2. **Inferential analysis:** This type of analysis uses data to make inferences about a population. It can be used to test hypotheses, estimate parameters, and make predictions.
3. **Predictive analysis:** It uses data to predict future events. It can forecast voting behavior and identify voters likely to cast their votes.
4. **Prescriptive analysis:** This type of analysis uses data to recommend actions. It can optimize voting campaigns, allocate resources, and improve candidates' skills.
5. **Exploratory data analysis (EDA):** It explores data and identifies exciting patterns. It is often used as a precursor to other types of statistical analysis.
6. **The causal analysis:** This statistical technique is used to identify the cause-and-effect relationships between variables. It can be used to determine which factors are most important in driving outcomes.

Statistical data analysis can be a powerful tool for gaining insights from data. It can answer questions, make decisions, and improve performance. The literature review reveals that many factors affect voting behavior, such as age, gender, education, income, religion, and party

identification. While the young generation is more likely to vote for liberal candidates, older voters are more likely to vote for conservative candidates. Moreover, women are more likely to vote for liberal, while men are more likely to vote for conservative candidates. Also, college-educated voters are more likely to vote for liberal candidates, while voters with less education usually vote for conservative candidates. Regarding income, it may be argued that higher-income voters generally vote for conservative candidates, while less-income voters typically vote for liberal candidates. (See Snyder III, 2011)

Additionally, religious voters are more likely to vote for conservative candidates, while non-religious voters are more likely to vote for liberal candidates. Regarding geographical variables, voters in urban areas are more likely to vote for liberal candidates, while voters in the countryside are more likely to vote for conservative candidates. Moreover, strong party identifiers are more likely to vote, and they are more likely to vote for the candidate of their party. Furthermore, turnout is higher among voters who are interested in politics and feel their vote will make a difference. Finally, campaigns can significantly impact voting behavior, especially when they are well-funded and well-organized. (See Snyder III, 2011; and Mcdermott, 1998, pp. 895-915)

These are just a few examples of voting behavior. Many other factors can influence how people vote, such as the candidates' positions on the issues, the state of the economy, and the news coverage of the election. Voting behavior is a complex and ever-evolving field of study. Political scientists use statistical data analysis to study voting behavior and to develop theories about why people vote the way they do. This information can improve voter turnout, inform voter education campaigns, and help candidates win elections.

The previous literature reviews demonstrate that the most common statistical types used to analyze the impact of the election and other explanatory factors on democratization are: (See Babbie, 2008; and Wysocki, 2008)

1. Time-series analysis: This type of analysis examines how election outcomes have changed over time in a particular country. This statistical technique may help identify factors driving democratization, such as economic development, social change, or political reforms.

2. Cross-sectional analysis: It compares election outcomes in different countries at the same time. It can help identify factors common to countries experiencing democratization, such as a solid middle class, a free press, or a well-functioning judiciary.
3. Probit and logit regression: These types of regression analysis are used to estimate the impact of different factors on the likelihood of a country becoming democratic. For example, probit or logit regression can be used to estimate the impact of economic development, social change, or political reforms on the likelihood of a country holding free and fair elections.
4. In addition to these statistical methods, researchers also use qualitative methods to study the impact of elections on democratization. These methods can include interviews, focus groups, and participant observation. Qualitative methods can help provide a deeper understanding of the factors driving democratization and the challenges and opportunities countries face as they transition to democracy.

The impact of the election on democratization is a complex and multifaceted issue. There is no single factor that can guarantee the success of democratization. However, the statistical methods and qualitative approaches described above help identify the factors most likely to contribute to this effect. This study's most used statistical techniques are the following: Figures, Descriptive Statistics, Correlation Coefficient, and Regression.

