Abstract
Dubai’s economic fortunes have recently experienced a rollercoaster ride of rapid growth, bust, and slow uncertain recovery. The same events affected other cities in the Gulf region, though none as dramatically as Dubai, where work stopped on the ambitious Burj Dubai project (tallest building in the world), until it was saved by the emirate of Abu Dhabi and duly renamed Burj Khalifa (after Sheikh Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the ruler of Abu Dhabi and president of UAE). This paper deals with the challenges to urban planning and policy caused by the ongoing global economic slowdown that has left no economy untouched. The interconnectedness of currencies and investments has meant that as capital has fled markets, it has often left behind half-finished projects and debt-ridden private- and public-sector entities. This has created a downward pressure on property values, rents, employment and wages, and tax revenues, threatening the financial standing of already embattled planning agencies. In such situations planners are faced with the difficult task of trying to control the damage and jumpstarting local economic development, with a restricted budget and against market trends. Dubai is facing a similar situation since its real estate crash, which started in 2008, with prices falling steadily until 2011. A large number of buildings in Dubai’s glittering skyline are now vacant. Many ongoing construction projects have been stalled. And despite the oil wealth, budgets are being tightened, and public spending is being looked at more closely (Jones Lang LaSalle, 2011). Dubai, which holds only 10 percent of the country’s oil reserves, realized early on, that to “catch up” with the rest of the world it had to break away from the traditional master planning with its predictive capacity and demand-side orientation. It chose instead to capitalize on its trade and mercantile heritage. Dubai devised a supply-side strategy by creating clusters of free-trade zones and artificial islands that, with marketing and infrastructure, attract cutting-edge companies, provide impetus for growth, and ultimately influencing the city’s morphology. What can Dubai learn in terms of the planning process and urban management from the experience of being distressed and attempting to recover from it? We argue that Dubai’s model so far has been set up for periodic crashes. If it is to remain competitive, and become resilient (Hordijk and Baud, 2011) and “resourceful” (MacKinnon and Derickson, 2012), Dubai must look for a model focusing on creating real value, and building strong communities.