

STABILITY,CHANGE OR TRANSITION?ACHIEVING AND RETAINING
MINISTERIAL OFFICE IN LIBYA FROM 1969 TO 2010.

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Abstract:

This research analyses the determinants of ministerial hazard rates in Libya from 1969 to 2010. We focus on three sets of attributes i) personal characteristics of the minister; ii) political characteristics of the minister and iii) characteristics pertaining to the government in which the minister serves. We use different strategies to control the characteristics of each government and Our results were robust to any of these controls. We find that educational background increases ministers' capacity to survive, and older ministers have lower hazard rates. Experienced ministers have lower hazard than newly appointed ministers. Ministerial rank increases a ministers' capacity to survive.

الملخص

ان هذه الدراسة تقوم بتحليل المحددات (لمعدلات الخطر على التغيير الوزاري) في الحكومات الليبية المتعاقبة في الفترة من 1969 م الى 2010 م حيث ركز هذا البحث على ابراز ثلاث مجموعات رئيسية من السمات الوزارية والتي من المتوقع ان تؤثر على امكانية بقاء الوزير في الحكومة حتى انتهاء مدة عمل الحكومة رسمياً . وهذه الخصائص تمثلت في

- 1 - الخصائص الشخصية للوزير
- 2 - الخصائص السياسية للوزير
- 3 - الخصائص المتعلقة بالحكومة ذاتها

وقد خلصنا في هذا البحث الى نتائج إيجابية ودقيقة من خلال استخدامنا لعدة استراتيجيات لضبط الخصائص الحكومية في هذه الحكومات المتتالية ، فمثلاً وجدنا أن الخلفية التعليمية المتقدمة للوزراء تزيد من قدرتهم على الاستمرار في الحكومة أكثر من الذين لديهم خلفية تعليمية متوسطة ، وأن الوزراء الأكبر سناً لديهم معدلات خطورة أعلى لمغادرة الحكومة أكثر من غيرهم ، وأن الوزراء المتمرسين لديهم مخاطر أقل للبقاء في مناصبهم من الوزراء المعينين حديثاً . كذلك فإن الرتبة الوزارية تزيد من قدرة الوزراء في أماكنهم لعدة حكومات متتالية .

Introduction:

Executive cabinets are a common feature of nearly every political regime type. But the comings and goings of individual cabinet ministers are not well understood. This research explores the tenure of individual cabinet ministers in Libya during Qadhafi's rule. This research sheds light on Qadhafi's survival strategies by systemically examining his treatment of loyal Libyan elites. In addition, it discusses dynamics likely to be of relevance to any scholar interested in ministerial appointments, particularly in autocracies with strong personal leadership.

Cabinet ministers are chosen and leave office for many different reasons. They may leave the government during reshuffles, or fall, or through government resignations whether it is accepted or not by the head of state (Warwick 1994). Ministers may weaken the cabinet or cause a fast leave. They may also leave office because of the death of whether by natural or otherwise causes, old age or for health reasons and personal reasons such as corruption scandals and because of the electoral cycle (Browne et al 1988). Second, ministers are selected to join a cabinet for a variety reasons, such as being leader's recommendations or if they represent powerful groups, tribal, partisan or elite constituencies. Nevertheless, ministers still have to perform well in order to maintain their position over the long term. Length of tenure is therefore considered as significant indicator of ministerial success.

The Libyan constitution (Chapter 2, Article 19) charges the leader of the country to guarantee the law's implementation, as well as controlling and planning the country's strategies in all policy areas. In regarding of this charge the leader has the power of selecting the best appointee to implement his agenda, which is stated in his annual speech every year. Although Libyan society has a large number of Qabilas (more than 140 Qabilas separated in three regional areas of the country) that compete to be involved in the cabinet, the leader has to select a small staff that should be competent and faithful to his agenda. Cabinet appointees are expected to exercise collective responsibility, and they are not allowed to resign for normal reasons without the leader's permission (Dolamari

2009). The leader has a team of approximately 484 ministers in whole of his government, which lasts for up to 42 years.

The leader faces a difficult short term task after the annual meeting of the General People's Congress: to make decisions brought to him by cabinet staff. In addition, some powerful Qabilas wish to put pressure on the leader to gain more representations than others (Shalgam 2012). Other factors include the symbolism of the appointment, such as choosing women to be represented in certain cabinet positions, more educated persons in a certain policy area, political and professional, personal qualifications, one mutual feature sought by the leader in all cabinets is the loyalty of Qabilas to his tribal coalition (Shalgam 2013).

Loyalty allows ministers to serve as an implemented tool no matter which ministry they occupy, through which helping the leader to achieve his agenda's goals. Some of the literature and interviews with some of the previous ministers (shalgam 2014, Jalood 2014, Al-houni 2016) illustrate that minister behaviour and actions in the ministry are essential to promote their accountability, and to be reappointed in the future cabinet. Yet in spite of both theoretical and practical importance of ministers reappointed to the Libyan government, there have been only two quantitative studies of factors of ministers' performances. This study focuses on one aspect of the ministerial performance: the factors that decide their reappointment for the following cabinet, and the length of service of each minister in the office.

Ministerial service can be challenging, for the ministers who seeking to stay in office for a long time. Their task is related to the level of the satisfaction that they offer to the leader. The ministers are central policy players who influence public policymaking within the offering of some technical advices to the leader and implementing his agenda. Ministers' capabilities in these charges depend on many factors, such as their experience in that position. Almost all of ministers are not specialists in their ministerial positions. Many ministers join the cabinet with lack of experience about the job and do not have a high talent of being leaders. Qadhafi showed the reason of reappointing ministers many times. He declared in a life meeting of the the General People's Congress on the beginning of the 90s " the purpose of reappointing a

minister to different positions is to build their ability of learning about this position and discourage them of being corrupted after they get used to advantage of their being in that position for a long time” (Qadhafi’s 1997, official meeting with with his ministers at the annual meeting of the General People 's Congress).

The leader also pursues ministers who are loyal to him as they will apply his agenda with few complaints. Ministers who are shortly leaving the cabinet have less chance of being reappointed are debatably considered less loyal. Ministers are required to gain strong leadership in their departments on behalf of the leader to guarantee probability of staying longer in the cabinet. The previous two studies regarding the Libyan ministers show the importance of the ministers applying the leader’s agenda. Regarding the different principal feature of the Libyan system, the leader had increasingly over time tried to utilise the ministers’ tribal backgrounds and their character, and he preferred to deal with certain ministers who stayed in office for sufficient period to maintain his power.

The precise question addressed in this statistical analysis is: What determines how long ministers serve and probability of being reappointed in different cabinets? The ministerial spell is treated as the length of time that minister will serve in all posts during the 42 years of the Libyan regime during Qadhafi’s rule.

The main difficulty with regard to study of cabinet tenure in Libyan politics is the lack of data. Although literature has focused on issues faced by Libyan prime ministers during the Qadhafi’s rule (see, for example, Almgarif 2009), there have been no systematic studies of ministerial tenure and behaviour. The length of tenure is based on an established data set for each minister, which contains information about each minister in terms of the prime minister they served under, their date of appointment and length of service, the length of time they were assigned to a particular posting and some personal information (e.g level of education, gender, date of birth and tribal affiliation).

The Literature Review:

Contrary to what happens in Western countries, vested with a parliamentary system, a substantial number of Korean ministers in

Korea were bureaucrats before becoming ministers. For instance, between 1980 and 2008, 187 out of 504 were bureaucrats. Administrative experience appears particularly essential in situations such as end of a presidential mandate, when the incumbent wants ministers to control and manage his department tighter (Jung, Moon, and Hahm 2008). Dominance of former public officials also could be interpreted in the context of the elite structure in Korea, where senior officials benefitted from an excellent education and play an essentially key role in the process of fast economic progress.

