Abstract
It is a long and winding road towards peace and stability in Libya. Despite some relative positive developments following the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), a durable peace still eludes the Libyan people and the international community. Today, Libya is faced with an uncertain future: a political morass; severe economic hardship; risks of renewed military escalation due to the political deadlock following the expiration of the LPDF roadmap; and a failed electoral process. Enduring violence in Libya, though at a low intensity, as demonstrated by regular militia skirmishes, coupled with the continued presence of foreign fighters and mercenaries, makes peace fragile and vulnerable to further upheavals. Substantial work on the political, economic, and military tracks remains pending, including the resolution of complex issues such as the future of militias, security, and the thorny issues of the electoral process and a permanent constitution. Despite the efforts exerted by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to move the constitutional process forward during the latest high-level meeting on Libya’s constitutional track in Geneva on June 28-29, 2022, major disagreements persist on a number of issues, mainly on the eligibility requirements for the candidates in the first presidential elections post-2011. While the several rounds of consultations in Cairo and Geneva yielded significant progress, they have fallen short in meeting requirements to hold comprehensive and inclusive national elections in Libya. The fact is that since the fall of the Gaddafi regime, Libya has failed to transition to stability and democracy, as both the uprising and the ensuing conflict divided Libyans into essential categories of ‘winners’ and ‘losers.’ The UN and a number of international actors have attempted to bring resolution to the crisis through various mediation efforts but the role of foreign powers, including some of the permanent member states of the UN Security Council (UNSC), has not always been constructive. Disagreement and competing interests between these UNSC member states have negatively impacted the trajectory of the conflict, impeding the efforts of the UN to find a durable settlement to the conflict. Competing foreign interests have often prevented consensus both at national and international levels. Despite some positive results in the political process, the crisis continues unabated. However, no final, inclusive, and lasting settlement looms on the horizon, in part because little serious attention has been paid to keys issues such as national dialogue, transitional justice, security sector reform, and reconciliation. The UN has been involved in mediation in the Libyan conflict through its special mission in Libya, UNSMIL. However, each head of the mission – Special Representatives of the Secretary General (SRSGs) – Ian Martin, Tarek Mitri.Bernardino León, Martin Kobler, Ghassan Salamé, Acting SRSG Stephanie Williams, and Ján Kubiš – opted for different approaches. A comparison of these efforts suggests that there have been inherent flaws in the design of the process and inconsistencies of strategy and approach. In addition to the lack of a unified strategy in the UN-led political process, there have also been concerns within large segments of Libyan society that the impartiality and neutrality of the UN has been compromised at times, and the political process has lacked transparency, according to our interviewees. Participants were kept in the dark ahead of the political dialogue and had no access to the dialogue agenda, its minutes, or the results. Coupled with the negative influence of contending regional and international actors, the UN process was destined to fail in many respects. This report demonstrates that in the eyes of the majority of Libyans the work of UNSMIL suffered many weaknesses and scored quite low on most criteria considered necessary for success. As there was no clear transparent criteria for selecting the participants in the national dialogue processes, the consequent deficiencies of inclusion and ownership reduced accountability and allowed participants to politicize the process. Moreover, there were few voices representing civil society and their limited participation was seen more as a token attempt at inclusivity. Women’s participation did not constitute any meaningful representation. Thus, the process failed to address the issues related to women and civil society further reduced inclusivity, undermined public ownership, and ignored the conditions that continue to generate conflict and violence. Lack of inclusivity and ownership also meant that implementation became essentially haphazard and circumstantial. The Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), being the major achievement of UNSMIL and the framework that defines its work and determines current Libyan state institutions, has, despite all the support it had from UNSMIL and the international community, failed to achieve its objectives. In fact, the LPA created a context in which Libyans became even more divided than before and created new issues of contestation. The process failed to become a transformative national dialogue inducing changes in public attitudes that would pave the way for desired and sustainable change, and thus the conflict has become more entrenched. This report shows that for any dialogue to achieve a sustainable resolution to the Libyan crisis, it must be transformative and adaptive. This goal may be achieved with clearer and more solid commitments to ending foreign interference, and the designing of a broader, more inclusive national dialogue that puts reconciliation at the very forefront. Any attempt to resolve the Libyan conflict must be based on an appropriate understanding of the socio-economic, and historical contexts, that will help parties genuinely commit to implementation of agreements. Any effort that ignores this requirement will result in a superficial agreement that could backfire. There is a need to widen participation, uphold Libyan ownership, and limit foreign interference. Instead of continuing to rely on foreign actors, peace in Libya will require Libyan stakeholders joining together to develop a peace and reconciliation agreement through a Libyan-led process, in which they themselves frame the contested issues as shared problems. This would pave the way for the implementation of commitments and guarantees based on mutual, not exclusive, benefits. Such an agreement would then no longer be a mere tool for power-sharing that privileges some factions. Instead of continuing to rely on foreign actors, peace in Libya will require Libyan stakeholders joining together to develop a peace and reconciliation agreement through a Libyan-led process, in which they themselves frame the contested issues as shared problems.