While Figure 3-1 refers to the level of democratization achieved since 2010, Figure 3-2 indicates the correlation between elections and democracy. There were ups (in 2011-2014) and downs (2015-2022) for the democracy curve in Libya post-Kaddafi. The deterioration in the democracy curve in Libya post-Kaddafi era is due to many factors, such as delayed elections and poor conducting of governments. Moreover, an increase in the score of elections is followed by a higher level of democratization and vice versa. In short, delayed elections since 2015 may result in a lower level of democracy since 2015. (See Figures 3-1 and 3-2)


The data of this study refers to positive correlations among the independent variables in 2012-2014 and a negative relationship after 2015. (See Figure: 3-3) Higher scores in elections, political participation and culture, improved government functions, and civil liberties lead to a higher

level of democratization in Libya and vice versa. Nevertheless, the previous statistical techniques do not approve of a causal correlation between the independent and dependent variables; therefore, further analysis will be run. (See Tables-3-1, 3-2, and 3-3)

Moreover, the data of this chapter refers to the minimum and maximum of six variables mentioned in Table 3-1. A decline in a democracy index is followed by low performance in elections, functioning of government, political participation, political culture, and civil liberties. The descriptive statistics may answer the research question regarding how the independent variables affect democratization in Libya post-Kaddafi. Thus, different means and variances in statistical analysis indicate that the two data sets are different. The mean is the average of a set of data, and the variance measures how spread out the data is. If the means of two data sets are different, the average value of the two sets is different. In addition, if the variances of two data sets are different, the data in the two sets is spread out differently.


Two sets of data might have different means and variances for several reasons. One possibility is that the two sets of data are from different populations. Another possibility is that the two data sets are from the same population but have been collected differently. Measurement errors can also cause different means and variances. In statistical analysis, different means and variances may be used to test correlations among variables. For example, one might want to test the hypothesis that the elections with other independent variables are expected to affect democratization in Libya. To do this, one would compare the means of the six variables. If the means differ, one would have evidence to support the hypothesis. (See Figure: 3-1)

Figure: 3- 1
The Development of Democracy Index in Libya since 2010



Data Source: Democracy Index Report, different issues


Figure: 3-2
The Correlation Between Elections and Democratization in Libya



Data Source: same as Figure: 3-1.



Figure- 3-3
The Level of Independent Variables, 2012-2022



Data Source: same as Figure: 3-1.

Table: 3-1
Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	Variance
Democracy Index	7	1.95	5.15	3.1400	1.41944	2.015
Elections	7	.00	4.33	1.7014	1.97046	3.883
Fun Govt	7	.00	5.71	1.8357	2.47638	6.132
Pol Participation	7	1.67	3.89	3.3329	.78489	.616
Pol Culture	7	3.75	6.25	4.9129	1.10962	1.231
Civil Liberites	7	2.24	5.59	3.6829	1.47678	2.181
Valid N (listwise)	7					

Data Source: same as Figure: 3-1.



Table: 3- 2
Pearson Correlation among the Study’s Variables

Correlations

		Democracy Index	Elections	Fun Govt	Pol Participation	Pol Culture	Civil Liberties
Democracy Index	Pearson Correlation	1	.988**	.992**	.430	.820*	.984**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.335	.024	.000
	N	7	7	7	7	7	7
Elections	Pearson Correlation	.988**	1	.976**	.340	.856*	.957**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000	.455	.014	.001
	N	7	7	7	7	7	7
Fun Govt	Pearson Correlation	.992**	.976**	1	.494	.774*	.982**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000		.260	.041	.000
	N	7	7	7	7	7	7
Pol Participation	Pearson Correlation	.430	.340	.494	1	-.132-	.568
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.335	.455	.260		.777	.183
	N	7	7	7	7	7	7
Pol Culture	Pearson Correlation	.820*	.856*	.774*	-.132-	1	.713
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.024	.014	.041	.777		.072
	N	7	7	7	7	7	7
Civil Liberties	Pearson Correlation	.984**	.957**	.982**	.568	.713	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.001	.000	.183	.072	
	N	7	7	7	7	7	7

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Data Source: same as Figure: 3-1.

Table: 3-3
Model Summary and Parameter Estimates

Dependent Variable: Democracy Index

Equation	Model Summary					Parameter Estimates	
	R Square	F	df1	df2	Sig.	Constant	b1
Linear	.975	197.033	1	5	.000	1.930	.711

The independent variable is Elections.

Data Source: same as Figure: 3-1.