Furthermore, it seems that business groups are not particularly offered ministerial tenures in Korea, which represents a particular feature in that country. For instance, under the military rule (1980-1088) 11 ministers were recruited from the private sector. However, in the first decade of the 21st century, from 2003 to 2008, things changed dramatically since only one minister was from the business sector in the center-left government (Hahm, Jung, and Lee 2013). Such transformations suggest that the parameters influencing ministerial positions in Korea might have distinctive characteristics.

Studying the formation and termination of cabinets in Libya is highly problematic for any researcher. This is because the nature of the Libyan political system makes it difficult to determine the political elite in a clear and unequivocal manner. This results from the fact that the Libyan political system does not recognize the existence of an elite who influence the decision-making process. This is because according to the concept of people power applied in Libya, the decision-making authority lies entirely in the hands of the popular masses in combination with the exclusive, limited role of the popular committees (the ministry) in implementing the decisions of the People's Congresses. However, two empirical studies have been undertaken in Libya in. Both were concerned with showing the development of the political elite. The first study conducted by Al-Mogherbi (2000) traced the trends and developments in the political elite in Libya between 1969 to 1999. The political elite is conceptualized as a group of individuals that affect the decision-making and policy-making process in the Libyan society. Three indicators were selected to highlight the role of the individual and its

place within the elite structure in Libya. These indicators were as follows: the extent of an individual's ability to develop policy initiatives; the extent of the individual's ability to stop and prevent the decisions; and the extent of the individual's ability to oversee and manage the implementation of decisions.

Through these, al Mogherbi's study (2000) identified five centres of power and influence within the elite structure in Libya, namely: Colonel Muammar Qadhafi; the remaining members of the leadership of the original Revolutionary Council; the leaders of the armed forces and security agencies; the Revolutionary Committees; the and technocratic members of the General People's Committee (or cabinet). The study shows that the influence and power of these centres are not created equal, and vary from time to time. That being said, Colonel Muammar Qadhafi at the top of the elite structure, in terms of influence and power and of being the leader of the revolution, maintains the chief power position. This literature shows that the political elite were granted official positions in the legislative and executive political system, which represents one of the important indicators and benchmarks important in determining the role of the individual within the political elite. Whether these official positions granted to an individual made a significant impact on the decision-making and policy-making process is a question remaining; and this is what will be analysed and tested for in this study.

The study shows that the technocrats (Cabinets) represents the fifth important level of power centres in Libya. However, it does not mean that they have no influence on the decision-making process in Libya. Because they have technical expertise in economic and social matters, they have value and political importance for the political leadership of Libya. This is due to their role in providing advice and counselling, and in justifying policies, and in the implementation and application of the various economic, political and social decisions of the political system. The study highlights some of the indicators that reflect the trends and developments in this elite and its importance for the Libyan political system. Firstly, 112 ministers have held positions in the Council of Ministers and the General People's Committee during this study, which lasted for thirty years. The majority of them were males and only two women were appointed – one during the 1970s and other in the

1980s. Although, the leader's discourse in Libya focuses on the role of women in political, social and economic life, Libyan women are still lack representation in influential positions within the cabinet structure.

Secondly, the distribution of Ministers in the General People's Committee in accordance with the regional and tribal background higher for the western areas with 50 ministers, 34 Eastern areas, 26 southern and 2 ministers from both Tunisia and Egypt. This reflects the national trend of the leader's discourse in the Libyan political system. Thirdly, looking at the professional background of the ministers. There were 12 with a military background; nine soldiers who held ministerial posts were members of the Revolutionary Command Council; two took office during the first months of the revolution, and were arrested at the end of 1969 and accused of planning a coup attempt; one was a policeman, he took a ministerial post in the late seventies.

Lastly, the researcher come up with a result that the Libyan regime depended on a significant number of the members of this elite who are selected for these positions, not because of their professionalism and expertise, but mainly because of the revolutionary commitment and confidence in their ideological orientation. The Libyan political system is based on a narrow base of the technocratic elite, ranging between 20-30 people. Even when a minister leaves the cabinet, he is assigned the functions of other positions in some key sectors, such as the secretariat of the General People's Congress and the General Planning Council and the United Nations and the League of Arab States. This narrow based of rule does not agree with the philosophy of applied mass system in Libya, which calls for broad and active public participation in the context of making and implementation of public policy in the Libyan society.

Obeidi (2008) investigated the process of elite change in Libya between 1969 and 2006. She showed the controversy between the theory of democracy, where the people are the central element of authority and, and the use of a political elite, created by the regime as advisors for the leader, to implement the people's programmes. This temporary elite remains in place until 2006.

The study emphasises ideology as a central reason for elite recruitment. It also points to the small influence of international factors, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union and economic sanctions in 1992. Another

important factor was tested in this study: the technical experience of the both executive and legislative and the elite's ability to survive. Qadhafi utilised this factor to justify and implement different social and economic decisions. Consequently, the elite maintain their power and shifting between cabinets from the advisory role and the assassination with regime. At the domestic level, and during the challenges that faced Libya, the elite did not have any clear agenda for solving any of these challenges. For instance, in 2003 one of the ministers with great expertise in finance, Shokri Ghanem, admitted that he struggled to implement any reform policy to improve the economic sector. The last finding showed that there is competition between the old generation's elite and the emerging technocratic elites regarding the rule of ideology. For instance, some ministers like their ability to speak English. Moreover, the length of stay of this section of the elite in the advanced Western countries and universities will likely have a positive impact on their political agenda and ideology.

Another important study, comparable to the Libyan case, is Shevchenko (2005). It distinguishes between ministers in consensual policy areas and the ones supervising conflictive policies. According to her 'bureaucrat ministers' – those in charge of non-contentious portfolios – last longer than 'political ministers' – those who preside over divisive policy areas. The study showed that after the Russian system turned into a presidential system, the powers of the president increased to include the power to select the prime minister and the most important cabinet portfolios. Parliament and political parties have comparably less influence. Russian cabinets are controlled by non-partisan ministers. This is in contrast to West European countries (they generally depend more on the partisan role). The selection of these ministers in Russia depends on the role of the patronage, loyalty and the extent of the network that each minister has. The government has contained the highly educated elite and the dominant ethnic group. Although cabinet turnover increased in the 1990s, the civil high ranked employee and former junior ministers are more controlled in post-Soviet era cabinets.

Theory:

Libyan constitutional convention obliges the leader to carefully and

faithfully execute public policies. This obligation, including technical competence, is also widely presumed to extend to ministers. Ministers are also subject to collective cabinet responsibility, exhibiting loyalty to the leader. The theory in this research focuses on explaining what determines the length of time that ministers remain in their posts and the risk that they will leave.

The dependent variable for the analysis is ministerial longevity. This is measured in two ways a) the number of times that each minister was reappointed for all posts during his service with the regime and b) the number of months from the beginning to the end of each minister's service for all selected positions.

The independent variables include ministerial attributes such as their education level, age and tribal affiliations, Portfolio and ministerial rank, the role of Prime minister, as well as instances of exogenous events and economic variable:

Education: There are several variables such as educational skills which play simultaneously a direct and indirect role. It is true that generally the criteria of education is not at the top of the priorities to enter into government. Nevertheless, a member of the government with a solid educational background, will be less worried in staying as a minister when a variety of crises appear and threatened its position. Certainly, ministers skilled are able to find suitable opportunities outside of government, fact which facilitate their leaving if circumstances require that. Conversely, informal networks, found usually in school and university affiliations, might give a certain kind of protection to a minister during periods of crises or political uncertainties. Consecutively, it is conceivable to ask the following question: to what extent does minister's education affect the minister's position in office (Berlinski et al 2007: p 247). The educational background seems to have an influence on duration, although if it is not easy to affirm that it is the level of education and not social networks that is the factor which increases the durability in office.

Portfolio and ministerial rank

It is possible to consider that portfolio might have an impact on ministerial durability. According to Indridason and Kam (2008: 641)

ministerial reshuffling is likely going to be used to control ministers responsible for the key or intricate portfolios. In such a case, the ministers in charge are faced or incur higher risks since monitoring is less easy and the failure to do so inexcusable and will eventually cost them their position. Therefore, it might be judicious to make shorter the duration in important portfolios than in less significant ones. Based on the UK and Australia's data, Indridason and Kam (2008: 647) observed that 'the more influential the portfolio, the more it was reshuffled'. For their part, Huber and Martinez-Gallardo (2008: 172) consider that ministers in charge of key portfolios go through a more careful earlier screening, and so they will be able to perform better and their tenure in office will be longer. Based on their empirical work, the above researchers observed that by looking at 19 parliamentary democracies, it appears that ministers in charge of important portfolios are faced with a lower risk of being ended (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2008: 176).

It could be said as well that there is little evidence as regard to a variety of risk rates across portfolios. By looking at the study conducted in Germany, Fischer and Kaiser (2009: 142-144) observed that it is the ministries of defense or home affairs, which are more likely prone to resignation calls than other ministries such as justice or postal affairs. Since it is believed that wider screening results getting more competent ministers, it implies that the higher the formal position of minister, the more long-lasting it will be. Even with greater levels of scrutiny than their lower-ranking fellow ministers from parliamentarians and media, higher-ranking ministers, the same observation, as in Germany, has been made about the UK (Berlinski et al., 2007: 254, 259-260). The same observation could be made regarding coalition systems, where junior-party leaders occupy deputy-PM positions.

Loyalty:

Another potential explanation is the loyalty to the leader, which could evidently influence minister's duration in cabinet. Loyalty in its simple meaning is the subordinate's acceptance of the principal's individual or institutional goals and values. Politically it is argued that people vary in terms of whom they should be loyal to, that is to an institution such as a

party or an individual such as a manager or the leader. In a democracy, voter's commitment to an organisation is more indirect and it could be changed in between over time (Toka 1998). In contrast, in an authoritarian regime such as in China, people are more loyal to the characterized by rule of an individual than the rule of law (Chen et al 2002). This study emphasises that an individual's loyalty to the leader or supervisor is likely to be more direct, salient and intense in driving their behavior.

In terms of ministerial duration, loyalty can be approached from different perspectives. Loyalty can be seen as a reciprocal variable. From one perspective, a negative perspective, it could be argued that political leaders might be threatened by ministers who serve for long duration in the cabinets fearing that they be building up their own power base. From another more positive an extended length of tenure might indicate loyalty to the leader. This could be the case when there are some equilibrium points in time when the leader determines that the additional loyalty indicated by allowing the minister serve another year is less than the potential challenge by a minister who builds up his own power base. For instance, it is well known that Libyans are more loyal to their Qabilas than to a system (Shalgum 2012). This is because society is organised by the relationship between Qabilas and between Qabilas and the political system. In such a society, it can be assumed that ministerial loyalty or disloyalty to the leader or the system is likely to be more salient in the process of selecting the cabinet. In such a regime, the prime minister has minimal power in selecting his own cabinet.

Every community in the third world country, especially those who contain Qabilas, has its unique rules. The tribal community depend on the Qabilas' coalitions where the individual shielding under the Qabila power to protect him from government authority. All in the Qabila (Tribalism) take a right; customs must be obeyed (Davis 1988). The link combining a diaspora Qabila is (ratios) and the link that brings together members of the Qabila is the (blood), which is considered as a national percentage in the tribal community. The Qabila is the only government that is understood by the individuals who belong to these Qabilas. They

protect members and in turn, tribal members implement decisions without criticism or objection, even if it is against the government will. Each Qabila has a grandfather who inspires a sense of belonging. This ancestor could be a real human or it could be a name of the alliance of several Qabilas. The land that the Qabila lives on is under of the leader of the Qabila's authority and even the government cannot start any project without the leader of the Qabila's approval. IbnKaldhun said, "The goal of the tribalism is the gain and maintaining power" (IbnKaldhun :123). The leader, who is looking to maintain his power in a tribal community, needs to know how to use tribalism to make a great coalition from the powerful Qabilas (Davis 1988). If a Qabila's power increases through coalition building so that it is equal to government power, the demands of that Qabila will increase and they will occupy a more powerful position in the country.

The tribal coalition is based originally on the interest of this Qabila. It has been proven that the natural law of the alliances that have bonds of need and interest is more likely to be broken at the first chance for each Qabila. For instance, the coalition between Almgarha and Algaddfa (Qadhafi's Qabila) was broken at the first chance when they felt that regime would collapse. In contrast, the coalitions that have bonds of blood are more likely to last longer than other coalitions. The coalition between Werfla and Algaddafa's Qabila remained strong even in the last moments before the regime collapsed when almost of the Qabilas left the coalition with Algdaddfa and stood against the regime. The powerful Qabilas seek to make a coalition with the Qabilas who are weak in size.

Prime minster:

This study also focuses on leader's effects. Almost all of the executive studies conducted in democratic countries have focused on the role of the prime minister (PM) in directing the shape of his or her cabinet. Despite the constraints in the procedures for ministerial selection and terminating, the disposition and characteristics of the prime minister ought to have certain influence. PM effects are generally measured for in duration analysis, but there are a rich a variety of ministerial styles (Berlinski et al., 2012: p5). In order to be able to generalize their

observations for the UK, Berlinski et al. (2009: p64–68) underline, that ministerial survivor occupations by prime ministerial term are not so different and that the most noticeable might be due to the period spent in office. Conversely, in the Spanish case, the ministerial survivor occupations vary significantly depending on the PM in charge, which suggest that the PM's strategic designs have a major effect on the typical ministerial duration (Real-Dato and Jerez-Mir 2009: 110–120).

The planned designs of a PM may be known from the sacking rule applied in the case of ministers' failures or disgraces. Applying a rigid sacking rule affect the performance of other ministers who will do their utmost to avoid being fired and reduces the possibility of other eventual disgraces; however, simultaneously, it removes gifted ministers from the cabinet (Dewan and Myatt, 2010). Quiroz Flores's (2009) underlined, following his study on foreign ministers, that there is usually, a connection between the time in office of the Prime Minister and his/her subordinate ministers. In authoritarian regimes, the reverse assertion is that the more time a PM is in charge, the lower the prospect of sacking a minister occurs.