Different means and variances can also be used to identify outliers by examining the effect of other independent variables. Outliers can be caused by measurement errors or by the presence of an unusual data point. In statistical analysis, outliers can be identified by looking at the means and variances of the data. If a data point is much further from the mean than the other, it will likely be an outlier. Different means and variances can provide valuable information about the data one analyzes. By understanding the meaning of different means and variances, one can use statistical analysis to test hypotheses, identify outliers, and gain a deeper understanding of the



data. However, more statistical analysis regarding the impact of elections and other independent variables means using the correlation.¹³

The sign a (+ or -) of the correlation coefficient indicates the direction of the relationship. A positive correlation means that the dependent and independent variables move in the same direction, while a negative correlation means that the variables are in opposite directions. The correlations among the six variables are strong (Except the correlation between democracy and political participation where $r = 0.430$) and positive. For example, a correlation coefficient of 0.5 indicates a moderate positive correlation. It means there is a moderate relationship between the two variables, and as one variable increases, the other variable also tends to increase.

Correlation coefficients can be used to test hypotheses about the relationships between variables. If the correlation coefficient is positive and statistically significant, one would have evidence to support the hypothesis. The data of Table 3-2 refers to significant correlations between democratization on the one hand and elections, functioning of government, and civil liberties at a significant level of (0.000) on the other hand. Nevertheless, the correlation between democratization on the one side and political participation and political culture is moderate and statistically insignificant on the other. (See the data in Table 2)

Furthermore, correlation coefficients can also be used to identify variables associated with each other. For example, one should identify variables associated with elections in Libya. The variables with the highest correlation coefficients would be the most strongly associated with elections. However, the functioning of government and civil liberties are highly correlated and statistically significant to the election in Libya. ($r = 0.955^{**}$)

¹³ - The correlation coefficient technique measures the relationship between two variables or more. It may range from -1 to 1, where:

1. A value of (-1) reflects a perfect negative correlation. This correlation means that as one variable increases, the other variable decreases.
2. A value of (0) indicates no correlation. It means that there is no relationship between the two variables.
3. A score of (+1) means a perfect positive correlation. It means that as one variable increases, the other variable also increases.

In short, the correlation coefficient is a powerful tool to measure the association between two variables. By understanding the meaning of the correlation coefficient, we may use it to test hypotheses, identify variables associated with each other, and gain a deeper understanding of the data we are analyzing. Further statistical analysis requires the use of multiple regression techniques.¹⁴ To explain the data in Table 3-3, we should clarify the following points:¹⁵

1. The R-squared value is considerably high; thus, it reached the value of (.976). This value tells us how much of the variation in the dependent variable or democracy is explained by the independent variable or elections. While a value of (0) means that the independent variables do not explain any of the variation in the dependent variable, a value of (1) means that the independent variables explain all the variation in the dependent variable. A value of 0.976 means that the independent variables explain 97.6% of the variation in the dependent variable. (See the data in Table 3-3)
2. The F-values for the independent variables or elections reached (197.033). Thus, it tells us the probability that the relationship between variables is due to chance. Here, the high F-value means the relationship between elections and democratization is not due to chance. Thus, more elections resulted in a high level of democratization in Libya—delayed elections led to a decline in the overall scores in the democracy index and vice-versa.
3. Thus, since the R-squared value is high and the F-values for elections are low, we may conclude that the elections are statistically significant predictors of democratization.

¹⁴ - Regression analysis is another statistical technique to test the relationship between or among variables. The dependent variable is the factor we are trying to predict, and the independent variables are the variables we use to predict the dependent variable. In regression analysis, correlation measures the strength of the association between factors. The correlation may range from (-1 to +1), where:

1. A value of (-1) refers to a perfect negative correlation. It means that as one variable increases, the other variable goes in the opposite direction.
2. A value of (0) indicates no correlation. It means that there is no relationship between the two variables.
3. A score of (+1) means a perfect positive correlation between two variables and vice versa. It means that as one variable increases, the other variable also increases.


¹⁵ - It is vital to note that multiple regression analysis could be a better tool. However, several factors may affect the accuracy of the results, such as the sample size, the normality of the data, and the presence of multi-collinearity. It is vital to carefully consider these factors when interpreting the outcomes of regression analysis.