In contrast, in authoritarian countries such Libya, the authoritarian leader generally has more power to shape cabinet composition (Shalgm 2012). As a consequence, little studies of Libya have concentrated on the relationship between the prime minister and their cabinet because, in contrast to democratic countries, the prime minister's power to compose the cabinet is finite. Thus, there are certain conditions which a Libyan prime minister must take into account when composing their cabinet e.g. the tribal affiliation of each minister, and the extent to which they are satisfactory to the leader. Moreover, the personal characteristics of the prime minister can also play a significant role in deciding a minister's tenure. Almost all the literature on the prime minister's influence in cabinet composition focuses on political circumstances. In contrast, the statistical analysis which will be used in this study will focus on the process of resignation in addition to the relationship between the prime minister and their individual ministers. The essence of this relationship is the leader's power of patronage and tribal cover. The prime minister is the executive arm of the leader's

power, and in turn they are selected to implement the leader's aims. Although their selection is also related to the leader's and prime minister's preferences, notably almost all of the individuals whom are selected for cabinet positions reflect the country's distribution of tribal power. However, the prime minister's influence is often limited: sometimes they are forced to adopt minister according to the leader's objective whilst at other times they are afforded more freedom to select ministers. Another important feature of Libyan politics is the frequency of infighting and ministerial transitions (Shalgm 2012). Some ministers even become prime minister and opt to continue with working with their former colleagues e.g. Dorda, Alzrog, Albgdadai. In addition, ministers may leave the cabinet for tribal reasons and return to office when the balance of tribal power shifts in their favors e.g. Matog who represented the WerfelaQabila

Tribal afflation:

Countries and regions with tribal cultures have unique rules. Tribal society depends on the Qabilas' coalitions, and individuals rely on tribal power to protect them from government authority. All members of the Qabila are obliged to abide by tribal customs and rules. The Qabila is the only authority understood by the individuals who belong to one, even if their rules and activities defy the central government. The strongest tribal coalitions are based on "blood", which unites Qabilas with a shared heritage. The strength of larger tribal coalitions can be understood according to the percentage of the population they include (Davis 1988).

Each Qabila has a "grandfather" figure which they pay homage to. This ancestor could have been a real person or the name of a tribal alliance. The land that a larger Qabila lives on is under the authority of the head Qabila (Khreisat 2005). The government cannot start any project on this land without the leading Qabila's approval. In Ibn Khaldun's introduction to tribalism he said "the goal of tribalism is to gain and maintain power". The leader looking to maintain his power in a tribal community needs to know how to utilise tribal culture to build loyal coalitions of powerful Qabilas. Powerful tribal coalitions can rival the government in authority, ensuring that the demands of that Qabila will be more readily

accommodated by central government (Ibn- Kaldun p125-126).

Tribal coalitions demand the loyalty and subordination of all individuals within them. Tribal alliances based on convenience and short-term interest are more likely to break down quickly than those with “blood” relations (Davis 1988). For instance, the coalition between Almgarha and Algaddfa (Qadhafi’s Qabila) broke as soon as it became clear the regime would collapse. On the other hand, the coalition between the Werfla and Algaddafa Qabilas remained strong during the regime’s collapse because of their “blood” based alliance.

An important example demonstrates that tribal affiliation sometimes played a bigger role than ability in ministerial reappointments under Qadhafi. In May 2011 on Libyan state television there was an important meeting between the leader and previous ministers from the eastern Qabilas. Qadhafi said *“I heard that you all organized a meeting under a name, the first Conference of Elders of the Eastern Region to show your support for the revolution. I can see all of the best represented of these Qabilas in front of me. Here I can see Althee from Ahwamd in the green mountains, who is better than him at representing the Qabilas in that area? Adulatee Alobid - who is better than him at representing the Albydat Qabilas? Mohamed Hejazi - who is better than him at representing Aldressa Qabilas? Ali Alshari - who is better than him at representing Alswar Qabilas?, Abdulrzaq Alsosa - who is better than him to represent the Albrasa Qabilas?”* (Colonel Qadhafi meeting with the ministers of the eastern region, 12-05-2011, on the official channel of the Libyan state) . The leader’s speech at this meeting understood at western countries as a sign of his solid tribal support in these areas, and also as a way of reappointing ministers.

Military background:

It is argued that certain military background may affect the cabinet formation. Some factors of the military background may be linked to a coup actions. Such of this military action (coups) diminish elites’ abilities to organize the overthrowing of the dictators. This will give the dictator leader the opportunities to consolidate his power by utilizing this military elite to occupied profiles in the cabinet. Miller (1970) argued that the probability of the military intervention will increase if this

institution feels a more threatened by the civilian rulers. For instance, in the first cabinet of 1969 is represented with 20 percent of ministers who have a military background and the first coup attempt was after of three months. This coup led by the defence minister Adam Hwaz and the interior minister MsaAlhasi. This made Qadhafi increase the military representation of the following cabinets to reach 57 percent and occupied the defence minister for the three following cabinets to consolidate his power in front of the civilian elites.

Age:

According to studies done in the UK it appears that a connection exists between the ministers' age and the risk of compulsory resignation, older ministers are less long-lasting than younger ones (Berlinski et al., 2007: 257–258). Though, there is a non-linear rapport when ministers are disapproved, the younger and older ministers are more expected to quit than those in between: it might be explained by the fact that, on one hand, the political career of the older reach an end, and on the other hand younger ministers could quit and come back on the political scene later. The category of age in between fights in order to stay in office

Previous experience:

Following research conducted in three European countries, the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany the results show that politically connected features appears to have more importance to ministerial survival, such as prior parliamentary involvement and substantial cabinet practice (Fischer and Kaiser 2011, p209; Bovens et al 2010, p 332). The ministers with more consistent experience tend to have more political credit and will be less expected to leave than new ministers, due to their understanding of the official processes and their eventual wider political influence.

Hypothesis:

The theory predicts that the tribal affiliation of ministers from certain regions was more important to Qadhafi than other personal characteristics. Ministers who belonged to powerful Qabilas were more likely to be reappointed more than others. For example, the WerflaQabila in the western region was represented by Mohamed

Aljadi in all cabinets until 1981, then by Lange, then by Matog from 1988 until the collapse of the regime. These ministers were reappointed repeatedly, regardless of whether better qualified individuals were available. Despite a lack of qualifications, Matog worked at 14 different posts thanks to his tribal power and consensus regarding of his name.

H1. The minister's tribal loyalty rather than minister's quality and experience critically shapes the number of the reappointing times and length of a ministerial tenure.

H2. Ministers from larger Qabilas have longer tenures.

Another way in which the leader rewarded experienced ministers for their service was by making them candidates for many different posts. The chance of the minister being reappointed to multiple different posts in succession typically reflected mutual loyalty. This can be tested by comparing the longevity of ministers who occupied multiple posts with those who occupied only one. Approximately one-third of the posts in the dataset were filled by ministers who achieved multiple appointments. For example, 144 ministers occupied 484 posts for the period of 42 years, while fewer than 20 of these 144 ministers served for more than 200 months.

H3. Ministers with more relevant experience have longer tenures.

H4. Ministers with longer tenures are more likely to survive in office than ministers with short tenures.

H5. Ministers who occupied multiple posts across cabinets should have longer duration of total service.

Data:

Turning to the empirical assessment of the theory in this research, I exams the factors that affect the number of times that each minister being reappointed for different posts. To analysis the prospects flowing from the theory, the personal records of each ministers were obtained and stated in a table in this research. The records of each minister contained the start and the end dates of service, the age, the type of position, the level of education, gender and the tribal affiliation. Table 1 provides the definitions of each of the variable used in the analysis and provides basic descriptive statistics for the whole sample. Due to privacy considerations, the IM data did not allow identifying ministers by

their tribal origination. An electronic version was created and sent to two Libyan Qabilas expertise in the Libyan foreign ministry and to the Libyan media sector in the Libyan embassy in London.

Excluded in the analysis are ministers that left the cabinet for involuntary reasons such as death, or forced leave because of involvement in coupe attempts (which were two ministers). Also excluded are ministers that served less than 30 days, because these were mainly temporary positions or symbolic appointment near the end of the prime minister spell (which were two cases). Over the period of this analysis there have been 29 cabinets with 484 observations of ministers in total.

Reappointing of the minister can be affected by the previous experience of the minister. Experience is a dummy variable which is coded as one if a minister joining more than one cabinet. A total of 141 ministers out of 484 ministers were junior ministers, 343 were experts with over than 70%. Almost of the 13 full cabinet ministers worked more one time in this position. Since ministers with more experience tend to be equipped with better domain Knowledge, its hypothesized that ministers with more relevant experience have longer tenures.

Military or civil educational background is a dummy variable that takes a value 1 if the minister is a member of the military institution or 0 if has a high educational level (bachelor's degree and above). There have been 38 ministers who have a military background. The military background variable shows the increase of the military representations in contrast of the civil educational level of the ministers. In the first four cabinets with a highest of 57%, then it decreased gradually to reach a zero percent in fourteen cabinets. The number started to increase again in the last three cabinets to achieve 0.08% in the last cabinet.

Female is a dummy variable that taken 1 if the minister is female. Females are Under-represented among Libyan ministers. Out of 141 joiner ministers only 3 have been females (0.02%). In particular, the number of female ministers remains steady, by representing an only one female in each of the seven cabinets that they worked under. In General, none of these women have been full cabinet ministers. Female ministers in Libya are appointed for symbolic representation and placed

in charge of relatively marginal positions such as Ministry of Social Affairs or Ministry of Culture and Mass Mobilization. For example, FoziaShalbi was the only women who served under five cabinets in different positions.

Age is measured as the age (M=42.3 years old in Libya) when ministers were appointed. The age variable shows an increase of the ministers selection since the first cabinet (M= 35.22) to the last one which reached (M=59.83). The increase of ministers age is expected to have a positive association with ministerial duration since they have more extensive networks, have more expertise in managing the cabinet, and maintain good relationships with other colleagues and leader's office in the Libyan context.

The dataset also contains records on the tribal coalition in each cabinet. Coalition size and tribal representation are two important variables that leader's use to maintain their power for a long period. Both variables are expected to effect the ministerial duration. The size of the tribal coalition is represented by the number of the actual portfolios in each cabinet. A dummy variable that take a value 1 if all three provinces are represented in the cabinet. The variable is divided to east, west and south Qabilas accordingly. The first minister is appointed the same value as his tribal regions. Being a first minister and the quota of each provinces has a special meaning because the leader is well-motivated and energized to fulfil his agenda after staying one more year after the anniversary day. On one hand, under political spoils manner, the portfolio is considered as private goods that a leader offers to his winning coalition. The first wave of ministers is those who represent the most loyal provinces to the leader and not necessarily the best-qualified. Therefore, there is a high possibility that first ministers will serve a longer period in their positions due to their high level of loyalty to the leader. On the other hand, the leader is eager to choose a team of best talents and those whom have a high level of loyalty tribal background to ensure the high level of responsibility to their own cabinet and leader's. In this regard, data in table 2 will represent information of the variations on the leader's coalitions and how it affects the ministerial duration.

An important variable, called the tribal affiliation is created because of the large numbers of Qabilas located in three specific areas in Libya. The unique geographical nature and the expansion of desert areas, which reaches more than 90 % of distance in Libya, forced the Libyan Qabilas to live in three specific areas. During the era of monarchical rule, Libya was divided into three administrative areas. This increased the distinct social relations between the Qabilas in each area separately. There have been few Qabilas who have achieved representation in the Libyan Parliament and governments because of the number of members in these three areas. Consequently, it remains necessary to refer to the distribution of the executive members in Libya, according to tribal background, which is one of the most important factors influencing the social and political life in Libya. The main Libyan Qabilas are as follows:

1. Western Region Qabilas (Tripoli) is coded as 1, and the main Qabilas in this area are: AwladBoucif, werfla, Al Mahameed, Alfwater, Awlad al Sheikh, the QabilasAlkragh and Misurata, Altoaguirr, weshfna, Alnwail and Zinta.
2. Eastern regional Qabilas (Cyrenaica) are coded as 2. This includes two groups of Qabilas. The principal destinations are Saady and Almrabteen. Saada is divided into two main branches: first, Aharabi, which include Qabilas of Albydat, Albrasa and Aldrsa, Alhasa and fayd family. Secondly, Aljabbarnh, which include Qabilas of Al wager, Almgarba, Majabrh, Algwazi, Albeed ,Alorfa and Alerbat and the permissible and slaves and Arafa and Aeribat. The most important QabilasAlmorabteen are Almnfh, Algetan, Alfoakhar,Alshawaar, AlzwaiaAlmsmer and Alhbon.
3. Southern regional Qabilas (Fezzan) are coded as 3, which includes the Qabilas of wladslleman, Alhassaonh and Almgarhh.

To extend the effectiveness of this data, I have also included an important variable on the dataset showing the most important portfolios and which areas are more allocated with specific portfolios during the study period. To decide the most important portfolios in Libya, three experts have been asked to rank the four most important portfolios in Libya. Which were ranked as follows: ministry of defence,

ministry of interior, foreign ministry and ministry of finance. It is assumed that the most important portfolios will tend to be the most consistently occupied ones from the powerful Qabilas. Important portfolio is a dummy variable, equal to 1, if the minister from a certain province occupies one of the most important portfolios and zero if otherwise.

Results:

Through the previous literature, I have observed that there is some interest in the differences in the survival probabilities of ministers in their cabinets, especially with regard the personal, political and institutional factors that could impact their survive in the office. In order to analyse the contribution of each of these factors on a minister's probability of being reappointed in the Libyan case, the logit analysis will be used to estimate the impact.

In sum, this analysis will examine factors related to ministerial tenure. Although there are various factors to take account of, I mainly focus on three, namely military background, experience and tribal background, which are proposed to have more effect more than the others. At the same time, the results will show briefly the impact of the other variables.

As can be seen from table 2, age was one of the important characteristics with a small significance in terms of reappointing ministers in Libya. It has a positive effect on the probability of older ministers to be reappointed more than younger ones as lifetime of the regime increased. At the time of the revolution, the average age of ministers was 30 years old. By the end of 1980s and 1990s, the average age became 40s and 50s respectively. The explanation would seem to be that an older minister, when facing a problem of reshuffling, are more likely to join a new cabinet because they are close in age with the country's leader. For example, Qadhafi was a prime minister of first five cabinets with average age in the 30s. When he resigned in the last cabinet, many of his colleagues in the revolutionary council and some of his close friends remained in the following cabinet. And, of course, Qadhafi may feel comfortable in dealing with these ministers. This could be confirmed by the last cabinet which had an average age of 59 years


with no minister under of age 55 years.

One interesting fact from table 2, in chapter 2, needs to be discussed. Representations of female ministers that clashed with the leader's ideology in official speeches, which encourages women to occupy political positions and to be treated equally as men. Women represent 1.4 percent of the 29 cabinets during the 42 years of Qadhafi's rule. Among the 484 ministers, only 7 women held office and none of them held an important portfolio. The portfolios that they held are the Ministry of Media and Mass Mobilization, the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Education. Fawzeya Shlabi was the only minister who was reappointed five times in different positions. The other two, Baketa Al-shelye and Fatima Al-abar, were appointed for one terms. It is also found that gender has no significant effect on the probability of being reappointed as minister.

The level of education of the cabinet during the 1969- 2011 period illustrates that most of the ministers have received at least a university education with almost 89 per cent, and 11 percent who had a military degree. In general, almost all of the ministers got their degrees from both (Garyons and Alfath University) and approximately 20 per cent of ministers got their higher education in Europe, United States and some neighboring countries. Although education was an important factor in deciding the hazard rate of the ministers in many countries, in the Libyan case it is well-founded that education has no significant influence in deciding the probability of ministers being reappointed for the new cabinet.