4. After considering each variable's variance, the standardized beta coefficient tells us the strength of the correlations between variables. A standardized beta coefficient of (0) means no relationship between variables. In contrast, a standardized beta coefficient of (1) means a perfect positive relationship between the independent and dependent variables. The data of this book demonstrates that the standardized beta coefficient reached (0.711), which means there is a strong positive relationship between elections and democracy in Libya.
5. The residual standard error value tells us how much variation in the dependent variable is not explained by the independent variables. A minor residual standard error means that the independent variables better explain the variation in the dependent variable. The Data of this book show a low value of a residual standard error (.000), which means that the elections are explaining the variation in democratization vehemently.
6. Figures 3-4, 3-5, and 3-6 refer to the correlation between the independent variables (elections, functioning of government, and civil liberties) on the one hand and democratization on the other. These figures with estimated curves demonstrate that elections, efficient government, and enjoying civil liberties lead to democratization and vice versa.¹⁶

Thus, linear curve estimation is a statistical method to fit a curve to a set of data points. The curve is assumed to be linear, meaning that a straight line can represent it. Linear curve estimation aims to find the line that best fits the data points. (See Figures 3-4, 3-5, and 3-6) Linear curve estimation is often used when the correlation between the variables could be more perfectly linear. Linear curve estimation can fit a curve to the data points that better represent the genuine relationship between the independent and dependent variables. It can help make predictions about future values of the dependent variable. For example, if we know an election will be held shortly, we can use linear curve estimation to predict their impact on democratization. (See Berry and Feldman, 1985)


¹⁶ - Some examples of linear curve estimation in real-world applications: Political scientists use linear curve estimation to predict the relationship between variables. Linear curve estimation is a versatile tool used in various fields. It is a helpful technique for analyzing data and making predictions.

Figure: 3-4
The linear relationship between Elections and Democratization



Data Source: same as Figure: 3-1.


Figure: 3-5
The linear relationship between Functioning of Government & Democratization



Data Source: same as Figure: 3-1.



Figure: 3-6
The linear relationship between Civil Liberties and Democratization



Data Source: same as Figure: 3-1.

Several approaches may be used for linear curve estimation. One standard approach is called least squares regression. Least squares regression finds the line that minimizes the sum of the squared residuals. The residuals are the gaps between the fundamental values of the dependent variable and the predicted values. Linear curve estimation is a powerful tool for analyzing data. It can be used to fit a curve to a set of data points and predict future values. However, it is essential to remember that linear curve estimation only approximates the genuine relationship between the independent and dependent variables. The actual relationship may be nonlinear, and linear curve estimation may not be able to represent it accurately. (See –Lewis-Beck, 1980)

In short, the previous statistical data analysis shows the strong relationship between elections, the functioning of government, and civil liberties on the one hand and democratization on the other. Furthermore, the data of this study report the insignificant correlation between political participation and political culture on the one side and democratization on the other. The weak correlation between political participation and political culture on the one side and democratization on the other is due to the following reasons:

1. Many countries have low political participation due to hard economic life, but they still call democratic governments, and Libya is no exception.

2. The Libyans were unsatisfied with their choices during the past elections in 2012; thus, some decided to refrain from participating in the upcoming election in 2014. For example, the turnout during the first general election 2012 was higher than the next election in 2014.
3. Libya is a tribal society except for big cities, such as Tripoli and Benghazi; therefore, parochial and subjective cultures affect the political life of the Libyans. Parochial and subjective cultures slow down democratization. However, the Libyans are eager for democracy, and the enhancement of participation in political culture has been improving since 2011. In a delivered questionnaire on a random sample in 2012-2013, the author found out that most of the sample identified themselves as political participants. (2013، خشيم)

Of course, other independent variables affect democratization in Libya post-Kaddafi that is indicated by other reports, such as the Fragile States Indexes. In this context, the Fragile States Index Reports refer to eleven internal factors that can be quantitatively measured, whereas the Reports provide measurable indicators. In this context, the data in the Fragile States Index refer to the weights of each component received for Libya in 2022 compared to 2012. The in-depth analysis of the data can note the following:

1. Although the weights of the internal factors, such as migration (8.6/10), the lack of legitimacy (9.4/10), and refugees (9.1/10), have increased, the highest value was obtained by the external factor, which increased from (9/10) in 2012 to (9.6/10) in 2022. While the value of five internal environmental factors has decreased, namely the lack of security, the division of elites, the economic collapse, the unbalanced development, and the violation of human rights, it is noted that the same data also points to the increase in the values of six other internal factors, namely migration, the shrinking of legitimacy, the deterioration of public services, refugees, and population pressure.
2. Although political elite conflict has decreased slightly (by a rate of 0.06/10), it is considered an essential factor that contributed to the weakness of the Libyan political system, as the data indicates that the level of elite conflict fluctuated from 8/10 in 2012 to 7.4/10 in 2022. The absence of national unity has increased intra-political differences among Libyan political elites.
3. Several other promising areas can be improved for Libya, the data indicates several avenues where the performance of the Libyan state

can be raised. Among these areas are those related to improving public services, achieving balanced development, and economic development in general due to the relative stability in energy production?

It is clear from the above discussion that Libya is progressing slowly in the process of democratic transition due to the existence of internal and external obstacles. However, many political, economic, and social barriers can help Libya overcome its surrounding environmental conditions. The new Libya can take off to the ranks of prosperous countries once it has overcome the most pressing problems, starting with achieving security and filling the political, economic, and cultural vacuum; thus, reducing external ambitions and achieving national unity. Perhaps holding elections in 2023-2024 will bring new blood that will transfer Libya from the long-lasting transitional phase to the stage of building a democratic Libya inclusive of all.

Conclusion:

The effect of internal and external factors on democratization in Libya and other developing countries is complex and multifaceted. Several internal factors have hindered the country's transition to democracy, including: First, a history of authoritarian rule, foreign intervention, and a lack of democratic culture. Kaddafi ruled Libya for over 40 years, and his regime was highly repressive. This authoritarianism left the country with a weak civil society and a population not accustomed to democratic practices. Second, Libya is a tribal society with deep divisions between regions and ethnic groups. This tribalism has made it challenging to build a national consensus on the way forward for the country. Finally, Libya has been disputed since the 2011 revolution that overthrew Kaddafi. These conflicts have further hindered the country's ability to transition to democracy.

Moreover, external factors have also played a role in the democratization challenges in Libya. These factors include: First, the interference of foreign powers. Foreign intervention has increased dramatically since 2011. Many foreign countries, including the United States, France, Egypt, the UAE, and Turkey, have intervened in Libya's affairs since the 2011 revolution. This intervention has often been done to promote their interests rather than the interests of the Libyan people. Second, the international community has been slow to provide Libya with the support it needs to rebuild its institutions and transition to democracy. The external intervention has made it difficult for the country to progress on its democratic journey. Finally, UNSMIL manages Libya's crisis rather than solving it permanently.

Despite these obstacles, there are some positive signs for democratization in Libya. First, Libya has held two parliamentary elections since the 2011 Revolution, and a presidential election is scheduled for 2023. This election shows that the country is committed to the democratic process. Furthermore, the local polls continued to run in Libya until recently. Second, a new National Unity Government was formed in Libya in 2021. This government is tasked with uniting the country and laying the groundwork for a more stable and democratic future. Third, the majority of Libyans want to live in a democracy. It provides a strong foundation for the country's democratic transition.

In short, the future of democratization in Libya is uncertain, but there are reasons to be hopeful. With the continued support of the Libyan people


and the international community, the country can overcome the challenges it faces and build a more democratic future.

As far as the examination of independent variables is concerned, it is fair to conclude that the elections, the functioning of government, political participation and culture, and civil liberties are all crucial factors in democratization. By the end of this chapter, some specific results may be drawn from the quantitative research on the impact of elections, the functioning of government, political participation and culture, and civil liberties on democratization:

1. Elections are essential for democracy, but they are not enough. Countries that want to transition to democracy need free and fair elections. Still, they also need a functioning government capable of delivering services to its citizens.
2. A functioning government is essential for promoting economic development and social welfare. An efficient and effective government can help create a more stable and prosperous society, which can lay the foundation for democracy.
3. Political participation and culture are also crucial for democracy. Citizens need to be able to participate in the political process and have a culture that supports democracy.
4. Civil liberties are essential for democracy. Citizens need to have the freedom to express their opinions, to assemble peacefully, and to form political parties. Without these civil liberties, it is difficult to have a true democracy.

Overall, the quantitative research on the impact of elections, the functioning of government, political participation and culture, and civil liberties on democratization is clear. These factors all positively affect democratization, but they have different levels of impact. Countries that want to transition to democracy must focus on these factors to succeed. As the data of this chapter indicate, the most influential independent variables on democratization in Libya may be arranged as follows: the functioning of government (0.992^{**}), elections ($r = 0.988^{**}$), civil liberties ($r = 0.984^{**}$), political culture ($r = 0.820^{*}$), and political participation ($r = 0.430$). Figure 3-7 summarizes the different levels of correlations among the variables of this book. The correlation scores range between strong and weak ones. As we notice, an effective central government can run an accountable and responsible election and respect human rights, may speed the democratization process, and vice versa.