In the following I present the most important variables that are believed to give high priority for reappointing ministers for new cabinets. First, Table 3 shows also the variation of the military background as a factor that could increase the probability of a minister being reappointed. In table (3) the result is divided into two periods (before and after 1977) regarding a democratization change. In the first cabinet which was headed by the civilian prime minister, Mohamed Al-mogrbe, the cabinet remained for four months. The military representation started with 22 per cent in two important portfolios, the Interior Ministry (Col. Mosa Ahmed) and Defence Ministry (Col. Adam

Hwaz). After the first coup in the beginning of January 1970, which was commanded by the previous defense and interior ministers, the military institution increased its representation in the following cabinet with 57 per cent and occupied the most important portfolios. Qadhafi remained as a prime minister and minister of Defense for the following four cabinets and the most important portfolios was occupied by ministers who have the military background. Qadhafi's Assistant AddulsamJalod remained in three cabinets as a prime minister until 1977. In the beginning of 1977, the military representation decreased to 11 per cent when Qadhafisteped down from power and announced the beginning of masses era, which directly ruled the country through People's Congresses and People's Committees. The applying of logit method shows that military background had significant influence in the pre-1977 period; indicating more than 70 percent probability of reappointing a minister, while there was no impact on the post 1977 period.



Figures 1 and 2 Shows the Frequency of the Minsters and Impact of the Experience on Likelihood of Ministers Reappointing

Technical and professional expertise are attributes needed for any minister to be in cabinet. This experience was needed in terms of the implementation of policies and guaranteed their ideological loyalty to the regime in Libya. Much of the literature emphasised experience as an important factor of ministerial survival. Table (1) and figures (1) and (2) shows how many ministers stayed longer in different cabinets than others because of their solid experience. It has long been noted in figure (2) that ministers with previous cabinet experience tend to be reappointed slightly more than the junior ministers, but this difference is not statistically significant. Although the importance of this variable is

not significant, reasons given usually point to experienced ministers being more capable in implementing policies with high performance and greater knowledge of the bureaucracy than junior ministers. The Libyan leader is more likely to retain the powerful ministers who have extensive experience and demonstrate obedience in the implementation of his policies. The small number of the ministers, specifically 144 during the 42 years of Qadhafi's regime, shows the high leader's resistance to choosing junior ministers for the new cabinets. Approximately, 383 positions were occupied from those 144 ministers by reshuffling around positions. For example, more than 35 ministers were reappointed more than five times; some famous ministers like Althee and Dordawere reappointed 15 times among 29 cabinets during the 42 years.

Table 1: The Ministers Distribution in Libya Regarding Months of Service

Months of Service	Frequency	Months of Service	Frequency	Months of Service	Frequency
1-9	36	70-78	19	151-159	8
10-16	70	80-89	22	160-167	8
22-28	57	90-99	31	170-177	5
30-39	53	112-119	12	182- 187	4
40-49	24	121-128	14	192-198	4
50-59	37	130-136	9	200- over	20
61-69	33	140-148	6	Total	484

Tribal influence in the political process in Libya continued under Qadhafi. In the era of Qadhafi, the absence of a constitution and the rule of law and the lack of ability to form political parties and trade unions, made the Qabila the main national umbrella, and sometimes only. Popular social leaders were mainly working to provide protection, and the collection of rights, access to jobs in state agencies, all depended on the strength of his Qabila or the degree of closeness of his loyalty to the regime.

In the absence of law, the tribal composition of social norms for the conduct of all aspects of life in what is known as the "the law of the desert". This custom, which became a penal code, defines patterns of

relationships between members of the Qabilas. It also oversees relationships between Qabilas, the tribal system, coalitions succeeded during Qadhafi's rule through his system of People's Congresses and People's Committees idea, and through escalation and popular choice of the leaders. It spread in Libya during the Qadhafi era. It has resulted in coordination, consultation and agreement between the Qabilas for naming Secretary of the Conference, or popular (prefecture) in the rough. It means that the winner of the job will not be outside the Qabila in most cases.

Qadhafi used massive oil revenues, which accounted for most of the aspects of the income of the Libyan state since end of the fifties, to buy the loyalty of the Qabilas by distributing some of the proceeds of oil directly to them and to the members of their Qabila, and also through the provision of financial support system. On this basis, he was able to employ large and small Qabilas in the east, west and south. They pledged to defend him to the last moment of his rule. Qadhafi realized the importance and seriousness of the tribal partisanship issue; he sought to enable the people of his Qabila "Gadhadhfa" to make it at the top of senior government positions in the administrative organ or the military, along with intermarriage and lineage relationships that linked him with other tribal leaders.

Qadhafi remained for 42 years in office, during which he conducted what is called "the game of balance between the Qabilas". It is estimated that Libya has about 140 Qabilas and clans, some of which extend from Egypt to Tunisia. It is estimated that there are about 20 to 30 of these Qabilas which have real clout. After taking power, Qadhafi sought to undermine the tribal system. He considered it backward and linked to property reactionary practices. The tribal system is not in line with the national vision of progress, nor with the fact that he himself was descended from a small and relatively important Qabila. As a result, after a short period of time, he took a series of steps to modify the administrative boundaries that were based on the interval between tribal lines and isolate all the officials who were appointed by the king on a tribal basis.

With the efforts of modernization and economic development in the

seventies and the resulting immigration on a wide range of urban areas, Qadhafi decided that he cannot work without the tribal system. Even in the early years of his rule, he used to visit the main tribal leaders in an attempt to persuade them to join his side. Clan loyalties also seeped into the political process through a filtration system; he would promote those whose work on behalf of people who belong to Qabilas allied with his regime. There was a similar practice occurring in the trade unions and student unions controlled by the state. Also, there were positions distributed to members who belong to certain dominant Qabilas. These Qabilas reached an informal agreement regarding the distribution of positions. The Minister of the oil sector explained in 2010 that he did not have the choice to appoint people in important positions unless they belonged to certain Qabilas. Qadhafi also sought to play on the dissimilarities between the Qabilas in order to purchase tribal loyalty. His Qabila is Gadhadhfa. It is relatively small by Libyan standards. The number of members is about 100 thousand. The main center of the Qabila is in Sirte, but it has members in Sabha and Tripoli. Regarding the weakness of his Qabila, Qadhafi held some strong coalitions in the three regions of Libya and he tried to find blood bonds in this coalition to make it strong.

At the same time, it experienced problems with regard to the loyalty of this large tribal system. In 1993, he tried to get a group of army officers from the Warfalla Qabila to stage a coup. Qadhafi's response was to sentence to death the officers who participated in the coup. Since that time, the Warfalla Qabila appears cautious. During the nineties, and with the system struggle against the challenges posed by the imposition of international sanctions, the reliance on tribal structures has risen. In March 1997, for example, the collective punishment of the law, "charter of honour", deprived the family or Qabila of civil rights and social services if its members were accused of any action against the regime. These sanctions could include water and electricity suspension, in addition to depriving families or Qabilas of food, petroleum derivatives and public services and the transfer of government-backed development projects into their region.

In the same year, Qadhafi also founded the "Social People's

Leadership", an organization of tribal leaders gathered in one organization under the regime's control. This organization was used to ensure the control of tribal leaders of their Qabilas, through the pressure of the repudiation of rebel elements for example. In the end, this body was designed to integrate the Qabilas more directly into the centre of the political stage. Obeidi, the Libyan academic, noted that the Social People's Leadership Qabila transformed from unofficial institution to an official partner in the political process. For example, it played a role in the choice of people who should be appointed within the Department, which exposes them to the risk of corruption. Social People's Leadership, in particular, are increasingly to the forefront in this system. It has been called on to resolve sensitive issues, such as working as mediators in conflicts between the security agencies and the families of victims of the Abu Salim prison massacre in 1996. The role of the Qabilas increased more in the beginning of 2000 when the regime solved almost of the external crisis with the West and tried to increase opportunities for development. Qadhafi' gave his son Sif Al islam more power to contact the Qabilas and to select the youth leaders for this new stage of development. The big Qabilas played the same helpful role of electing their representative to be future ministers or leaders.