Figure: 3-7
The Correlations among the Variables of this Study



Data Source: Same as Figure 3-1.



The Conclusion: Results

Many internal and external factors have affected democratization in Libya since 2011. Some of the most critical factors include the legacy of the Kaddafi regime, political fragmentation, a rentier economy, economic crisis, elite fragmentation, armed militia, and foreign intervention. These are just some factors that have affected democratization in Libya since 2011. The challenges facing Libya are daunting, but there are signs of hope. The Libyan people have shown a strong desire for democracy, and some Libyan leaders are committed to building a democratic state. With time and international support, Libya may eventually be able to achieve its democratic aspirations.

However, few aggregate data sources are published annually, such as the Democracy Index Report, which has data on Libya. This study adapts the method of the Democracy Index Report; therefore, we examine the impact of five independent variables on democratization in Libya post-Kaddafi, namely: election, functioning of government, civil liberties, political culture, and political participation.

Elections are vital to democracy, allowing citizens to choose their leaders. Free and fair elections are essential for ensuring that the government is accountable to the people. However, elections alone are not enough to guarantee democracy. A country also needs a functioning government capable of delivering services to its citizens.

Thus, the functioning of government is another vital factor in democratization. An efficient and effective government can help promote economic development and social welfare. It can also help to build trust between the government and the people. However, a government that is corrupt or inefficient can undermine democracy.

Political participation and culture are also crucial factors for democratization. A politically active and engaged society is more likely to be democratic. Citizens need to be able to participate in the political process through voting and other forms of civic engagement. They also require a culture supporting democracy, such as respect for human rights and the rule of law.

Civil liberties are also essential for democracy. Citizens need to have the freedom to express their opinions, to assemble peacefully, and to form political parties. They also need to be free from arbitrary arrest and

detention. Without these civil liberties, it is difficult to have a true democracy in Libya.

These factors are interrelated and interdependent in a qualitative data view. For example, elections promote political participation and culture, which can help improve government functioning. Similarly, a functioning government can help protect civil liberties, making it easier for citizens to participate in politics. The impact of these factors on democratization can vary from country to country. However, they are all essential considerations for any country transitioning to democracy, and Libya post-Kaddafi is no exception.

Significant data from quantitative research has examined the impact of elections, the functioning of government, political participation, political culture, and civil liberties on democratization. This book has found that these factors are all critical for promoting democratization. However, they have different levels of impact on democracy. For example, a decrease in the elections index has negatively affected Libya's democratization score since 2015.

The impact of these factors on democratization can vary from country to country, e.g., Libya post-Kaddafi. However, they are all essential considerations for any country transitioning to democracy. A literature review reveals some specific quantitative studies that have tested the effect of these factors on democratization. For example, a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) study found that countries with free and fair elections are more likely to be democratic than countries with authoritarian regimes. The UNDP study also found that countries with functioning governments capable of delivering services to their citizens are more likely to be democratic.

A study by Freedom House found that countries with high levels of political participation and a culture that supports democracy are more likely to be democratic than countries with low levels of political participation and a culture that is hostile to democracy. It also found that countries with strong civil liberties are more likely to be democratic. Another study by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project found that all the factors discussed above positively impact democratization. However, it also found that the impact of these factors can vary from country to country. For example, the effect of elections is likely more significant in countries with a history of authoritarian rule. At the same time, the impact of civil liberties

is potentially more remarkable in countries with a strong tradition of respect for human rights.

Overall, the quantitative research on the impact of elections, the functioning of government, political participation and culture, and civil liberties on democratization is clear. These factors all positively affect democratization, but they have different levels of impact. Countries that want to transition to democracy must focus on these factors to succeed, and Libya post-Kaddafi is no exception.

The results of quantitative studies on the impact of elections, the functioning of government, political participation and culture, and civil liberties on democratization are precise. These factors all positively affect democratization, but they have different levels of impact. The functioning of government, and elections have been found to have the most decisive impact on democratization in Libya. Countries with free and fair elections are more likely to be democratic than countries with authoritarian regimes. However, elections alone are not enough to guarantee democracy because a country also needs a functioning government capable of delivering services to its citizens.

The functioning of government has also been found to have a positive impact on democratization. Countries with efficient and effective governments are more likely to be democratic than corrupt or inefficient ones. A functioning government can help promote economic development and social welfare, leading to a more stable and prosperous society. It can also help to build trust between the government and the people.

Political participation and political culture have also been found to impact democratization positively. Countries with high levels of political participation and a culture that supports democracy are more likely to be democratic than countries with low levels of political participation and a culture that is hostile to democracy. Political participation can promote accountability and transparency in government. It can also help to build a sense of civic culture and a commitment to democratic values among citizens.

Civil liberties have also been found to have a positive impact on democratization. Countries with substantial civil rights are more likely to be democratic than countries with weak civil rights. Civil liberties, e.g., freedom of speech, are essential for allowing citizens to participate in the political process and to hold their government accountable. The impact of these factors on democratization can vary from country to country.

However, they are all critical considerations for any country transitioning to democracy.

The lessons learned from transitional democracy in Libya are essential for the country's future. If the country is to achieve democracy, the government must take steps to address these challenges. It is important to note that these are just some lessons that can be learned from transitional democracy in Libya. Many other lessons can be learned, and it is vital to continue studying the experience of Libya and other countries undergoing democratic transitions. Some lessons may be learned from the transitional democracy experience in Libya. Good examples are the importance of security, the need for consensus, the importance of international support, the need for a robust civil society, and the need for a free press and media.

The lessons learned from the elections in Libya are essential for the country's future. Suppose the country is to achieve democracy, the next elections must be held in a secure environment. In that case, there is a consensus among the major political factions, and the international community must provide support. In addition, it is vital that the electoral commission is independent and impartial and that voters are educated about the electoral process.

Elections and other factors examined by this study can help to promote democratization in Libya by providing a mechanism for citizens to choose their leaders. However, more than elections are needed on their own. If democracy is to be successful in Libya, several other factors must also be in place. It is important to note that the relationship between elections and democratization in Libya is complex. Many factors can influence this relationship, and it is difficult to say how elections will affect democratization in Libya in the future. However, elections can play an essential role in promoting democratization in Libya. If the next elections are free and fair, and the different political factions respect them, they could help consolidate democracy in the country. In short, delayed elections can hurt democratization in Libya in many ways.

1. When elections are delayed, it can lead to political instability because it can create a power vacuum and allow for rival factions' rise. Continued rival factions can make it difficult to establish a stable and democratic government.
2. Delayed elections can also undermine public trust in the political process. It can also lead to the perception that the government is not committed to democracy. Delayed elections can make it difficult to

mobilize people to participate in the political process and to support democratic institutions.

3. Delayed elections can also give an advantage to incumbent groups. They have more time to consolidate their power and prepare for the elections. Delayed elections can make it difficult for new groups to emerge and challenge the status quo.

The impact of delayed elections on democratization in Libya will depend on several factors, including the length of the delay, the political context, and the government's actions. However, delayed elections can have a negative impact on the country's democratic transition. Here are some of the ways that delayed elections can be addressed in Libya:

1. The government can commit to holding elections regularly. Elections can build public trust in the political process and discourage rival factions from trying to seize power through force.
2. The government can create a more inclusive political environment. It can help ensure that all groups have a voice in the political process and that no one group can dominate.
3. The government can support civil society organizations that are working to promote democracy. It may help to build a stronger foundation for democracy in Libya and to make it more difficult for those who would seek to undermine the democratic process.

In short, the impact of elections, the functioning of government, political participation and culture, and civil liberties on democratization in Libya since 2011 has been mixed. Regarding the elections, Libya has held several national and sub-national elections since 2011, but some violence, irregularities, and boycotts have marred them. The 2014 elections resulted in a deadlock between two rival governments, each party claiming legitimacy. For example, the 2019 sub-national elections were also inconclusive, and the country remains divided between rival governments.

Moreover, the ongoing conflict has severely hampered the functioning of the government in Libya. The two rival administrations have been unable to agree on a unified government, and the country has no functioning parliament. It has led to a power vacuum, which armed militias and other non-state actors have filled. Also, the political participation of

Libyans has been hindered by the ongoing conflict and the need for a functioning government. Many Libyans fear participating in politics due to the risk of violence. The country's political culture is also deeply divided, making building consensus on essential issues difficult.