Due to both the literature above and statistical studies of Libya (Obeidi and Almogrbe), there has been significant support for the idea that Qabilas have a huge influence on the reappointment of ministers. The results of this study I have conducted are shown on table (3), highlighting the difference between the eras before and after 1977; namely, that the tribal factor had no influence before 1977 regarding the probability of ministers being reappointed to new cabinets. In contrast, during the post 1977 period, the tribal factor is significant to a small extent.




Figure 1. Shows the Provincial Background of the Libyan Ministers from (1969 to 2011).

Table 2. The Overrepresentation of the Qabilas Reappointed * Overrepresented (yes or no) Cross tabulation

			Overrepresented yes or no		Total
			0	1	
Reappointed	No	Count	80	112	192
		Expected Count	82.5	109.5	192.0
		Residual	-2.5	2.5	
	Yes	Count	128	164	292
		Expected Count	125.5	166.5	292.0
		Residual	2.5	-2.5	
Total	Count	208	276	484	
	Expected Count	208.0	276.0	484.0	

Table 3: The Military Background impact on the Likelihood of Ministerial Reappoint

Reappointed * Military experience yes or no * Pre 1977 versus post 1977.

Pre 1977 versus post 1977				Military experience yes or no		Total
				no	yes	
1977 post	Reappointed	No	Count	157	7	164
			Expected Count	159.9	4.1	164.0
			Residual	-2.9	2.9	
	Yes	Count	236	3	239	
		Expected Count	233.1	5.9	239.0	
		Residual	2.9	-2.9		
	Total	Count	393	10	403	
		Expected Count	393.0	10.0	403.0	
	pre 1977	Reappointed	No	Count	18	10
Expected Count				18.3	9.7	28.0
Residual				-.3	.3	
Yes		Count	35	18	53	
		Expected Count	34.7	18.3	53.0	
		Residual	.3	-.3		
Total		Count	53	28	81	
		Expected Count	53.0	28.0	81.0	
Total		Reappointed	No	Count	175	17
	Expected Count			176.9	15.1	192.0
	Residual			-1.9	1.9	
	Yes	Count	271	21	292	
		Expected Count	269.1	22.9	292.0	
		Residual	1.9	-1.9		
	Total	Count	446	38	484	
		Expected Count	446.0	38.0	484.0	

Qadhafi was keen to select his ministers from the Qabilas who have a high impact on Libyan society; in particular, the Almgarhh, originally from mid-western Libya, and the Warfalla, a Qabila with a population of one million people spread throughout the country, as well as the Qabilas in the eastern region. The longevity of each minister's cabinet post shows that less than twenty-five ministers were able to retain their positions in different cabinets. This confirmed the fact that Qadhafi

depended on a certain Qabila in order to maintain power. In the following discussion, I select six ministers who stayed in different cabinets due to primarily their Qabila's power, in addition to other characteristics.

Selected Ministers:

According to the interview meeting with the previous Foreign Minister AbdulrhmanShalgam and who worked the General People's Congress for a long time: the final ministerial selection will always start in the night before the meeting of the General People's Congress on first of March. The meeting will be held until the morning with the many names who represent the different Qabilas - it could happen that one Qabila will be represented by many candidates. The final meeting will be held with Ahmed Ibrahim, the Secretary of Congress Affairs, Secretary of the People's Committee and Qadhafi to review all the suggested names.

Shalgam was appointed by Qadhafi himself after the fights between two Qabilas for this position. For example, southern Qabilas candidate was Mohammed Zwai and Mustafa Azaide was a representative for the eastern region, but Qadhafi asked that another candidate be proposed, which was Shalgam. The funny thing was that Shalgam was given a quick English test when Qadhafi ordered him to translate a letter from the Cypriot President the night before the government announcement. This was further proof that Qadhafi was attempting to foster different coalitions amongst all the Qabilas.

The ruling of the individual often creates a circle surrounding him accurately, but it is clear that this circle has a significant influence on creating this ruler and his decisions. Those people in the circle probably will utilise him as he benefits from them being around him and applying his agendas. The Libyan case is not exceptional from this vision, but it has its own unique features. Qadhafi played a central role of being Universal Father for those who surrounded him in all the political and economic levels and even social levels such as the tribal factors. Qadhafi was very proficient in the use of intimidation and offering goods, he also possessed the ability to identify the natures of people and measure their abilities and thus puts them in the right place and draws how they

will deal with him and what is required from them. The questions that people have repeated, how Qadhafi managed to rule Libya for 42 years and who are these people who helped him to implement his agendas and how they accepted to stay around him all of this time.

1-Miftah Mohammed Kayba:

He was born in Musrata, and is the same age of Colonel Qadhafi. He was a close friend of Qadhafi and was one of the first to be informed of his intention to carry out a revolution.

He helped organise civil groups to support the revolution. He accompanied Qadhafi to Benghazi finishing high school and joined the faculty of literature. There he succeeded in attracting MusrataQabila members to join the revolution.

When the revolution succeeded, Qadhafi chose Kayba to lead the popular movement, which mobilized citizens to stand with the revolution. Kayaba was a well-networked individual at the time, within his own Qabila and many others. Though a close friend of with Qadhafi, he feared the Colonel so much that he was known to physically shake in his presence. Given the large network of connections in his Qabila and his good-humoured nature, Qadhafi chose him to accept a variety of positions, including Secretary of General People's Congress. He joined the cabinet in 1976 as Minister of Youth and Sports and remained in this position for five successive cabinets. In 1985 he was appointed Justice Minister with the Alzroq Government. He later moved to the Ministry of Marine Resources and eventually left the cabinet in 2000. Kayba was one of the regime's most prominent ministers, occupying the most ministerial posts (15) and completing 263 months of service. Kayba utilised his tribal network and close relationship with Qadhafi to remain in office for so long (Shalgham2012).

2. AbdesalamJalood:

Jalood belonged to the AlmgarhaQabila and he was an important member of the revolutionary council. He is generally considered the second powerful regime official after Qadhafi. He was nominated to be in the first cabinet formed by Qadhafi as an interior minister at the age of 26. He was later selected to be a leader of the war with Chad. Jalood was in competition with other members of the revolutionary council,

which led him to encourage large numbers of his Qabilasmen to join the intelligence services and armed forces. His Qabila became the third best represented in the army after the Algdadfa and Werfla. He cultivated special relationships with a large number of technocrats in various ministries and other Libyan Institutions (Shalgham2012).

Jalood was known as a “Stalinist” because of his passion for building factories and implementing five-year plans of development. He was opposed to some of Qadhafi’s decisions. For example, he disagreed about the Great Man-Made River Project and raised his voice in front of people’s congresses and members by saying “it is a waste of the Libyan people’s money, we should think of something alternative”. After this incident Qadhafi put him under of a house arrest until 2011. (Jalood 2014: interview)

Jalood was chosen for six portfolios and completed 93 months of service. He led the interior ministry twice, and was later put in charge of the Finance ministry and the Industry ministry. He served as Prime Minister twice and was the last prime minister to hold a military background before the democracy transfer in 1977. Despitethe powerful military and tribal background Jalood had, he was ejected from the government after holding six portfolios. This is because of his tendency to compete with other ministers and members of the revolutionary council and to gain more power. He was one of Qadhafi’s strongest rivals.