Finally, civil liberties in Libya have been eroded since 2011. The country has experienced increased human rights abuses, including arbitrary detention, torture, and disappearances. The media has also been muzzled, and there is no freedom of expression.

Overall, the impact of elections, the functioning of government, political participation and culture, and civil liberties on democratization in Libya since 2011 has been limited. The country remains mired in conflict and instability, and there is little hope for progress on the democratic front shortly. Thus, some of the specific challenges Libya faces in its democratic transition: First, Libya is a considerably divided country along tribal and regional lines. This division has made it hard to build a consensus on critical issues and form a stable government. Second, several armed militias operate in Libya, many loyal to rival political factions. These militias have become a significant source of instability and have often been involved in violence and human rights abuses. Third, Libya has been a significant battleground for foreign powers, including France, Turkey, Russia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. This foreign interference has further complicated the conflict and made it more challenging to achieve a political solution. Finally, Libya's state institutions must be more robust and functional. It has made it difficult to govern the country and to provide essential services to the people.

Despite these obstacles, there are reasons for hope for Libya's democratic future. The country has a long history of resistance to authoritarian rule, and Libyans strongly desire democracy. Some civil society organizations are also working to promote democracy and human rights. Libya may overcome its challenges with international support and build a stable and democratic future.

By the end of the book, we may summarize the results in the following points:

1. No theoretical framework can describe, analyze, and predict the impact of elections and other independent variables on democratization in Libya post-Kaddafi. Each theoretical framework may describe, analyze, and predict some variance; thus, several approaches may help to understand different aspects of the relationship between democracy and the five mentioned explanatory variables.

2. Democratization is the concern of social scientists because it reflects political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions. However, this book focuses on some of the political aspects of democratization. Thus, understanding democratization in Libya, post-Kaddafi, requires interdisciplinary studies.
3. Despite the different approaches to studying democracy, combining macro and micro levels, normative and empirical, and qualitative and quantitative techniques is the best methodological strategy.
4. Despite the focus of this book on the impact of five independent variables on democratization in Libya post-Kaddafi, other confounding variables need to be tested because there is no single independent variable that explains the total variance in political science and other social sciences. However, it may be mentioned that the methodological limitations and data restriction led to a focus on the impact of five independent variables on democratization in Libya post-Kaddafi.
5. There is a remarkable positive relationship among the variables studied by this book; therefore, a delayed election, division of governments, and human rights violations led to a setback in democratization since 2015, and vice versa.
6. The strongest correlation in this study ($r = 0.992$) is between the functioning of government on the one side and democratization on the other. In short, a united government can quickly run an accountable and transparent election instead of a divided one. Thus, a united, stable government in Libya is a priority to enhance democratization in Libya post-Kaddafi.
7. The second most effective independent variable is the election ($r = 0.988$), which has been delayed since 2015. However, the data of the Democracy Index Report seems not to consider the local and sub-national elections. The sub-national elections continue to run in most regions of Libya. Of course, there is no democracy without elections; thus, the democratization score may remain low until national and sub-national elections run on time.
8. The third most influential independent variable on democracy in Libya post-Kaddafi is the respect for human rights and civil liberties ($r = 0.984$). Since people govern themselves, civil liberties are essential for democratization. Divided and weak governments lead to many human rights violations and civil liberties. The spread of weapons and armed groups weakened Libya's obligation for human rights and civil liberties.



9. The least correlated independent variable to democracy is political participation ($r = 0.430$). Libyan voters' disappointment during the 2012 elections led to low turnout in the election of 2014. The no running of elections on time and power mania by the elected representatives resulted in disappointment among voters. Some voters said, for example, that they would never participate in any coming elections. Nevertheless, political participation can distort but not disrupt democracy.
10. The second least related independent variable to democracy in Libya is political culture ($r = 0.820$). In a previous study, the author found that various political cultures existed among the Libyans during the February Revolution's early years. Furthermore, more respondents identified themselves as belonging to the political participants' culture. Parochial and subjective cultures have existed alongside political participation culture since 2011. Libyans' support of democratization and early elections will enhance the political participation culture.

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