3.Jadallah AzzouzTalhee:

He was born in eastern part of Libya and belongs to a powerful and important Qabilacalled Awlad-hamd from the Albyda region. He graduated from Belgium in the field of geology and was appointed Minister of Industry at the age of 33 in Jalood’s cabinet. He had a unique relationship with Jalood, who was interested in industrialisation and had found in Jadallah someone who could implement his goals.

Talhee had a strong personality and gained the respect of technocrats. He served as Prime Minister three times. He was routinely attacked in the media and newspapers because he did not appoint their favoured candidates to lead important projects. As a result, he was called a “corruption fighter” because of his willingness to stand up to corrupt

members of the QadhafiQabila (Shalgham2012).

His ability, efficient administrative skills and tribal power enabled him to successfully manage all of the positions he took on. He is the third longest serving member of Qadhafi's cabinets, occupying 14 ministerial posts over 266 months of service. He was reappointed among many ministries such as the Ministry of Industry for six times, was prime minister three times, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and lastly the Minister of Development and Planning.

4. AbozydDorda:

He belonged to the AlmgarhaQabila and came from the city of Rahibat in western Libya. Dorda was influenced by his father, who worked in intelligence and was a prominent leader of tribal reconciliation in his area. Dorda worked as a history teacher and joined his first cabinet in 1972 at the age of 28. He was called a man of difficult missions, and was tasked with winning the support of Arab newspapers to adopt and promote the ideas of Qadhafi. Dorda wrote articles praising Qadhafi and was primarily responsible for printing the Green Book in several languages. (Shalgham2012).

Colonel Qadhafi trusted Dorda to the extent that he sent him to several conferences of Arab and African countries as a surrogate. The most notable of these occasions was when Dorda was sent to the Summit of the Organization of African Unity in Addis Ababa and delivered a speech to Emperor Haile Selassie, describing him as a "traitor and a reactionary and supporter for colonists". After this event he became one of Qadhafi's closest confidants and went on to occupy numerous cabinet posts. He was Qadhafi's second longest serving minister, occupying 15 different portfolios over 221 months of service.

Dorda occupied several ministerial positions which did not reflect his specialty. He began at the Ministry of Culture, then served as Minister of Municipalities for 4 consecutive terms. When he was excluded from the cabinet for a short time he received positions of similar stature to his ministerial posts. For example, he worked as a Vice Foreign Minister under Alhoni who complained to Qadhafi's about Dorda actions and decisions. Dorda took over Alhoni's position after accusing him of planning to assassinate Qadhafi. Dorda took another higher position

when he was selected as a representative of Libya to the United Nations and later lead the Department for External Security. He was also appointed as economy minister twice, Ministry of Agriculture for three times and was successful in both posts.

Dorda was appointed Prime Minister in 1991, for two main reasons. Firstly, Qadhafi felt the administrative sector needed a refresh because of increased corruption and the weakness of the state in controlling the government's institutions. Dorda had a reputation as a strong leader who could deal with this challenge, in addition to his powerful influence in the southern and western regions of the country. The exceptional circumstances following the relaxation of international sanctions and the collapse of the Soviet Union were the second reason for his appointment. During Dorda's tenure (1990-1994), Qadhafi sought to maintain internal stability by giving the southern Qabilas a leadership role after their members had long been excluded from ministerial posts (Quannes 2012), and to ensure their full support given their representation in the armed forces (members of southern Qabilas made up a third of the total personnel).

5. Matog Mohamed Matog:

Matog belonged to the Werfla Qabila and was a prominent figure following his contribution to the suppression of the 1976 student uprising. He also contributed to the expulsion of Qadhafi's opposition, which included assassinations outside the country. In 1992 he combined five ministries into one (Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports, Training and Scientific Research), which was called the Ministry of the Five-Star.

Although Matog was reappointed in 12 different posts, and in total length of time in cabinet he is the longest serving of Qadhafi's ministers at 293 months. Matog received his first ministerial post (Ministry of Development and Training) aged 34 and remained there for three cabinets. Then he was reappointed for the Ministry of Education and again served three consecutive terms. He moved between several positions including Minister of Production and Services, Minister of Manpower and finally as Minister of Public Utility (Shalgham 2012).

He was famously accused of corruption during a public hearing of the

General People's Congress during his time as Minister for Education between 1994 and 1997. This event was shown on Libyan state television. Members of parliament attempted to indict him and remove him from the cabinet. Qadhafi attended this hearing, at which a member of parliament stated, "according to papers in front of us which show that almost all scholarships for study abroad were allocated to your Qabila's members, what is your justification for this act?". The minister answered Qadhafi directly, ignoring all other officials present, stating, "My leader I admitted all of what they said regarding this action but I want to clarify one thing: that all of whom I sent are people who believe in your theory, the principle of Alfath revolution, and that they are loyal to you. These students, I guarantee that they are coming back to serve the country. My leader, ask them about the students that previous governments sent and how many of them returned when they finished their studies ". Qadhafi was satisfied with this answer, and reappointed Matog Minister of Production and Services rather than removing him from cabinet (or worse). (Libyan official channel 1996)

5.Fawzeya Shalabi:

After graduating from the College of Education and literature, Shalabi worked as a journalist at the AlfjrAljded newspaper. She had many bold ideas which attracted Qadhafi's attention, and he appointed her chairman of the Libyan newspaper. She later moved to London to work in the cultural center at the Embassy (Shalgham2012).

Shalabi was the second woman appointed minister by Qadhafi after Fatima Abdul-hafeez, but and served as Minister for Media and Culture five consecutive times (Obeidi 2008). She was the only woman to last more than one cabinet. She was appointed at age 39 and remained in office for 127 months.

Qadhafi used her to reflect the idea of the new revolutionary woman who believed in freedom and equality in Libyan society. She was a high performing individual and encouraged women to participate in political life.

6. ShokriGhanm:

Ghanm acquired a PhD in economics from the Fletcher School in

Washington. He worked in several management positions within and outside Libya. He once served as research director and secretary general of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Ghanm took office as Minister of Economy, then in 2003 was appointed as Prime Minister. Ghanm did not have any tribal support because he was born outside Libya and raised in Tripoli where the social network is very weak in comparison to tribal village life.

Ghanm had a different kind of social network, and academic one, through which he met the leader's son Saif al-Islam Qadhafi while studying in Vienna. Ghanm was recommended by Saif al-Islam to his father as a strategic expert who could change the Libyan economy. After Ghanm's appointment, he faced criticism from senior ministers who were unsatisfied because of the new economic strategies he employed. Qadhafi supported Ghanm in an attempt to demonstrate to the world that Libya was on a path to peaceful economic development. After Qadhafi gave up his weapons of mass destruction in 2003, he used the slogan of "reform and change" to indicate the transformation of the economy from a socialist one into a capitalistic one in an attempt to receive more investment from western countries. All of these circumstances made Ghanm an ideal candidate for the position at this time (Pargeter 2006).

Ghanm, who worked for 45 months in two ministerial posts, declared explicitly that he faced many problems. This included the General People's Congress, which hampered the adoption of several laws made by the government. Ghanm received criticism from the Libyan people because of his cancellation of government subsidies on some essential goods. In a television interview for Qadhafi regarding increased opposition toward Ghanm, Qadhafi said "You do not know the real value of man; we can utilize his qualifications in another field".

Ghanm was appointed Oil and Industry Minister in the next cabinet and remained in this position until the collapse of the regime. After 2007 the Oil and Industry Ministry became an independent institution, still headed by Ghanm.

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